Localism in Joseph Chamberlain\u27s Social Politics, 1869-1895. by Hall, Everett Parker
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1977
Localism in Joseph Chamberlain's Social Politics,
1869-1895.
Everett Parker Hall
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation








EVERETT PARKER PIALL, JR.
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment




(c) EVERETT PARKER HALL, JR. 1977
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED




EVERETT PARKER HALL, JR.
Approved as to style and content by
Marvin Swai^tz, Cha3.rperson of Committee
n
C 1-!/ /
/// /,^ /it ^




ABSTRACT OF TIIE DISSERTATION
Localism in Joseph Chamberlain's Social Politics, 1869-1895
Everett Parker Hall, Jr.
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, 1977
Directed by: Marvin Swartz
This dissertation analyzes the Radical career of Joseph
Chamberlain in terras of the social and political context
in which he operated. It examines his relationship to a
single social-political force, localism, in order to show
the ways in which Chamberlain was a representative figure
in English social politics of the late nineteenth century.
Through this analysis, the dissertation illuminates the
wider social process in which Chamberlain was involved: the
incorporation of Nonconformists, industrialists and provin-
cial political elites into the British national elite, and
their growing defensive posture in the face of the rise of
Labour. Methodologically, the dissertation tries to explain
the struggle for power in terms of changes in the sources
of power.
Localism was a force in late nineteenth century British
politics which reinforced political organization based on
community structure, and retarded the development of poli-
tical organization based on class structure. It presupposed
that the basic unit of national politics would be the local
iv
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community rather than some portion of it. State expansion,
when necessary, was to take place through local sovernraent
rather than through a central bureaucracy. On the local
level, localism encompassed local government, politics,
economic relations, and social structure.
Joseph Chamberlain was a vigorous proponent of local-
ism. His approach to local government and politics was
consolidated when he was Mayor of Birmingham from 1873 to
1876. He united the reform party in the Town Council with
the electoral power of the Birmingham Liberal Association,
producing a sustained reform effort, and assuring the su-
premacy of his own social group in the town's politics.
His later social prescriptions all bore a family resemblance
to his greatest successes as Mayor: the municipalization of
the tovm's gas and water companies, and the Birmingham
Improvement Scheme. Within a narrowly defined sphere of
operation. Chamberlain saw local government as more efficient
than national government or private enterprise. This was
its charter to act, but only businessman dominance of local
government could assure that efficiency.
In 1877, Chamberlain organized the National Liberal
Federation as a coalition of provincial political elites.
Though never a true coalition, the Federation helped propel
Chamberlain into office in 1880. The rise of English social-
ism after 1882 threatened the communitarian basis of his
politics. He responded by becoming more vocally radical,
vi
and succeeded in convincing Gladstone to reunite Liberals
and Radicals behind the old cry of franchise reform.
Chamberlain's localistic politics came apart in the
election of 1885* He was caught between his efforts to
appeal to nev; working class voters and his need to hold
onto old Nonconformist supporters. His weakness after the
election made hira powerless to stop Gladstone's adoption
of Home Rule, and he was repudiated by most of his ov/n
followers
.
By 1895, Chamberlain re-established himself as a lead-
ing Unionist. As his Radicalism faded, so did his local-
ism. His programs of the 18903, old age pensions and
employers' liability, were nation-centered rather than
localistic. After 1889, he joined the reaction against the
New Unionism, and he became a critic of the London Progres-
sives. When he joined the Conservative attack on the Lon-
don County Council in 1895, he repudiated his own past.
Though Chamberlain was a strong proponent of localism,
he had no particular interest in local government reform
unless it was tied to wider issues of power. He consistently
pushed it aside for more important issues. He favored a
local government bill only in 1886, when he tried to use
it to block Home Rule, and in 1888, when he needed it to
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Historians are revising their estimates of some parts
of Joseph Chamberlain's career. The standard biography is
J. L. Garvin and Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamber-
lain , 6 vols. (London: Macraillan and Company, 1952-1970).
But, Garvin completed his third volume in 193^, and recent
works have challenged some of his interpretations. Though
several monographs and articles have reinterpreted specific
parts of Chamberlain's life, they have had less impact
upon the overall assessment of him than works which have
considered Chamberlain in the context of the realignment
of British politics in the late nineteenth century. These
works focus on matters foreign to the biographical format.
Joseph Chamberlain was a representative figure and drew
much of his power from that fact. Rather than moving the
social and political forces of his age, he was moved by them.
These articles and monographs are listed under Joseph
Chamberlain in the secondary works section of the bibliography.
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There are important discussions of Chamberlain m the
following works: Michael Barker, Gladstone and I'uadicalism:
The Reconstruction of Liberal Policy in liritain, 1o8'i>-9^t-'
(H.Y.: Barnes and Noble, 1973). Thomas V/. lleyck. The piinen-
sions of British Radicalism: The Case of Ireland, '^<^'^'}~'0
~
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 197^), and Willard
V/olfe, From Radicalism to Socialism: Men and Ideas in the
Formation of i'abian oocialist Doctrines, 1c3d1-1c>89 (Hew




Any study of Chamberlain's career must examine the social
basis of politics in the late Victorian age.
Between 1859, when Chamberlain's political career be-
gan, and 1905, when it ended, the groups which he represen-
ted—provincial political elites, successful industrialists,
and Nonconformists—were admitted to Britain's national
political elite. The new establishment thus created con-
fronted the most politically active elements of the working
class, v/ho had been their allies before admission. The
nev;ly admitted members of the establishment passed from the
offense to the defense—from attacking the privileges of
the aristocracy to resisting the demands of Labour for
legislation and parliamentary representation.
As one political effect of this realignment, many mem-
bers of the middle class changed their party allegiance.
There was a steady movement of middle class voters to the
Conservative party throughout the period, v/hile the Liberals
made up much of the loss by extending their support among
the v/orking class maQority of the electorate. But, the
Liberals' gains were threatened by the rise of an indepen-
dent Labour party.
Historians have studied this process from the perspec-
tive of the major political party leaders and organizations:
the rise of working class militancy, the growth of middle
class strength within the Conservative party, and the rise
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of the New Liberalism.^ But, the history of those middle
class politicians who crossed over to Conservatism has -not
been examined as closely. The largest single secession
from the Liberal party was the Liberal Unionist split of
1886. Among the ninety-three Liberal Members of Parliament
who voted against the Home Rule bill, thirty-two were Radi-
cals led by Joseph Chamberlain. Most of them were business-
men, and they did not differ demographically from the eighty
percent of Radical M.P.s v;ho supported Home Rule.'^ They
Joined the Tories on the single issue of Ireland, and were
forced to sacrifice many of their other goals later, in order
to maintain the alliance. Liberal Unionism declined rapidly
after 1886, but Chamberlain was able to emerge as a powerful
subordinate leader of the Unionist alliance by 1895* He
"^For the rise of Labour, see: Henry Felling, The Origins
of the Labour Party, 1880-1Q00 , 2nd. ed. (Oxford: The Clar^
endon Press, 196^), and Popular Polibics and Society in Late
Victorian Britain (Londonl riacmillan and Company, 1968)
,
E. J. Hobsbawm, Labourin^r Men (N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books,
196^). For Conservatism , see James Cornford, "The Transfor-
mation of Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century",
Victorian Studies , 7 (September, 196$): 55-66, Paul Smith,
pj.sraolian v-lonservatism and Social [Reform (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 'i967), and E, J. Feuchtwanger , Disraeli
Democracy and the Tory Party: Conservative Leadership and
Organi::a'cion After the Second i-^Giorm jill (Oxford: The Clar-
endon i'ress, 19ob) . r or the liew Liocralism, see D. A, Hamer,
Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A
Study in Leadershio and Policy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press
,
1972), H. V. Emy, Liberals, :^adicalG and Social Politics,
1892-191 'I (Cambridge: Camoridge University Press, 197$),
Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism, and Barker, Glad-
stone and ."Radicalism .
^^Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism, p. I'io.
xi
did this by close attention to the sources of power.
As class became a more important determinant of poli-
tical allegiance, the forces v;hich had supported Victorian
Radicalism declined. Nonconformity faded as a political
force after 1885. The strength of local allegiances waned,
though more slowly than Nonconformity. The decline threatened
the sources of Chamberlain's power. He spent his career
trying to prevent the polarization of politics along class
lines. He tried to channel working class political aspir-
ations toward Radical and Nonconformist goals, and his
political ideology stressed community values over class
values. In his home base of Birmingham, Chamberlain welded
together a leadership of Nonconformist businessmen and a
mass follov/ing of middle and working class voters. He
tried to extend his system throughout the kingdom, despite
the fact that other cities had a stronger history of class
conflict than Birmingham. Even when his efforts failed,
his proposals for social reform presupposed such an alliance.
For Chamberlain, his local system v;as a mechanism of politi-
cal and social action which could be used to solve a range
of social problems. It was a key factor in his social
politics.
One distinction should be made for the purposes of this
dissertation. Looked at in traditional categories, local
government and local party organization were separate ele-
ments of Chamberlain's local power. But, he welded the two
xii
into one structure. In analyzing Chamberlain's politics,
we should be av;are of two senses of local government. First
it was a constitutional and administrative structure. This
sense of local government was the suboect of the debate
when a local government bill v;as passed. But, every par-
ticipant in the debate had in mind an already existing set
of power relations: who would control it, how they would
control it, and the opportunities v/hich that control offered
This second sense was a living model of local government
as it actually functioned. I refer to local government in
this wider sense as localism.
Localism, as a force in politics, encompassed several
meanings besides attachment to a particular locality. V/ith-
in a locality, it encompassed local government, local poli-
tics (including local rivalries over parliamentary repre-
sentation) and the local economic and social structure.
Its force depended upon the degree of autonomy and social
unity enjoyed by the locality. As a force in national poli-
tics, localism assured that the basic unit in national
coalitions would be the local community, rather than some
portion of it. As a political philosophy, localism favored
state expansion through local government rather than through
the central bureaucracy. In this form, localism was so
widespread as to be the conventional wisdom of the late
Victorian age. Different political positions emerged over




This dissertation concentrates on Joseph Chamberlain's
position and its relation to his social politics.
'
This dissertation is not a biography, though it sur-
veys twenty-five years of Joseph Chamberlain's life. A
biography concentrates on what is unique about an individual,
while we shall be interested in much that is typical about
Chamberlain. Localism is the avenue through which we shall
approach the larger issues of late Victorian politics.
Localism was central to Chamberlain's social politics.
Almost every element of his social program v;as filtered
through it. This fact poses a research problem. Chamberlain
was not a theoritician—in fact, he v;as a very unoriginal
thinker—and left no comprehensive exposition of his views.
But, his general attitude toward localism can be explicated
from the specific positions he took on the issues which
impinged upon localism.
This dissertation has three goals. It focuses on the
social politics of Joseph Chamberlain as reflected in local-
ism and local government. I will analyze Joseph Chamber-
lain's social views as expressed in his politics. The
second goal is wider: to illuminate the social process in
v/hich Chamberlain participated. His own career exemplified
the arrival of the provincial bourgeoisie in the late nine-
teenth century and their transition to a defensive stature
in the British polity. The third goal is methodological.
I wish to examine the connection of parliamentary and Cabinet
xiv
politics with these broader social and political movements.
Too often, historians discuss "hich politics" in isolation
from consideration of the sources of power. Such an iso-
lation is artificial because the historical actors were not
themselves so isolated. The realities of power permeated
their daily existence. There is a recent trend in the
historiography of this period which emphasises politics as
a "great game" in which political leaders make moves solely
in reference to each other. ^ At best, this approach is
too narrow, because it must exclude much of the social
matrix in which these leaders operated. At worst, it is
nothing more than a defense of traditional sources—primarily
diaries and correspondence—by declaring that other sources
are unimportant.^ However, it is easier for me to criti-
cise the approach I do not like than to replace it with
one I do. I regard the process of developing a proper
methodology as incomplete at this writing. I trust, however,
that this dissertation moves in the right direction,
'^The following v/orks exemplify this approach: Maurice
Cowling, Disraeli, Gladstone and ^evolution; The Passing
of the Second .'Reform '^ill (Cambridge: Gambrid,:;e University
Press , 1 967 ) , Andrew J ones , The Politics of Keform , 138^4-
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), and A. B.
Cooke and John Vincent, The Governing Passion: Cabinet
Government and Party Politics in Brifcain, 1883-86 (Brighton
:
Harvester Press, 197''0 •
^Cooke and Vincent do this in their chapter, "Small
Men and Lesser Archives: The Unimportance of the Unimpor-
tant", The Governing Passion , pp. 15^-61.
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During the late nineteenth century, a nation-wide
social structure solidified in Great Britain. Heretofore,
the industrial towns had differed from each other in impor-
tant ways, as all had differed from the smaller towns and
the countryside. In the early 1870s, the great provincial
towns were at the height of their political importance and
their social integration. After that, their growing size
and the solidification of national class alignments began
to pull them apart. Politically, the politics of class
began to supersede the politics of community.
Localism v/as a force which strengthened the politics
of community. It supported the rule of local elites in
both municipal and parliamentary politics. In the great
provincial towns, the beneficiaries of this force were
businessmen, 'Nonconformists, and Radicals. These groups
sought to counteract the growth of political organization
based on class, which threatened their rule. Though a
fading force, localism retained some power throughout the
century. The class basis of politics was not really ad-
vanced until the 1890s. In some towns, such as Birmingham,
the old community basis of politics was maintained well
into the twentieth century.
Joseph Chamberlain erected localism into a virtual
ideology. For him, local government was not an isolated
2
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constitutional and administrative system. It was closely-
tied to the other components of localism: local politics,
economic relations and social structure. He tried to
establish this system in practice while he was Mayor of
Birmingham, and he advocated it for other tovms when he
was a national political figure. In his social politics,
localism provided Chamberlain with a series of ready solu-
tions for social problems. Thus, it was a building block
of his entire approach to politics.
CHAPTER I
LOCALISM AND THE MIDDLE CLASS IN THE 1870s
We shall begin by considering in what ways Joseph
Chamberlain was typical of other people in late Victorian
politics. One way we may do this is to consider what
groups he belonged to, and the extent to which he represen-
ted them. Then, by considering the institutions of these
groups, and their position in society, we can describe the
social and political matrix in which Chamberlain operated
at the beginning of his career.
1
Joseph Chamberlain was, first of all, a wealthy busi-
nessman. He was born in London in 1836, the son of a Uni-
tarian shoemaker, also named Joseph Chamberlain. He was
educated in Nonconformist schools and at London University
until age fifteen, when he entered his father's trade. In
185^, his uncle, Joseph Nettlefold, purchased the English
license for an American patent to manufacture wood screws
by a new mechanical process. The elder Joseph Chamberlain
'^It was a family tradition to name the eldest son Joseph
The Joseph Chamberlain with whom we are concerned was afc
least the third of the name. He named his eldest son Joseph
Austen Chamberlain, and the name has continued for at least
tv;o generations since.
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invested in the license and sent his eighteen year old son
to the firm's headquarters in Birmingham to supervise the
investment. The younger Joseph Chamberlain rapidly rose
to become the financial and sales manager of Chamberlain
and Nettlefold, He developed superior sales techniques to
match the superior product which the American patent gave
the firm. In the late 1860s, he became a leader of the
new movement for the rationalization of industry. An ex-
cellent negotiator, he absorbed the firm's two largest
rivals and soon gained an effective monopoly of the trade
in Great Britain.
According to Chamberlain, the expansion of Chamberlain
and Nettlefold brought great benefits to its work force:
healthier work places, regular hours, economy of labor, in-
creased demand, lower prices, and higher wages. The firm
enjoyed excellent labor relations during his tenure. There
were no strikes or lockouts; Chamberlain was treasurer of
a workingman's club supported by the firm, and he was popu-
lar among the "hands". When Chamberlain retired from the
firm in 18?^, they held a ceremony and presented him with
gifts. His reputation among the West Midlands working
classes was sufficient for him to be called in as an arbi-
trator in labor disputes. His reputation for fairness to
labor brought him strong working class support at elections,
^J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain^ vol. 1:
1 836-1835: Chamberlain and Dcr.ocracy (London; iiacml'llan and
Company, 19:5^), pp. 171-V;^. i^^lsie E. Gulley, Josenh Cham
-
In his rGlip;iou3 aff ilia Lion, Chamberlain wac a Uni-
tarian, a menibor of ono of the Nonconformist or T) ! seen binp;
Grouf):". who made up approxiiuaUci^ hall" o I" I'ln; ;1 i I 'I'otootants
.
They nurucd. iioredilary [-jriovancca a(_!;ainijU Uio Clmrcli of
England and the ariatocracy which ijupiio 1-1.(^1 it. Cliainbor-
lain always spoko with iM-ldo of an anccaLor who wa:; LuimkmI
out of his pastorate in 1GG2 rather than conform to Ane;li-
can doctrine.-^ Influenced hy their history as a poroocutod
minority, many Nonconformists supported measures oT social
and political reform: temperance, relif^ious equality,
education, sanil.nry rofoiMii, .'md political doiiioci-acy . The
orcanizations they formed to advance tliose causes extensive-
ly used established techniques for influencini^ Parliament
throu[;;h public opinion. 'Pheir innovations in winning public
support were later taken over by the established political
parties when they souf'iht to improve their electoral orp;ani-
zation.
In national politics, Cliamborlain was a Kadicai, In
the words of one liistorian, tiio Ivadicals were "not a party,
but a persuasion of considerable distinctiveness and
borlnin nnd Knn;lioh r.ocial Politics (N.Y.: Columbia IJnivor-
siiy J'j'oss, 10;?^;, pp. r^^rl-^?. ITTTliam J. Davis, "Early
Recollections of a Great Statesman", The r.oarch 1 i I'-lit ol'
r.rontor H i rm i ni^hnm , November 1^, 19'1^, p. -l osoph Cham-
berlait" " i'he rlanufacture of 'Iron Wood Gcrews", Thoji" '"'""'"'
Prorlur. tr; and To'lur', t;T' i n 1 I Ti : ' 'XJlILJQj ' ' ' V'Jli cTTTWiniUul
Timinins ( hondon : li, Uardwlcu-j, 'Uiur^; rupriti u 'od . , London
:
Frank Cass and Company, 1967), P. 605.
'^Garvin, Chnmborla in 2:5-6.
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nificance." Host Radicals belonged to the Liberal Party.
Radicalism attracted many of the one-issue crusaders. No
one Radical advocated all of the reforms associated with
Radicalism, but there was a family resemblance among the
reforms. A continuous English Radical tradition reached
back to the French Revolution, with antecedents in the
English Civil V/ar. The Radical approach to politics was
both utilitarian and moralistic. The Radicals' greatest common
attribute was hostility to privilege, particularly those
aristocratic rights enshrined in law. Because of this
characteristic, Radicalism attracted middle class Noncon-
formists who resented the privileged position of Anglican-
ism, and the most politically conscious members of the work-
ing class. It provided a common political ground between
the two groups, and gave them concrete targets for joint
political action.^
Though their long-range political goals were incompat-
ible, middle class and working class Radicals cooperated
closely through the 18703. All Radicals favored greater
democracy as a counterpoise to privilege, though they dif-
fered on the precise limit of its extension. The battle
of aristocracy versus the people was a fruitful source of
Radical rhetoric, and one Chamberlain exploited fully. As
^Thomas V/. Heyck, The Dimensions of British Radicalisra
;
The Case of Ireland, 187-^-13'-);3 (lirbana; University of Illinois
Press, 197^^, pp. quo-ce from p. ix.
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long as he could keep working class voters convinced that
he and other businessmen were their natural leaders, his
Radicalism v;ould v;ork.
Chamberlain's social, political and religious connec-
tions among Birmingham's emerging industrial elite drew
him into local politics. He was elected to the Town Council
in November, 1869. Most of the members of the Council were
Radicals in national politics, but they did not translate
their Radicalism into a vigorous municipal policy. Before
1875? Birmingham's municipal elections v;ere usually non-
partisan. The factions which mattered were an "Economist"
group, which had dominated the Council in the late 1850s,
and a group of "Reformers" which slowly grew in strength
after 1861. Both groups contained Conservatives, though
the bulk of both v;ere Liberals—which in Birmingham meant
Radicals. There was, however, a difference in the social
base of the two groups. Small-scale tradesmen and landlords
dominated the Economist group, while the reformers were
wealthy businessmen.^ The Reformers were more willing to
spend money than the Economists, but reform was a tendency
rather than a program. They had no distinctive municipal
reform program until after Chamberlain became Mayor in 1873-
^Conrad Gill, The History of Birmingham , vol. 1: Manor
and Borough to 1865 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952)
i
pp. 35o-o1, ^l-;^5-^7. E. P. Honnock, Fit and Proper Pernonn:
Ideal and Reality in 1 1ineteenth Century Urban Governiaont
(London: Edward Arnoldf LPublishersJ Ltd., 197p)? PP« ^7,
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Chamberlain, therefore, belonged to several groups.
Economically, he was a wealthy businessman; religiously, a
Nonconformist; politically, a Radical and a municipal poli-
tician. Together, his roles connected him to much of the
English middle class. What the middle class was in late
Victorian England and what its relations were to the rest
of society, is our next consideration.
11
The terra "middle class" is ambiguous. First of all,
••class" is used in a variety of ways. It can mean social
stratification, which is determined by objective, measurable,
and largely economic criteria. It often includes status,
v;hich involves honor and deference, rather than goods.
Or, class can be considered as an identification group, in
conflict v/ith other identification groups. Such class
designations can be assumed by members of the class, or can
be assigned by others, or both. In this sense, classes
grov; up in relationship to each other, rather than indepen-
dently. Therefore, class involves class consciousness.^
R. S. Neale, "Class and Class Consciousness in Early
Nineteenth Century England: Three Classes or Five?", Victor-
ian Studies 12 (September, 1968) :9.
'^Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party", Class, Status and
Power: A Reader in Social Stratification , ed. Remhard
Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Ij.Y.: Free Press of Glen-
coe, 1963), pp. 68-70.
P. Thompson, The Makinrr of the Enr7;lish Working Class
(N.Y. : Random House, Vintage Books, 1)63), p. 9*
10
Victorian social thought used a three class model:
aristocracy, based upon ownership of land; middle class,
based upon ownership of industry; and working class, based
upon the sale of labor. But, the model was oversimplified.
The middle class was split between those people v;ho derived
their income from entrepreneurship and trade, and a smaller
but growing group who were professionals or clerks. After
1860, the professional and clerical group grew rapidly, as
government expanded and as large scale industry came into
the hands of professional managers.^ Richard Cobden and
other middle class leaders had distinguished between "active"
entrepreneurial wealth and "passive" aristocratic wealth.
But, as the capitalist owner-manager disappeared from
large industry, a division appeared in the business class.
Those wealthy businessmen who lived off of dividends had
little to distinguish them from absentee landlords. The
active entreprenurial class v/as composed of owners of small
workshops and stores. The poorest members of this class
lived no better than the more secure members of the working
class. A similar spectrum and division existed among the
professionals and clerks. The term '"middle class", therefore,
covered a wide range of conditions of life and sources of
income.
^Flarold Perkin, The Origin of Modern Enrlish Society,
1780-1880 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969^,
pp. 25^-70, 428-37.
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Relations between the middle class and the aristocracy
were ambiguous. The social prestige of the aristocracy was
enormous, and most members of the middle class copied aristo-
cratic manners and styles, as far as they could afford to
do so. But, Nonconformity and Radicalism slowed the pro-
cess of assimilation. The middle class was the backbone of
both movements. Neither Nonconformity nor Radicalism included
the entire middle class, but both were stronger among the
middle class than in either the working class or aristocracy.
Both movements expressed antagonism to the aristocratic
domination of society, and both were vehicles for the satis-
faction of middle class ambitions. Nonconformist and Radi-
cal leaders—often, but not always, the same persons—were
the most active exponents of middle class consciousness.
They raised most of the contentious issues between the
aristocracy and the middle classes. Their combativeness
affected party politics. When the Liberal party adopted
the Nonconformist or Radical viewpoint, the conflict took
place between the parties. V/hen the Liberal leadership did
not accept the Radical or Nonconformist program, there was
strife between Liberal factions.
There v;as little overt antagonism betv;een the middle
class and the working class in the 1860s. Prosperity took
the sting out of the grievances which had fed Chartism, and
religion eased many social tensions. The upper sections of
the v/orking class copied middle class manners as the middle
class copied the aristocracy. In 186?, Parliament agreed
with John Bright 's argument that many members of the worl:-
ing class had shown by their behavior that they deserved the
franchise. The trade Unions, which were Britain's most
distinctively working class institutions, represented mainly
skilled laborers and pursued a non-revolutionary policy.
In the 1870s, the most politically active members of
the working class used their votes to support Radical poli-
cies and leaders. Radical politicians like Chamberlain
could secure a working class following with little more
than verbal endorsement of v;orking class goals. But, work-
ing class independence was growing. The first two working-
men's representatives were elected to Parliament in 187^^.
However, most working class leaders had not yet abandoned
their faith in middle class Radicalism.
English society was not fully divided into antagonis-
tic nation-wide classes until the 1890s. Before that hori-
zontal pattern was fully established, elements of an older
vertical pattern survived to affect the balance of power in
society. One of these forces was localism. During the
Industrial Revolution, middle class elites established
themselves in most of the larger provincial towns. Local
patriotism was strong, and these towns were at the height
of their influence in the mid-nineteenth century. Their
societies differed sharply from that of London, and they
differed from each other. All of the influences on middle
13
class life came together at the local level. National
alignments, including political parties, were only coalitions
of local factions which often differed from each other.
The last half of the nineteenth century was the golden age
of local government, especially in those tovms which had
sufficient resources to support a vigorous and reforming
10Town Council.
As yet denied full admission into national politics,
many members of the middle class turned to local government
in the 1850s, '60s and'70s. It afforded them an outlet for
their energies, a sop to their ambition, and a degree of
social prestige. But, local government was a complex
mechanism, caught between the local community it represen-




When Parliament passed the Municipal Corporations Act
in 1855, the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, declared that
11
it was a great victory for the Dissenters. The Act
10
Perkin, Origins of Modern English Society , pp. 17-5Q-
Donald Read, The English Provinces c. 17'3Q-19bO, A Study in
Influence (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 196^). John Vincent,
The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857-1363 (London: Con-
stable, 1966}, pp. xv, 82-92. D. C. Hoore, "Political Mo-
rality in Mid-Nineteenth Century England: Concepts, Norms,
Violations", Victorian Studies 15 (September, 1969): 5-56.
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Sidney V/ebb and Beatrice V/ebb, English Local Govcrn-
ment from the Revolution to the Municipal CornorationG Act,
(5 & 6 William ^, ch. 76) threw municipal government into
the hands of the urban middle class. It reformed and
created a uniform system of government for 178 municipal
boroughs in England and Wales. A further forty-six boroughs
were chartered under the Act between 1835 and 1870. Over
one hundred smaller boroughs were omitted from the reform
and not reformed until 1883. Most of the larger boroughs
had the same boundaries as the parliamentary borough of the
same name, but parliamentary and municipal borough were
12legally distinct.
In most boroughs, the municipal franchise was broader
than the parliamentary franchise. Any adult male, living
in the borough or v;ithin seven miles of it, and owning or
occupying a house or shop rated for relief of the poor for
three consecutive years, was eligible to be a Burgess and
vote. In practice, the Burgess roll was much smaller than
the number of potential voters. Only 3/^ of the population
of Birmingham was on the Burgess roll in 1852. It rose to
8.3?^ in 1866. After the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869,
1
5
it rose sharply, and stood at 17*3/^ in 1873.
vols. 2 & 3 : The Manor and the Borough (London: Longman's,
Green and Company, 1908), 3:730.
'^^ibid., p. 752. Josef Redlich and Francis W. Hirst,
Local Government in England , 2 vols. (N.Y. : Macmillan Co.,
1903), i:224,l33.
^^Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 , s. 9. The figures
for the Birmingham Burgess iioll are calculated from the
following returns; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary
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The Burgesses voted in their wards for town Council-
lors, and no town official was elected by the entire borough.
One-third of the Councillors v/ere elected on November 1 of
each year to three-year terms. Three Councillors, or a
multiple thereof, were assigned to each v/ard. The Council
elected Aldermen, equal in number to one-third of the Coun-
cillors, for six-year terms, half of them every three years.
The Council elected a Mayor annually, usually from among
its members, though this was not required. Tov/n Councils
were large. The Birmingham Tov/n Council consisted of forty-
eight Councillors (for fourteen wards, tv/o of which had
double representation) and sixteen Aldermen; the Birmingham
Council alv/ays elected one of its members to be Mayor. To
be a member of the Council, a Burgess must possess a per-
sonal estate v/orth £1000 (£500 in tovms with fewer than
four wards) or be rated for poor relief for £50 (£15 in
smaller towns). Priests, ministers, and persons who held
contracts from the Corporation v;ere forbidden to be Council-
1 1^^lors.
The Tov/n Council's powers were vague. Its only obli-
gation under the Municipal Corporations Act v/as to set up
Papers (Commons), 18^9 (16), 45:186-87; 186? (11), 56:563-
417; 1867 (156), 56:449-59; 1874 (381), 53:^3-58. Brian
Keith-Lucas, The English Local Government Franchise; A




Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 , ss. 9, 25, 28, 30,
51, 39,~^-
16
a V/atch Committee to administer a police force. It had
power to appoint and dismiss officers, appoint committees,
administer charitable trusts, extend the area of lightinG
in the borough, and "make such Bye Lav/s as to them shall
seem meet for the good Rule and Government of the Borough".
The Council exercised both legislative and administra-
tive powers. The Mayor had no independent authority; de-
partments took their orders directly from the Council or
its committees. The Municipal Corporations Act directed
that the Police Department be managed by the Watch Committee,
which reported to the Council quarterly. This provision
set a precedent for other functions. Committees v/ere set
up to supervise each branch of tov/n administration, subject
to approval of their actions by the Council. In 1851, Bir-
mingham secured authority to delegate many of its powers to
committees, and other towns followed suit. There was no
regularity in the committees v/hich each Town Council set
up. A Health Committee was mandated in 1875? an Education
Committee in 1902, and almost all large and middling boroughs
had committees for finance, public works, and general pur-
poses. Where gas and water were supplied by the Corporation,
there were committees to supervise them. But, this was the
limit of similarity among boroughs. Committees intervened
directly in administration, committee members actively
'^Municipal Corporations Act, 1855 , ss. 25, 58, 60-68,
70-75, 87, '6b\ yo.
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supervised operations, civil servants were accorded little
autonomy, and Councillors occasionally made inspection
tours. '^^
The legal status of municipal corporations limited
their powers. As a legal person, the Corporation had the
power to do anything a living person could do, but this
power was insufficient for governmental purposes. In order
to condemn land, dig up a street for water mains, levy taxes,
or forbid the dumping of sewage in the streets, a municipal
corporation needed additional legal authority from Parlia-
ment. If it acted without that sanction, it was acting
ultra vires—beyond its powers. '
The doctrine of ultra vires, which the courts first
applied to municipal corporations in the 1850s, reinforced
their close dependence upon Parliament. Innovating boroughs
proceeded by securing a Local Act. Though Local Acts were
juridicially classed v;ith the Public General Acts, they
passed through Parliament by a separate procedure reserved
for Private and Personal Acts. Between 1800 and 188^, Par-
liament passed 18,500 Local, Personal and Private Acts,
1 gKeith-Lucas, Local Government Franchise , p. 193? n. ^.
Redlich and Hirst, English Local Government , 1:302-53. K. B.
Smellie, A History of Local Government , 4th ed. (London:
G. Allen and Unwin, 1968), pp. 9^+-96.
17
'W. Ivor Jennings , Principles of Local Government Law ,
4th ed. (London: University of London Press, 1960 j, pp.
139-51. Seward Brice, A Treatise on the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires (London: Stevens and Haynes, 1874), pp. vii-ix.
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almost double the number of Public Acts passed in the same
period. Local Acts covered almost every industrial and
social movement: enclosures, roads, courts, poor law unions,
town improvements, canals, railways, tramways, pas, elec-
tricity, and water supply. In all of these fields. Local
Acts led the way; they were followed by Public Acts only
18after many years.
Local Acts were a more important element of constitu-
tional and political relations in a town than were Public
Acts. Promotion of a Local Act v/as a major political event.
The Act governed relations between the Corporation and in-
dependent bodies which controlled vital town services: gas
and water companies, and improvement commissioners. Like
the Corporation, these bodies drew their powers from Local
Acts. An attempt by either the Council or a rival authority
to secure a new Act could produce a bitter contest, locally
and before Parliament. Political exploitation of ratepayer
apprehensions and legal appeals to the doctrine of ultra
vires exacerbated the struggle. Many towns tried to solve
the problem by absorbing these rival authorities, and a trend
set in to do so in the 18'^Os. But, the process was slow
and was still incomplete in the 1870s.
'^^Frederick Clifford, A History of Private Bill Legis-
lation , 2 vols. (London: But Uerworuhs , 1885-87; reprint ed.,
London: Frank Cass and Company, 1968), 1:266-67. 0. C.
Vv'illiams, The Historical Development of Private Bill Pro-
cedure and Otandin^': Orders in tno ifouno oT Co:'i[:ionr. , r^ncfed. ,
2 vols. (London: H.' ^Lationary Office, I'j^lo-^f'JT , 1:58-175-
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Finance was the most powerful single restriction on
municipal activity. The Municipal Corporations Act placed
tight financial controls on the boroughs. All money re-
ceived by the Corporation was to be paid into and out of the
Borough Fund, upon v;hich public accounts were to be kept
and an annual audit was to be conducted. Payments were to
be made only upon order of the Council. If there was a
surplus from traditional income and property, the surplus
was to be applied to the benefit of the inhabitants and the
improvement of the borough. If there was a deficit, the
Council was to levy a rate upon the inhabitant. Any sale
of Corporation property needed the approval of the Treasury,
19which could set conditions for that approval. ^
Only a fev; of the older municipal corporations possessed
enough income from property to avoid levying a rate. Newer
Corporations, such as Birmingham, were almost totally depen-
dent upon the rates. The borough did not tax its citizens
directly; it served a precept upon parish authorities to do
so. The valuation of property was determined by parish
authorities, v/hich often produced inequities between parishes
in the same borough. The parish levied a rate on the rate-
payer's visible estate, valued according to the annual rental
value of his property. The occupier of the property v/as
taxed, rather than its owner. Before IO5O, residents of
^ ^lunicipal Corporations Act, 1833 , ss. 59, 60, 92-9'»
.
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tenements and houses of the poor were not generally rated
because the costs of collection v;ere too high. But, tene-
ments and lodging houses were taxed after the Small Tene-
ments Rating Act of 18^0 allowed the owners to pay their
tenants' rates and charge it to their rent. This provision
allowed the tenants to vote if they stayed in one place
long enough to meet the residence requirement.^*^
Constant grievances arose from inequities in the rating
structure. Rental value was an adequate measure of valua-
tion in a rural society v;here land was the basis of wealth,
but annual rental value was a low assessment for a factory
or a store. An unfair proportion of the rates fell upon
land and houses. Despite the fact that owners were not
formally liable for the rates, landowners contended that
rates were simply passed on in the form of reduced rents.
Most of the increase of taxation in the middle of the nine-
teenth century fell upon property in towns, to finance the
costs of improvement and sanitation. Landlords v/ere one of
the main sources of opposition to local expenditure; the
Conservative party took up their cause. Radical business-
20Edwin Cannan, The History of Local Rates in England;
Five Lectures (Londoni Longmans, Green and Company, 1 896 )
.
Sidney Viebb and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government from
the Revolution to the [-iunicipal CornorationG Act , vol . 1 :
The Parish and the County (London: Longmans, Green and Cora-
pany , 'I90& ) , p. 1^?. ITT?. Ilcnnock, "Finance and Politics
in Urban Local Government in England, 1855-1900", Historical
Journal 6 (1963): 21 6. J. T. Bunce, History of the Cnrnora-
tion of Rirmin-^ham , 2 vols. (Birmingham: Cornish Brothers,
1 o/'6-(^A J , 2 : 1 shov/s variations in the incidence of
rating among the three parishes of Birmingham.
21
men like Chamberlain were less affected by climbing rates.
The landlords were their political enemies, and Radicals
wished to make owners formally liable for half of the rates.
^'^
Despite general dissatisfaction with the rating system,
it remained essentially unchanged throughout the nineteenth
century as the basis of local finance. Rates were easy to
levy and collect, and no single alternative had a consider-
able body of supporters.
In the last half of the nineteenth century, the central
government slowly increased its financial support of local
government. In 1859, the Education Committee of the Privy
Council inaugurated a system of grants-in-aid to schools
as a mechanism for raising educational standards. In 1856,
the Home Office took up the teclmique by paying one-fourth
of the cost of police pay and uniforms, provided the police
force was up to the standards of Home Office inspectors.
Few towns failed to apply. In 1855, grants in aid were ex-
tended to metropolitan fire brigades, in 1867 to vaccinations,
and in 1870 to the new Boards of Education. V/hen the system
was reformed in 1888, total grants-in-aid amounted to over
£4- million, some 13-6^ of local revenues. In the same period,
the Treasury assumed £2.7 million of local expenditure. All
grants were for specific functions, with inspectors exacting
21
Hennock, "Finance and Politics", Historical Journal ,
pp. 214-16. G. J. Goschen, Reports and opoochos on 1
Taxation (London: Macmillan and Company^ 1872), pp. i ,--25.
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performance according to central government standards.
Occasionally, one of the larger towns would refuse a grant
in the name of local autonomy, but such actions were rare
and were usually reversed within a few years.
National movements affected local government. The
sanitary reform movement, launched by Edwin Chadwick in
1842, extended the powers of local authorities. The Public
Health Act of 1848 authorized the creation of local Boards
of Health with extensive sanitary powers. Most municipal
corporations became their own Boards of Health. Though a
reaction unseated Chadwick in 1854, and destroyed the Gen-
eral Board of Health four years later, the movement grew
rapidly at the local level. In the ten years from 1848 to
1858, the General Board of Health authorized £2,956,178 of
loans for sanitary construction, while its successor, the
Local Government Act Office, authorized £7,363,566 of loans
in its thirteen year existence.
22
"Royston J. Lambert, "Central and Local Relations in
Mid-Victorian England: The Local Government Act Office,
1858-1871", Victorian Studies 6 (1962-63) : 126-28 , 132-58.
Jennifer H. Hart, "The County and Borough Police Act, 1856",
Public Administration 33 (winter, 1 956) : 403-13 . ilenry Parr is.
Constitutional i^uroaucracy ; The Development of British Central
Administration >Jince the Ei'-hfceenth Century (London; G. Allen
and Unwin, 1969), pp. 230-46. Maureen Schiilz, "The Develop-
ment of the Grant System", Essays in Local Government , ed.
Charles H. V/ilson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19^)8;, pp. 115-17.
In 1873, Birmingham refused a grant to pay the salary of the
gaol surgeon, but the action v/as reversed later in the year.
Proceedings of the Birmingham Council , February 4, 1873,
no. 8612, October 23, 1873, no. 9049.
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By 1870, the sanitary movement achieved something
close to consensus. Sanitary legislation was easy to ob-
tain, loans were readily given for sanitary construction,
and sanitary reform v;as easy to Justify at the polls. If
some towns, such as Birmingham, lagged slightly behind
others in this field, it only made a municipal reform move-
ment easier to fashion. When Joseph Chamberlain led Bir-
mingham into reform after 1873, he was able to take paths
which had been thoroughly tried in other towns.
The Royal Commission on the Sanitary Laws (1867-71)
recommended the consolidation of public health legislation
and administration. Because the largest part of local
powers related to sanitation, the Commission's recommenda-
tions amounted to an overhaul of local government. All
national health pov/ers were to be concentrated in one cen-
tral agency, v;hile the country was to be covered by a net-
work of about eight hundred sanitary districts, each governed
by a board which would be the sole public health authority
Ph.
in that district.
The Government acted upon the Commission's recommenda-
tions. In 1871, the Poor Law Board, the Local Government
Act Office and the Medical Officer of the Privy Council were
Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1872
[c. 516], 28:xliii-xlTv:
oil
"Second Report of the Royal Commission on the Sani-
tary Lav/s", Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers
(Commons), 1871 Cc. 281], 35:17^-77.
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consolidated into the Local Government Board, administered
by a member of the Cabinet. The Public Health Act of 1872
regularized the local administration of public health.
England v;as divided into urban and rural sanitary districts.
Urban districts were governed by the Town Council in boroughs,
improvement commisioners in an Improvement Act district,
or a local board in any specially constituted local govern-
ment district. Those parts of Poor Law unions outside of the
urban sanitary districts were to be rural sanitary districts,
with the Poor Law Guardians as the rural sanitary authority.
The Public Health Act of 1875 consolidated all previous
public health legislation into an overall code.^^
The public health Acts completed the structure of muni-
cipal government and provided a basis for its extension to
the rural areas. In 1875^ the municipal corporations and
the sanitary districts v/ere the only modern and reasonably
uniform element of English local government. Despite its
limitations, municipal government proved well suited to
urban social structures. But, rural government successfully
resisted reform for a generation after the towns had sub-
mitted to it. There, a different social structure prevailed,
and localism represented a different equation. Reform
could not be delayed forever, however. In the early 1870s,
^^Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc., Local Government
Board Act, 1871 , $4 & $5 Victoria, ch. 70, Public .'iGalth
Act. 1^72 , 35 & 56 Victoria, ch. 79, Public HealL-h Act, 1875 ,
58 & 0'-) Victoria, ch. 55.
25




The reform of county government raised problems of
the relationship between local government and localism.
The debate over the structure of county government could
—
and did—easily diverge into questions of control. In the
1870s, the landed class dominated county government. The
fifty-six counties of England and Wales were ruled by the
Justices of the Peace, who were royal officials appointed
from among the local aristocracy. The Justices, v/ho met
every three months in Quarter Sessions, had adapted well to
the new administrative demands imposed upon them. County
governments were generally honest and efficient. However,
after the Reform Act of 1867, the Justices were criticized
for the undemocratic nature of their rule. It was felt to
be especially a grievance because they levied taxes. All
reform proposals centered on dividing the Justices' adminis-
trative powers from their Judicial ones, and placing the
former in the hands of an elected board. Beyond this basic
agreement, a host of details remained to be settled.
Some Radicals looked beyond the reform of county govern-
ment to restructuring the chaotic system below it. They
fastened upon the nev; system of sanitary districts, v/hich
neatly separated urban from rural areas, and which already
26
had local boards exercising the most important functions of
local government. They contemplated a reform which would
give to the sanitary authority the powers of other ad hoc
local authorities, such as burial boards, Poor Law Guardians,
public libraries boards, baths and washhouses boards, and
school boards. In this way, they could create a comprehen-
sive district system.
Below the districts and municipal corporations was a
patchwork of about 15,000 parishes and townships. In the
1870s, the parishes were generally excluded from proposals
for local government reform. Since losing their Poor Law
powers in 183'^, the parish Vestries had been systematically
looted of their functions. In most areas, the parish sur-
vived principally as a taxation district. In 1871, George
J. Goschen, the President of the Poor Law Board, introduced
a bill to make the parish the basis of a reformed local
government system. A financial expert, he did so to simplify
the local taxation system, and the bill gave the parochial
council only taxing powers. Even this was too much for
his critics, for the parishes had a bad reputation. He
v/ithdrew the bill. Parish reform was not practical politics
until 1885, when Chamberlain's friend and ally, Sir Charles
Dilke, inserted it into the Liberal election program.
^^Goschon, Reports and Speeches on Local Taxation ,
pp. 209-10.
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The overwhelming fact of local Government reform in
the late nineteenth century was the power of the municipal
model. Provisions for rural local government bills were
always discussed in terras of current practices in the towns.
All parties assumed that the new rural system would resemble
the existing municipal one in greater or lesser degree.
The distinction between municipal reform and local govern-
ment reform, though sharp legally, was hazy in practice.
As local government was such a complex web of legal-
isms and practices, the struggle between localisms took
place over technical issues. Rural government reform was
debated in the Cabinet for a decade before it reached Par-
liament. The debate centered on representation, powers,
hierarchies of councils, and other matters of detail. But,
the issue was power: rural leaders versus urban ones, and
the result v;as determined by the condition of their larger
relationship. Even such a supposedly neutral issue could
not be separated from the social politics of the age.
CHAPTER II
JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN'S LOCALISM
We have already defined localism as a force which en-
compasses local government, local politics and local eco-
nomic and social relations. V/e have also noted that it was
a force in national politics in nineteenth century Britain,
both as a source of political coalitions and as a philo-
sophy for the extension of c^overnraent activity. But, each
person or group related the different elements of localism
to each other in a unique manner. In this chapter, we shall
analyze Joseph Chamberlain's localism. In so doinr;, we will
treat his views as unitary, though he expressed them over
the period of a quarter of a century. This approach is
possible because Chamberlain held rigidly to most of his
basic political prescriptions. He not only took similar
positions in the 1870s and the 1890s, he used virtually the
same words to Justify them. In the few cases where he
altered his position on an issue, v;e v;ill note the varia-
tions .
The center of our discussion of localism is Chamber-
lain's attitude toward local government, for it demonstrates
all of the attitudes and positions which made up the larger
v/hole. Chamberlain's system can be analyzed in several
parts: local government as an economic institution, its
28
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efficiency, its control, and the relation of localism to
national politics. We shall take each in turn.
1
Chamberlain viewed local government as an economic in-
stitution. He often compared it to a business enterprise:
The leadinc^ idea of the Enn;lish system may be
said to be that of a joint-stock or co-operative
enterprise in which every citizen is a share-
holder, and of which the dividends are receivable
in the improved health and the increase in the
comfort and happiness of the community. The mem-
bers of the Council are the directors of this
great business, and their fees consist in the con-
fidence, the consideration, and the gratitude of
those amongst v/hom they live. In no other under-
taking, whether philanthropic or commercial, are
the returns more speedy, more manifest, or more
beneficial. '
To him, the comparison was more than a metaphor. He felt
that local government was a particular type of business
enterprise, with special functions and responsibilities,
but operating according to economic rules which governed
all business concerns. In businessman's language, local
government was a trustee for the entire community. It
focused community effort, administered certain functions
for public benefit, and provided to all classes privileges
and conveniences otherwise reserved to the rich. As a
Joseph Chamberlain, "Municipal Institutions in America
and England", The Forum (Philadelphia), 1^ (November, 1892):
280. See also London iiunicipal Life; A Speech by tlie Rt. Hon.
Joseph Chamberlain, M.P.
, February 6, 189b (London; London
Municipal Socie uy , 1o9b J , p. 6.
2Joseph Chamberlain, "Municipal Government—Past, Present
30
businessman, Chamberlain fully appreciated the potentiali-
ties of a well-run local government enterprise.
In common with other reformers, Chamberlain was attract-
ed to the ability of government to achieve results by com-
mand. Government had distinct advantages over private
enterprise and philanthropy, v/hich was the accepted alter-
native approach to social problems in the mid-nineteenth
century. Instead of relying on uncertain contributions,
government could command resources through taxation. Through
law, it could command obedience, rather than use persuasion.
Compulsory purchase could overcome obstructive private
rights. And, as a popular agency, government could give
extended consideration to social costs and benefits.
Chamberlain wanted to expand the scope of municipal
activity, and he proposed that local authorities make vigor-
ous use of the powers they already possessed. He v/anted
to draw the line between government and business farther
into the private sector than most of his contemporaries did.
He recommended tv;o approaches to local government expansion;
municipalization and improvement. They were the core of
his program as Mayor of Birmingham, and all of his subsequent
proposals for local government v/ere extensions of one or
the other.
Municipalization was the purchase of private utilities
and Future", The New Review 10 (June, 189^0:656.
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—particularly gas and water companies—by local government.
Its purpose was to unify local services by placing them in
the hands of representative authorities and to improve their
efficiency.
V/hile Chamberlain was Mayor of Birmingham, the Town
Council purchased the town's two gas companies and one water
company. He justified the purchases as reasonable exten-
sions of municipal services. Water supply was vital to
public health. At the time the Corporation purchased the
Birmingham V/aterworks Company, the town's wells were pol-
luted and the company faced a search for new sources of
water. Chamberlain argued that essential municipal services
should not be a source of profit to private individuals.
While the Town Council received a profit of £25,000 per
annum from its gas operations, water company profits went
solely to reduce the price of water.
Chamberlain also appreciated the organizational advan-
tages of local government control. By unifying the town's
two gas companies, the Corporation of Birmingham v;as able
to eliminate duplication in works and staff, and achieve
-^Borough of Birmingham, A Short History of the Passing
of the Birmingham (CorporatiorTj Gas Act and bhe f.irmm'-ham
r Corporation) ..'ater Act, v/ith the L^Doechos of the Mayor
(Joseph Chamberlain, Ego.) in Support of these Measures, and
also in :.'avour of the Adoption of ' the Arbizans' and Labour-
ers Dv;ellin-:G' Iraprovement Act (Birmingham: General ir'urpo-
ses Committee, 1875) i PP- 5o-59- John Thackray Bunco,
History of the Corporation of Birnin.Tham , 2 vols. (Birming-
hara:" Cornish Brothers, 1 873-1 c34), 2:^1-1 5
•
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economies of ccale. Political unity had economic effects:
the companies no longer faced a hostile town council in
approachinc Parliament for powers. The Corporation could
expand services more cheaply than could the private compan-
ies; it did not have to pay a dividend, and it could borrow
money at three percent rather than five percent. Thus,
Chamberlain felt municipal operation of utilities to be
superior to private operation. The Town Council, close to
the people, was sensitive to public needs. It did not have
to reconcile public demands with those of private investors.
Its democratic nature made it more efficient.
Chamberlain was prepared to severely limit private
enterprise within the public sphere. In 1882, as President
of the Board of Trade, he carried an Electric Lichtinf; Act,
which assured municipalities extensive powers over electric
liGhtinn. Electricity was an experimental medium in the
1880s, so the Act allowed a town council to supply electri-
city itself, or to license a private company to take the
risks. If it chose to allow private exploitation, the
Council retained veto power over all licenses granted within
its jurisdiction. The law restricted the rif^hts of licensed
companies; they were held to strict standards of perform-
ance, and the municipality had the power of compulsory pur-
chase on easy terms after twenty-one years.
Chamberlain originally proposed seven years. Elsie E.
Gulley, Joseph Chamberlain and Knr^lish Gocial Politics (N.Y.
Columbia University i/ress, 'l^'.^) / pp. -lyo-y).
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Chamberlain's other approach to municipal extension
was called improvement. Improvement was a technical term
in the vocabulary of local government, describing construc-
tion which upgraded the town's services: streets, drainage,
lighting, water supply, and sanitation. Chamberlain wanted
to use improvement to intervene temporarily to correct some
evil or abuse, such as slum housing or poor conditions for
public health. Improvement involved greater difficulties
than municipalization. Chamberlain applied it to many of
the leading social issues which arose during his career,
but all of his proposals bear a family resemblance, especially
in technical details, to the Birmingham Improvement Scheme.
The Improvement Scheme was Justified as a sanitary
measure under the Artizans' Dwellings Act of 1875. Chamber-
lain proposed that the Corporation of Birmingham purchase
and demolish a slum area near the town's center. He linked
this sanitary district to an improvement district for up-
grading and expanding the adjacent business district. To
the Council, Chamberlain drew a picture of "a street as
broad as a Parisian boulevard from Nev; Street [in the busi-
ness district] to Aston Road [at the far end of the sani-
tary district]" without the cost of a local act. The scheme
justified this street, later named Corporation Street, as
an approach to the sanitary district; it v/ould provide ven-
tilation and raise property values in the sanitary area.
By linking the districts in one scheme, Chamberlain over-
3^
came ratepayer opposition which might have blocked either
portion of the scheme.^
The improvement district was vital to the financial
success of the entire scheme. The Council began reconstruc-
tion at New Street, where the most valuable property was
located. Opponents charged that the sanitary district was
being ignored, but Chamberlain and the Council refused to
demolish the entire district at once, as it would overtax
the town's construction industry and depress land values if
all sites came on the market at once. Expenses could be
kept down only if the Council received income from old
buildings still standing while phasing in income from new
sites. The Council deliberately let out nev/ sites slov/ly
to avoid depressing rents. The scheme faced financial dif-
ficulties in the depression of the 1870s and 1880s. The
market for new sites was poor, and the scheme did not return
a profit until the 1890s. In the nid-1S80s, the interest
on the Improvement Scheme's debt cost the Council £20,000
a year. Nonetheless, the diversity of the scheme and its
promoters ' shrewdness in negotiations with property ov/nors
made the scheme one of the fev/ to survive the depression
^Borough of Birmingham, Short History , pp. 81-85- Tes-
timony of Joseph Chamberlain, June 17, 183''+, "Report of the
Royal Commission on the Housing of the V/orking Classes",
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons)




Chamberlain's success with municipalization and im-
provement encouraged him to apply them as solutions to other
social problems. The two approaches also had other benefits
which encouraged him to recommend them. They fit in closely
to his social and economic views and reinforced the kind of
social politics he wished to pursue. For Chamberlain,
local government was closely integrated with the business
system.
ii
Efficiency was the criterion which Chamberlain used to
separate public from private enterprise. He rejected the
modern political habit v;hich allows government to intervene
in the economy, but loads it with so many limitations that
it must operate uneconomically and inefficiently. He did
not consider local government enterprise inherently ineffi-
cient, provided it had the same freedom to act as private
enterprise. He wanted public and private enterprise clearly
defined and separated. Local authorities had the right to
^Birmingham Liberal Association, Rotton Park V/ard, The
Improvement Scheme and the Coming Elections; A Speech by
Councillor R. Tan^'-ve, Aurusb 25, 1879 (Birmingham, 18793*
"Royal Commission on Housing" , Parliamentary Papers , p. ^i-^'l ?
q. 12,436, p. ^59, q. 12,587, p. 4-60, q. 12, -012. Isa Briggs,
History of Birmingham , vol. 2: Borou'^h and Citv, 1865-1'^38
(London: Oxford university Press, 19i>2), pp. 86-8^. K. P.
Hennocl:, "Finance and Politics in Urban Local Government in
England, 1835-1900", Historical Journal 6 (1965) : ^'^23
.
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be "supreme within their special jurisdiction", and private
enterprise existed within the public area on sufferance.
But, public o^risdiction was limited to matters which "the
community can do better than the private individual" be-
cause of their magnitude, necessity of concerted action,
or interference with private rights. He insisted that local
government must adhere to certain rules in order to main-
tain the efficiency which was its charter to enter the
7economy. '
Chamberlain considered the individual responsibility
of Councillors to be the pivotal element of both popular
control and efficiency in local government. In this quality,
it was superior both to private enterprise and national
government. Local authorities could avoid pitfalls through
the Councillors' intimate knowledge of their localities,
and a local bureaucracy small enough to be managed. His
prescription was tailored to the English municipal consti-
tution. Tovm councils v;ere large: Birmingham had sixty-
four council members, Manchester had seventy-two, Liverpool
had eighty. Through the committee system. Councillors
exercised detailed daily control over administration. Cham-
berlian praised the English local government civil service,
but warned against "a too great extension of officialism,"
His projects of municipalization and improvement
"^Borough of Birmingham, Short History , p. 9. Chamber-
lain, "Municipal Government" , ~i;ew i^eview , p. 658.
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were to be conceived and executed by Councillors on their
own responsibility and Gudcement. The lar^e size of the
Council made then close to their constituents and secured
the popular control which made the system work.^
Despite his activism, Chamberlain felt that Councils
should not get too far ahead of their constituents. Legis-
lation in advance of popular sentiment would fail. Progres
must be real and secure, backed by public sentiment. The
only way to accomplish this was by "o;radually increasing
[local government's] functions and responsiblities and so
raising its tone." Through increased responsibilities.
Councillors would gain a greater appreciation of "the dig-
nity and importance of municipal work." Even such features
as municipal titles and regalia would increase public inter
est and attention. The result would be a municipal patriot
ism animating the entire locality, making local government
a truly popular and efficient institution. Birmingham had
achieved this state of grace. He recommended that his town
be emulated by other localities, and even held it up as a
standard for the British Parliament.^
o
"Royal Commission on Housing", Parliamentary Papers ,
p. ^5^1 12,^91-92. Chamberlain, London i-iunicipal Life ,
pp. 8-15 • Chamberlain, "Municipal Government", Mow "{cvTow ,
p. 655.
Q
^Joseoh Chamberlain to John Morley, January 13, 1877,
January 25*, 1833, Chamberlain PaDers , JC 3/5V131,
Joseph Chamberlain to the Birmingham Town Council, November
9, 1876, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches , ed. Charles V/. Boyd,
2 vols. ( Boston: Houghton Mii'llin Company, 191''0 , 1:71.
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Chamberlain's localism was limited to communities no
larger than Birmingham. He felt that the advantages of
local government would disappear as a city grew beyond its
optimum size. No more than half a million people, he said,
could be efficiently administered from one center. Above
that size, Councillors would lose their detailed personal
knowledge of the district, and their close relationship
with their constituents.'^^
Chamberlain was sensitive to the legal and financial
details that underpinned local government economy, v;hich
he considered to be at the root of its efficiency. Where
most businessmen saw local government as a source of un-
profitable expenditure and irritating taxation, he empha-
sised its usefulness as an agency for social investment,
paying dividends in health, happiness, prosperity, comfort,
and intellegence of the community. He insisted that the
national government recognize the consequences of its social
legislation. Much of the activity of local authorities in-
volved the execution of national Acts, such as the Sanitary
Acts, and they had a right to expect Parliamentary support
in the form of Exchequer loans. Indebtedness was an invost-
Joseph Chamberlain, "Memorandum on London Government", Decem-
ber 21, 1881, Chamberlain Papers, JC 6/2/8/:^, also Public
Record Office, GAB 57/7/1, pp. 1-3. Chamberlain, London
Municipal Life , pp. ^-5*
10
Chamberlain, "Municipal Government", New Review
,
p. 6^6. Chamberlain, London Municipal Life , pp. 10-1^;.




ment for the community, often paying a handsome financial
return. The capital projects upon which the money was
spent made the money among the most secure in the kingdom,
and Chamberlain did not see why local authorities should
have to pay off their debt at all. The greater security of
their loans allowed local authorities to obtain a lower
rate of interest than private businesses. That leverage,
economies of scale, and the unification of local services,
enabled the municipality to employ resources more efficiently
than could a private concern.
In Chamberlain's view, local government enterprise
should be allowed unfettered operation within its proper
sphere. But, efforts to benefit individuals at public
expense raised the cost of municipal enterprise. Chamber-
lain felt this v/as the major difficulty facing local authori-
ties in their efforts to solve social problems. Especially,
the local authority should not be put at a financial dis-
advantage when it took land by compulsion. It should pay
only a price which a v/illing seller might obtain from a
v/illing purchaser on the open market, with no allowance for
compulsory purchase or prospective value. He was aware of
the difficulties of arbitration, especially v/here disturb-
ance of business was involved, but he held to his position
^"^5 Hansard 2^9:622-25 (August 9, 1879). 5 Hansard
233:1726-27 (April 23, 1877). Borough of BirmingHaPo^
Short History , pp. 13-1^. Chamberlain, London Municipal
Life, p. 22.
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that fair value should be paid and nothing morej^
To Chamberlain, the success of local government depen-
ded upon a sense of its proper limits. He drew a sharp
line between the powers he considered necessary for local
government to function effectively and the sphere of private
enterprise. Local government, he felt, should confine it-
self to administration of services for the entire popula-
tion and temporary interventions, such as improvement.
Especially, "all monopolies which are sustained in any v/ay
by the State ought to be in the hands of the representatives
of the people." But, the municipality should not under-
take projects which would bring it into competition with
legitimate private enterprise. Public invasion of the pri-
vate sphere would be v/rong, expensive and unsuccessful,
l^ereas public enterprise was more efficient than private
enterprise in its ovm sphere, it v;as less so outside of it.
It would only disrupt private enterprise, and fail to attain
its object.
12
"Royal Commission on Housing", Parliamentary Paners
,
p. 448, q. 12,415, p. 454, q. 12,482, p. 4bO, q. 12,605:
Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, November 21, 1885,
Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43886, f. 85. Joseph Chamberlain
to Henry Broadhurst, August 28, 1885, quoted in Neal Ivunze,
"English V/orking Class Housing: A Problem of Social Control",
Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles,
1971, p. 65. Joseph Chamberlain, "Labourers' and Artizans'
Dwellings", Fortni-htly Review , N.S. , 54 (December, 1885):
767. Joseoh Cnamberlam to ";villiam Dv/yer Gray, December 8,
1884, Chamberlain Papers, JC 8/6/51/5. "Royal Commission
on Housing", Parliamentary Papers , pp. 455-54, qq. 12,477-84,
p. 459, qq. 12,5a3-89a.
1
5
^Borough of Birmingham, Short History, p. 9.
^1
Chamberlain's housing proposals illustrate how sharply
he drew the line between public and private enterprise.
When the housing issue arose in the 1880s, he recommended
improvement schemes as a solution. His opponents immediately
pointed out that the Birmingham Tov;n Council had built no
artizans' dwellings in the nine years of the Improvement
Scheme, despite the fact that over five hundred dwellings
had been demolished in the sanitary district. Chamberlain
replied that none were needed, and rejected the notion of
public building proQects. He proposed to allow local au-
thorities to demolish old buildings, but private contractors
were to construct new ones. If local government entered
the construction market, "they would so much disturb the
market that they would stop the supply". Builders, afraid
of the competition, would stop building working class housing
voluntarily. Though Chamberlain favored a mixed economy,
he did so to preserve and strengthen the basic market system.
Local government enterprise was to enter the market as one
among many types of enterprise. It would supply services
or attack social problems insoluble by private means.
14
J. M. Brindley, The Homes of the V/orking Classes and
the Promises of the Rt. Hon. Joseph ChambGrlain , H.P. (./oGt-
minister : Ilational Union of Conservative and Constitutional
Associations, 1884). "Royal Commission on Housing", Parlia-
mentary Papers , p. 447, q. 12,598, p. 453, q. 12,465-7T;
p. 460, q. 12 ,614. During the controversy over London hous-
ing in 1884, Chamberlain made a temporary exception in
favor of London, because of its greater size and property
values. But, he abandoned the exception in the 1890s.




Control was at the root of Chamberlain's localism.
He had confidence in local government because he felt it
would be run by his own kind of people—wealthy businessmen
interested in politics. They would form local political
elites, each in firm control of a working class following.
Behind these local elites stood the national state, run by
a coalition of such elites, and in control of the sanctions
which supported their rule. The political and social sys-
tems which Chamberlain manipulated to assure the control
of local government related local government intimately to
the other elements of localism.
Chamberlain discussed local government in a combination
of democratic and business vocabulary. To underpin its
legitimacy, he advocated that local government be elected
on the widest possible franchise. Its peculiar excellence,
he said, was to be close to the electors and able to re-
spond to their needs. As a democratic institution, local
government v/as "the best political education for a free
people". It allowed men who would never be able to enter
national government to distinguish themselves in local gov-
ernment, and make decisions about a thousand details of
their fellow citizens' daily lives.
qq. 12,601-02. Chamberlain, London Municipal Life , pp. 17-22.
''^^ Hansard 238:908-13 (March ?, 1878). Chamberlain,
"Municipal Institutions", The Forum, pp. 267-68. Chamber-
^3
Despite its popular justification, Chamberlain's sys-
tem of local elites rested on aristocratic notions which
were rapidly becoming outmoded in the 1880s. Councillors,
he held, were to be men of wealth and leisure, taking up
public service for the best of motives:
If he is ambitious, what nobler position can he
hope to fill than that of the first citizen of
this great community? If he is a philanthroDist
,
where else can he expect to be influential in
saving the lives of thousands of persons and in
bringing health to tens of thousands of homesT'lS
An active municipal program would reflexively justify dom-
ination by businessmen, for who else was qualified to ad-
minister such schemes? Like any aristocracy, Chamberlain
felt that business elites held their rule by superior train-
ing and ability. Without their participation, local govern-
ment would decline into inefficiency and corruption. He
had no sympathy with businessmen who complained of rising
rates while refusing to participate. If businessmen would
have the local government they v/anted, they must enter the
17political arena and recruit a following. '
lain, "Municipal Government", New Review , p. 656.
1
6
Chamberlain to the Birmingham Tovm Council, November
9, 1876, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches , 1:71-
17
'ibid. Joseph Chamberlain to Villiers Blakemore,
September 2^^, 1869, Chamberlain Papers, JC 26/9. In Bir-
mingham and other towns, businessmen were attracted to the
gas and v/ater committees, which offered the best opnortunity
to use their business skills. Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963; Colophon Books edition, 1970),
p. 223.
^4
Without follov/ers, businessmen could not be political
leaders. Chamberlain was contemptuous of middle class peopl
who took refuge in negative conservatism. He felt that it
could only lead to open class warfare and working class
victory. He favored appeasement:
if they are uneasy or discontented, we have to
seek with them as well as for them the causes
and remedy of their dissatisfaction. In this
way it may be easy to deserve and win their
confidence, and thus to influence them to a wise
and moderate use of power which cannot possibly
be withheld. ^8
^
During his career as a Radical, Chamberlain sought to
gain working class backing, to institutionalize it, and to
focus it in pursuit of his own goals. He exaggerated the
danger of revolution for these ends, but he may not have
been entirely free of apprehension himself. During one of
the interminable Cabinet debates over domestic policy, he
wrote an exasperated note to Dilke: "This is worse than
Egypt. Except you and me, the rest of the Cabinet are help-
lessly drifting into Revolution." He de-emphasised class
legislation, speaking constantly of the general interests
of the community in an outdated vocabulary of natural rights
He treated working class demands as isolated grievances, to
8Joseph Chamberlain, "The Liberal Party and Its Lead-
ers", Fortnightly Review , N.S. 20 (September, 1873) :295.
See also, Joseph Chamberlain, "The Next Page of the Liberal
Programme", Fortnirghtly Review , N.S. 22 (October, 187^0 :^*0S,
^15-16.
19Note in Chamberlain's handwriting, undated, Dilke
Papers, Add. Mss. 43887, f. 153.
be settled within the system:
We may make it clear that equal justice and im-
partial lecislation are to be attained throuf-h
the usual channels of a free and orderly national
life; and anarchy and revolution v;ill be impos-
sible when all gust claims are satisfied by ordi-
nary constitutional processes. 20
Local Government was one agency for solving these problems.
It could only succeed if its leaders remained "in close
sympathy and relationship with the mass of people."
The Birmincham Liberal Association institutionalized
that relationship. Through it, the Birminchara business
elite mobilized their personal and social power to dominate
local politics. They supplied the Association's funds and
staffed its upper levels, while artizans staffed the lower
levels. Throunh its ward organization, the Association
mobilized voter support, while periodic meetings and publi-
city kept interest high among committed party workers. The
Association's leaders took an active role in community
affairs, led in contributing to charities, and had a claque
to constantly praise their services to the tovm.^^
Three quarters of the members of the Birmingham Six
Hundred belonged to the working class. Their presence
20
Chamberlain, "The Liberal Party and Its Leaders",
Fortnightly Reviev/ , p. 295.
21
Joseph Chamberlain to the Birmingham Town Council,
November 9, 1876, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches , 1:71.
22
A Birmingham Tory, "The Local Working of the Birming-




"-'^Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, November 25, 1876,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5^/15^1-.
^6
showed the success of Chamberlain's policy of actively
seeking working class support. The Liberal Association's
dominance of town politics relied on a longstanding alliance
between Birmingham's Radical businessmen and its artizans.
Even before the Liberal Association entered municipal elec-
tions, Birmingham Liberals outnumbered Conservatives by a
ratio of three-to-two. The Liberal Association simply or-
ganized these Liberals and discouraged opposition.
Chamberlain argued that the caucus v/as a voluntary
association of the majority to implement its own program.
It could not create majorities where they did not exist,
he contended, and it expressed opinion rather than made it.
Instead of being an oligarchy, "The aim of the caucus is
essentially democratic: it is to provide for the full and
efficient representation of the will of the majority, and
for its definite expression in the government of the people."
But, Chamberlain distorted the term majority out of recog-
nition, lie assumed that there was a true majority opinion
on every issue, and that the leaders of the majority never
became part of the minority. His argument was a poor copy
of Rousseau; he substituted "will of the majority" for "will
of the people". He used majority to designate a system
rather than the people who made it up. However, his claim
Trygve R. Tholfsen, "The Origins of the Birmingham
Caucus", The Historical Journal 2 ( 1959) : 161-84.
^^Joseph Chamberlain, "The Caucus", Fortnight! y Review,
N.S., 50 (November, 1878) :724.
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to represent the majority was necessary to the legitimacy
of his system.
Chamberlain recommended the Birmingham Liberal Asso-
ciation to all tovms as the model for political organiza-
tion. The political and social requirements of the caucus
structure reinforced his concern for the size of munici-
palities. The social dominance of the business class which
underpinned his method of political control depended upon
the personal prominence of the Association's leaders. Above
his limit of 500,000 people, that prominence disappeared.
His entire political system depended upon this type of con-
trol of local institutions. It guaranteed the efficiency
and probity of local government, which implemented his pro-
grams. As such, it was the building block of a national
system.
IV
Chamberlain pursued his local goals within a national
framework. His system of local elites presupposed some struc
ture to link them together. Of course, local governments
were linked administratively through the national government,
but this was unsatisfactory to Chamberlain. The aristocracy
was still the most powerful voice in national politics; Radi-
cals and Nonconformists were a small minority. Radicals did
not become a majority of the parliamentary Liberal party
until after Chamberlain left it in 1886. Chamberlain was
^8
looking for a political structure to focus the power of
Britain's urban elites and give them control of the state.
For nine years, his mechanism for doing this was the
National Liberal Federation. Founded in Birmingham in 18??,
the Federation linl.ed together the urban Liberal Associations
under Birmingham leadership. The Federation advanced no
programs; the only requirement for membership was that a
local Liberal Association be organized on a democratic basis.
But, the representatives of other provincial towns were
often less concerned to increase their national influence
than to prevent Birmingham domination of their politics.
The Federation, therefore, was more of a platform for Bir-
mingham's elite to advance their goals nationally than it
was any genuine coalition of elites.
^'^
If Chamberlain misjudged the political temper in other
large provincial tovms, he encountered greater problems when
he attempted to extend his system beyond them. Difficulties
showed up most clearly in London, Ireland and the rural
areas.
During the 1870s and 1880s, London was the only British
26
T. W. Heyck, The Dimensions of British Radicalism;
Ireland (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
^97^), shows the growth of Radical strength, pp. 1^4, 2$7-65.
27Proceedings Attending the Formation of the Rational
Federation of Liberal /.GsociafcionG ; with ..enort oj" C onL'or-
enco M'Gld in .^irmin.-nam on Thursday. i;ay ylsi;, 1o7'; (Mr-
mmgham: The "Journal" Printing Offices, 187?]. "'I'he nat-
ional Liberal Federation; Its General Ob.jects and 'mmedia t
e
^'^or\ UJirramgham: i^ationai Liberal Federation, 1880).
^9
city significantly above his limit of 500,000 population
for a viable local government. He was consistently hostile
to a unitary municipality for London: "the essence and vir-
tue of local government is that it should be local, and it
is ridiculous to use the word in reference to a nation of
five millions of people." Instead, he proposed to elevate
the Metropolitan Vestries to municipal status. As foci of
municipal patriotism, the new metropolitan boroughs would
concentrate local energy and produce an active program.
Chamberlain's proposals were implemented in the London Gov-
ernment Act of 1899. The result was, in the words of critics,
"twenty-nine Birminghams instead of one London."
In Ireland, the political organizing skill of the
Nationalists attracted his attention. Local autonomy might
take the steam out of the Nationalist movement. In 1885,
he proposed a scheme for County Councils and a Central Board
in Ireland. He openly admitted that his purpose was to di-
vert the Nationalist leadership with the opportunities of
T 1 29local power. Once discontent had been dampened with respon-
sibility, the Nationalists would become a manageable local
28
Chamberlain, London Municipal Life , pp. 4-5, 12. Cham-
berlain, "Memorandum on London Government", Public Record
Office, pp. 1-3. K. B. Smellie, A History of Local Govern-
ment , 4th ed. (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 19b8;, p. 152.
29
-^Joseph Chamberlain at Swansea, February 1, 1885, quoted
in Stephen Gwynn and G. M. Tugwell, The Life of the P t. ;'on.
Sir Charles T)ilke , 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1917), 1:3'i'6.
Joseph Chamberlain, "Memorandum on Local Government in Ire-
land", April 25, 1885, Chamberlain Papers, JC 8/5/1/12.
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elite and enter his coalition.
In the English countryside, Chamberlain found no com-
parable local elite to be his ally. The Counties were domi
nated by landlords and farmers, both hostile to Charaber-
lainite Radicalism. Favoring the agricultural laborers,
Chamberlain refused to support representative local govern-
ment in the Counties until the franchise was extended.
Though he sought no institutional subordination of rural
areas to urban elites, Chamberlain hoped to supply the poll
tical leadership of the countryside from the cities, thus
reinforcing his coalition.
In the early 1880s, Chamberlain supported land reform.
Chamberlain and his associate Jesse Ceilings (who became
closely identified with the issue) rejected proposals for
land nationalization, and concentrated on using government
purchasing power to create a class of peasant proprietors.
Their plan resembled the Birmingham Improvement Scheme in
its technical details. Local governments would be given
power to take agricultural land by compulsion, paying only
fair market value. They could then sell small holdings to
agricultural laborers with a three percent mortgage, making
them independent yeoman farmers. The object of the plan
Hansard 238:908-13 (March 7, 1878).
51 David Aronson, "Jesse Ceilings, Agrarian Radical,
1880-1892", Ph.D. dissertation. University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, 1975, PP. 62-73.
51
was independence: the state was to intervene to chanr^e the
social and economic balance in the countryside, but after
that it was to withdraw. Continuinr^ state commitment, an
important element of twentieth century programs, was missinp;
After achieving: a new balance, the market was to be left
alone. Accordingly, the project must pay for itself. The
state would loan money on favorable terms, but it would not
give any away. Ultimately, the yeoman would pay for his
o\m land. The program was to be administered by local au-
thorities, though the Exchequer would float the mortgage.
From the beginning, Ceilings was bedevilled with local
agencies obstructing his Acts, but neither he nor Chamber-
lain questioned the necessity for local administration.
Chamberlain's localism had its limits. He never chal-
lenged the strict subordination of English local government
to national government. As in the case of public and privat
enterprise, he assumed that the line betv/een national and
local power could be drawn clearly and sharply. He insis-
ted on the supremacy of Parliament and national institutions
and never questioned the doctrine of ultra vires . He ex-
pected Parliament to uphold the authority and dignity of
local government, legislate in its favor, and supply admin-
istrative, financial, and legal support for its efforts. He
opposed state expansion at local government's expense. In
1877, he attacked the transfer of prisons from municipal to
central control as "a distinct slur on local government and
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management", despite the financial advantages. But, he had
no compunction about extending central power if it would
aid local government against private monopolies. His Elec-
tric Lighting Act of 1882 gave the Board of Trade extensive
pov/er to make rules for granting licenses. Only a year
later, a Parliamentary committee was disturbed at the Board's
vigorous use of these powers.
Irish Nationalism most thoroughly tested Chamberlain's
conception of the limits of localism. He refused to go be-
yond a narrow and rigid conception of central-local rela-
tions. His proposed Irish Central Board v;as explicitly not
a parliament. It was burdened with the host of restrictions
v/hich limited English local government. All efforts to win
Chamberlain to Home Rule foundered on his feeling that there
was nothing "between my scheme of National Councils and ab-
solute separation." V/hen Gladstone sought Cabinet sup-
port for his Home Rule bill. Chamberlain drew out the legal
status of the proposed Irish Parliament. His questions
defined the legal limits of English local government
.^"^^
^^3 Hansard , 232:^36-38 (February 15, 1877). Frederick
Clifford, A Hi'story of Private Bill Legislation , 2 vols.
(London: Butterworth ' s , 1C85-37; reprint ed. London: Frank
Cass and Company, 1968), 1:237-4-0, 2^5.
-^Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, December 24, 1885,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5V669.
^ Chamberlain's questions v;ere : 1) V.Tiether the Irish
representation was to cease at V.'estminister? 2) V/hethcr
the power of taxation, including customs and excise, v;as to
be given to the Irish Parliament? 3) V/hether the appoint-
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Convinced by Gladstone's replies that the Irish Parliament
was unlike any English local authority, Chamberlain resif^ned
and went into opposition. He was willinr; to moderate his
scheme of Councils and extend broad powers to Irish councils
and provincial legislatures, but real sovereign power was
something else. He would grant the autonomy enjoyed by
Birmingham, but no more than that.^^
The remaining chapters of this dissertation will con-
sider, in a chronological framework, the relationship of
Chamberlain's localism to his social politics. That rela-
tionship rested on the factors v/hich we have discussed in
this chapter: local government as an economic institution,
the criterion of efficiency, control, and the relationship
of his localism to national politics.
Chamberlain's concern for local government was, at bot-
tom, social. The Birmingham business elite dominated the
ment of the judges and the magistracy was to vest in the
Irish authority? ^) Whether the Irish Parliament was to
have authority in every matter not specially excluded by
the Act constituting it or whether it was only to have au-
thority in matters specially delegated to it by statute?
Gladstone answered yes to the first three questions and
specified the first alternative in question four, the exact
opposite of English practice. Joseph Chamberlain, A Political
Kemoir, 1880-1892 , ed. C. H. B. Howard (London: Batchwood
Press, l^:?^;, pp. 198-99.
35-^Joseph Chamberlain, "Memorandum on Ireland", March,
1885, Chamberlain Paoers , JC 8/5/1/16. A Radical [Joseph
Chamberlain], "A Raaical View of the Irish Crisis", Fort-
nightly Review , N.S. 59 (February, 1886) :275-8^.
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town more by careful manipulation of their social supremacy
than by formal political structures. This was amply demon-
strated in 1888 when Chamberlain and his followers lost con-
trol of the Birmingham Liberal Association, and yet retained
their grip on the tov/n's politics. In justifying his local-
ism, Chamberlain appealed to the concept of natural leaders.
It was an aristocratic concept with was gaining adherents
among the industrial leadership in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Its diffusion made the middle classes more like the
aristocracy and so eased their assimilation into a national
elite.
But, social politics had a more restricted meaning in
the late nineteenth century. It described specifically the
programs and policies which middle class politicians put
forward to win, or maintain, working class support. Local-
ism was central to Joseph Chamberlain's social politics.
Before the 1890s, almost all of his positive proposals for
social reform rested on local government. At various times,
he proposed that education, housing, unemployment, land re-
form, temperance, and Irish Nationalism be solved within
the framework of local government. No matter how radical
his rhetoric. Chamberlain's concrete proposals were basic-
ally conservative, because they v/ere to be administered by
local elites according to Chamberlain's standards of local
government efficiency.
Chamberlain's social politics were designed to take
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the edge off discontent, to tinker with the economic
system in order to make it more acceptable to the mass of
the population. The real conservatism in his system lay
in its application. Localism gave him a collection of ready
solutions to social problems. Its very flexibility blinded
him to other solutions. He blamed landlords for bad housing,
rejecting solutions which dealt with low working class in-
come. He approached unemployment with simplistic and pal-
liative solutions, ignoring deeper factors. V/hat is sur-
prising to us is that for half of his career, his contem-
poraries considered him a dangerous—or exciting—radical.
Chamberlain was a political activist, not a theorist.
He used commonplace ideas to support positions he wished
to take for other reasons. Consequently, his prescriptions
for local government were a Jumble of ideas in current cir-
culation. His criterion of efficiency illustrates some of
the confusion in his thinking. He did not separate norma-
tive and empirical statements. He held that local govern-
ment enterprise was most efficient within a certain sphere
36
In 1888, as President of the Local Government Board,
Chamberlain issued an order to Poor Law Guardians which
allowed them to hire unemployed workers at low wages for
public works projects. Justifying his proposals, he said,
"It v/ill remove one great danger, viz. that public senti-
ment should go wholly over to the unemployed, and render
impossible that state sternness to which you and I equally
attach importance. 3y offering reasonable v/ork at the lov/-
est v/age to the really industrious, we may secure the power
of being very strict with the loafer and "the confirmed pau-
per." Joseph Chamberlain to Beatrice Potter [IVebb] , March
5, 1836, quoted in Peter Fraser, Joser^h Chamborlain; Radical -
ism and Empire, 1868-191^ (London: Cassell .:c Co., 196b), p.
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because he felt that it should be most efficient in that
area. In the private sector, he held that it v/as less
efficient because he felt that it should be less efficient.
He judged efficiency in an ideal situation. Many of his
prescriptions, such as the right to take land at fair mar-
ket value, never existed, even in Birmingham. He arbi-
trarily decided v;here local government enterprise v/as more,
or less, efficient than private enterprise. Efficiency
justified businessman dominance of local government—but
which v;as premise and v/hich v/as conclusion?
57 "Royal Commission on Housing", Parliamentary Papers,





1 8 6 9 - 1 886: ATTACK
From the beginning of his political career until 1886,
Chamberlain was a Radical, and for much of that time a
leading one. His national political career began simul-
taneously with his local one. He became a member of the
Birmingham Town Council in November, 1869, and chairman
of the Executive Committee of the National Education League
a month later. For four years, the League was his chief
political activity. Though he did good work on some Town
Council committees, he often missed meetings. Even his
fame in the town v/as a result of his activity on the School
Board, not the Council. By 1875, Chamberlain was clearly
aiming at a seat in Parliament. Had he won it, he might
have been no more closely tied to a specific locality than
most other politicians.
He failed to gain a seat, and instead became famous
as a reforming Mayor of Birmingham. V/hen he entered Par-
liament in 1876, he did so as a representative of his o\m
city. V/ith a solid political base in Birmingham, Chamber-
lain applied the lessons of his term as Mayor to national
politics. As he had fashioned a local coalition for reform
in Birmingham, he tried to forge a national coalition of
urban leaders. His object v/as to achieve national pov/er
for himself and his supporters. His move amounted to a
sustained attack on the role of the aristocracy in politics.
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But, England was not Birmingham v;rit large. He faced
stronger class rivalries, entrenched conservatism, and a
difficult and ambiguous relationship with William E. Glad-
stone, the leader of the Liberal party. Chamberlain saw
the rise of English socialism as a threat to his power and
ambitions. He tried to assert his Radicalism as an alter-
native. In 1885 and 1886, his Radical leadership failed,
and his coalition of local elites turned on him and drove
him into the political wilderness.
CHAPTER III
MAYOR OF BIRMINGHAM
Joseph Chamberlain first put his localism into practice
while he was Mayor of Birmingham from 1873 to 1876. As
Mayor, he applied his business attitudes and skills to
politics, turning Birmingham into a showcase for municipal
reform. He did not depart significantly from established
national patterns of municipal reform; his contribution was
as a leader who made things work. He took advantage of a
broad national and local consensus as to the direction in
which municipal reform should go. His major departure in
municipal reform was to fuse municipal and national politics.
After 1873, the Birmingham Liberal Association supported
his municipal reform program at the polls. By 1875, Cham-
berlain's personal ascendancy in Birmingham politics gave
him a permanent political base. Birmingham localism was
thereafter the basis of his power.
Chamberlain was elected to the Birmingham Town Council
in November, 1869. He was recruited by William Harris,
Secretary to the Birmingham Liberal Association, and George
Dixon,. Member of Parliament and a former Mayor. Until Cham^
berlain became Mayor in 1873, he was better known as a poli-
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tical leader in the town than as a member of the Council.
During his campaign for re-election to the Council in 1872,
he faced criticism for his poor attendance at Council meet-
ings .
A month after Chamberlain entered the Town Council,
he became Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National
Education League, which was led by the same Birmingham men
who entered the Council as reformers. The League diverted
his political energies until 1875. In December, 1870, the
Birmingham reformers suffered a shock when the better organ-
ized Conservatives won control of the first Birmingham
School Board. Chamberlain led the Liberal minority on the
Board through three years of hot partisan debate, and became
one of Birmingham's best knovm political figures.^
Until 187^, Chamberlain tried to enter national poli-
tics. He developed a friendship with John Morley, editor
of the Fortnightly Review . In September, 1873, the Fort-
nightly published an article by Chamberlain, "The Liberal
Party and Its Leaders", in which he attacked the Liberal
Cabinet and represented Radicalism as the wave of the future.
In October, 1873, he accepted a candidacy for Parliament at
1 Newspaper clippings on the 1872 election. Chamberlain
Papers , JC V2/1-8. E. P. Honnock, Fit and Proper PerGons;
Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth Century Urban Govornrncn t;~
(London: Edward Arnold LPublishersJ Ltd., 1973), pp. 31-3^.
2
Francis Adams, History of the Elementary School Con-
test in England (London: ChaDman and liall, 1882), po. 196-97.
Birmin^ma.-Ti Uaily Post , October 10, 1873, p. 5.
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Sheffield, but was defeated in the General Election of 187^.
Temporarily frustrated in his national ambitions, he con-
centrated on Birmingham municipal affairs.^
A general impetus for municipal reform existed among
Birmingham's Nonconformist business elite in the 1860s.
George Dawson, minister of the Church of the Savior, started
the movement among the Unitarians and Quakers in 1861. He
supported European nationalist movements and admired Mazzini.
Applying Mazzinism locally, Dawson declared that "a town is
a solemn organism through which should flow, and in which
should be shaped all the highest, loftiest and truest ends
of man's moral nature." Accordingly, "a great town exists
to discharge towards the people of that town the duties
that a great nation exists to discharge towards the people
of that nation." He founded the Town Crier , a satirical
reform magazine, and recruited wealthy businessmen for the
Town Council.
In 1867 > Robert William Dale, minister of Carr's Lane
Congregational Chapel, took up Dawson's message. He spread
it among orthodox dissenters: Congregationalists and Baptists.
As ministers, both Dawson and Dale were excluded from mem-
bership on the Tovm Council, but both served on the School
'^Joseph Chamberlain, "The Liberal Party and Its Leaders",
Fortninhtly Review , N.S. 1^ (September, 1873) : 287-302
.
/J.
Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons , pp. 61-79; for quote,
see p. 75.
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Board, and Dale was a leader of the Birmingham Liberal
Association. Their reform message covered many topics; it
was not specific to municipal reform. In municipal poli-
tics, the reformers concentrated on changing the membership
of the Town Council, and had no particular reforms to advo-
cate. They were equally interested in the education move-
ment, which diverted the reform leadership from municipal
politics for several years.
^
The reformers on the Council responded to specific
local problems, and found their first leaders among persons
already on the Council. William Harris, founder of the
Birmingham Liberal Association, led them until ill health
forced his retirement in 1871. He worked closely with
Alderman Thomas Avery, a Conservative who was Mayor in 186?
and 1868. Avery stood for narrowly defined financial re-
sponsibility. He was a stabilizing influence on the Council;
commentators used the balance (manufactured by his firm of
scales makers) to symbolize his personality. As chairman
of the Finance Committee, he tightened the Corporation's
financial procedures and reformed its method of servicing
its debt. By the early 1870s, Avery had an unassailable
reputation as an effective independent reformer.
-'^Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons , pp. 1 5*^-69
.
^Birmingham Faces and Places , August 1, 1888, pp. 51-
52. "Our Kepresentatives , VIII" , Birmingham Morning News ,
February 15, 1875» p. 5- Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons ,
pp. 105-06.
6^
The reformers faced an entrenched opposition of small-
scale tradesmen and shopkeepers, led by Alderman John Sadler
The Sadlerites' pov/er was concentrated in the Public V/orks
Committee, which controlled most tov;n services. They met
at the V/oodman tavern, near the Town Hall, to plan Council
strategy. The tavern became the symbol of their regime.
In 1871, a crisis over sewage pollution in nearby
rivers undermined V/oodman influence. The Court of Queen's
Bench ordered the Corporation to cease fouling the River
Tame. The crisis stimulated the Public V/orks Committee to
long-delayed action, but they did not satisfy Avery, v/ho
was supported by the reform party. Unable to answer his
criticisms, the Sadlerites challenged him to do better.
Avery and the reformers accepted the challenge and a Sewage
Inquiry Committee was appointed. Its report, v;hich the
Council accepted on October 26, 1871, was the first triumph
7of the reform party.
7
"^J. T. Bunce, History of the Corporation of Birmingham
,
2 vols. (Birmingham: Cornish Brothers', 1878-84 J), 2:126-28.
E. C. Osborne, Facts and Fin-ures in Relation to the Gev/a^Te
Question, Being the Gubstance of a Speech Delivered at a
Meetm'T of the Birmingham Tov/n Council, Juno 27th, 1871,
Published by
_
P.eouest , (Birmingham: E. C. Osborne, 1871).
Borough of Birm£n"hara, Proceedinrs of the Council (Birming-
ham: George Jones and Son, Town iiall Printing Office, 1872ff )
,
March 24, 1871, no. 7591, April 14, 1871, no. 7648-49, April
21, 1871, no. 7676-77, April 28, 1871, no. 7680, June 6, 1871,
no. 7748. Chamberlain was appointed to the committee but
declined to serve, Council Proceedings
, July 6, 1871, no.
7777. The committee's report recommended a dual program to
excluded material from the sev/ers (which had been designed
to carry water runoff only) and to treat sewage at the out-
let. To pay for the new system, the Corporation would bor-
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Their majority, however, was confined to the single
issue of sewage. The reformers failed to block Sadler's
election as Mayor a few weeks later. The decisive shift
in the balance of power came in early 1873, when the Sewage
Committee proposed transfer of the Nightsoil Department to
their jurisdiction from that of the Public Works Committee.
The issue v/as hotly contested, and the vote to make the
transfer broke the power of the Public V/orks Committee.
The reform party stabilized its control of the Council by
the middle of 1873, but it still had a restricted program




Until 1873, Birmingham's local politics was separate
from its national politics. In national politics, the town
was overwhelmingly Liberal, even Radical. The Birmingham
Liberal Association protected Liberal control of the borough'
three parliamentary seats, but it did not generally inter-
vene in municipal politics.*^ The reform party on the Town
row £32^,000 and obtain a Local Act for the purpose. For a
long-range solution, the committee recommended formation of
a regional drainage commission. "Report of the Sewage Inquiry
Committee", Council Proceedings , October 3, 1871, no. 7907.
o
Council Proceedings , November 9, 1871, no. 7938, Janu-
ary 7, 1873, no. 8586, January 14, 1873, no. 8589-95, Janu-
ary 21, 1873, no. 8596-8601, January 22, 1873, no. 8604-05.
Birmingham Daily Post , November 10, 1871, p. 6.
9̂In 1870, the Liberal Association intervened to prevent
Sebastian Evans, the Conservative party leader, from obtainin
a Council seat, but it was an isolated action. Hennock,
Fit and Proper Persons , pp. 133-3^»
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Council included both Liberals and Conservatives. Their
opponents, the Sadlerites, possessed Liberal credentials
as good as Chamberlain's.
The education controversy fused national and local
politics in Birmingham. Chamberlain and the other leaders
in the education controversy used their control of the
Liberal Association to win control of the School Board. In
1872, the Conservatives tried to defend their position by
attacking Liberal control of the Town Council. In March,
1873, the Liberal Association resolved to enter the muni-
cipal elections. The municipal and School Board elections
were held two weeks apart in November, 1873, which further
unified the contest. Chamberlain, who was to become both
School Board President and Mayor in the event of a Liberal
victory, led the Liberal forces.
The Liberal Association leaders represented the fight
as a straight party contest, but six of the ten contested
Council seats were fought between Liberal factions. Party
loyalty previously demanded only in parliamentary elections
was extended to the Association's candidates for Council
and School Board. Liberals who refused v;ere expelled. Pas-
sions ran high over denominational schools, though temper-
10Reform party leaders asked Chamberlain to become Mayor
v/hen V/illiam Brinsley, Sadler's assistant, announced his in-
tention of seeking the post. Nev/spaper Clipping, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC V2/61 . Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons ,
p. 137. Birminr-ham Daily Post , I'iarch 26, 1873, P. edi-
torial, March 27, 1873, p. 3.
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ance was a secondary issue. The Liberal Association claimed
victory: fifteen Liberals were elected to one Conservative.^'^
The victory was less sweeping when the contests between
Liberals are included. The reformers' net gain of friends
over foes actually amounted to one seat.'^^ The reform party
already controlled the Council, and the accumulated forces
of their opponents did not unseat them. Chamberlain was
elected Mayor on November 10, 1873.
11
As Mayor and President of the School Board, Chamberlain
fused the separate parts of Birmingham politics into one
system centering on himself. He used the organizing strength
of the Liberal Association to support the reform party on
the Tov/n Council. Reflexively, the reform party's achive-
Birmingham Daily Post , September 12, 1875, p. 5; Sep-
tember 11, 187p, p. 8; September 13, 1873, p. 8; September
27, 1873, p. 5; September 29, 1873, p. 5; November 3, 1873,
p. ^. The Liberal , November 4, 1873, p. ^. Joseph Chamber-
lain to John Morley, November 19, 1873, Chamberlain Papers,
JC 5/5V28.
12Four seats changed hands. Liberal reformer Alfred
Arculus defeated Conservative incumbent Joseph V/adhams in
St. Martin's V/ard. Liberal reformer William' V/hite defeated
Liberal incumbent Michael Maher in St. Mary's V/ard. The
principal issue in both contests was Temperance; the losers
were the President and Counsel of the Licensed Victuallers
Association. In St. Paul's V/ard, Liberal incumbent John
Coppock lost his seat to Liberal Thomas Aston. Coppock was
a lukewarm friend of the reformers, but Aston was an enemy.
In the only Conservative victory, Henry Cox defeated refor-
mer Samuel V/hitworth in Bordesley V/ard for the seat of re-
tiring reformer Edmund Tonks.
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raents v/ere hailed as victories of the Liberal Association.
Conservative reformer Thomas Avery assented to the linlcage
when he addressed Liberal Association meetings in favor of
two members of his Sewage Committee in the election campaign
of 1873. Chamberlain solidified the newly-made alliance
and supplied it with the momentum, publicity and achieve-
ments needed to make it invincible at the polls.
The Birmingham Liberal Association therefore became
the mechanism through v/hich the reform party maintained its
control of the Council. It included a large working class
element. There had been an alliance between Radical busi-
nessmen and artizans since the campaign for manhood suffrage
in the 1850s. The Liberal Association was founded in 1865.
During the reform cam.paign from 1865 to 1867, it worked
closely with the Birmingham chapter of the National Reform
League, a working class organization. The two groups merged
in October, 1867. In that reorganization, Liberal Associa-
tion Secretary William Harris departed from the old format
of a Liberal election committee and created the distinctive
organizational format of "the Caucus". The new organization
was tv;o-tiered. Liberal electors in each ward chose a V/ard
Committee and officers, and sent representatives to the
Association's Grand Committee, the "Four Hundred". The Grand
1
5
^A Birmingham Tory, "The Local V/orkings of the Birming-
ham Caucus", National Review 6 (November, 1885): 365. Bir-
mingham Daily Post
, September 29, 1875, p. 6; October J7~
'18/3, p. b.
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Committee met only eight or nine times a year, with its
power in the hands of an Executive Committee of one hundred
and a Management Committee of eleven.
The Association's real strength was in its ward organi-
zation. Party leaders took an active role in their wards,
and were able to exercise effective personal leadership
over the artizans who made up the bulk of the party's mem-
bers. The leaders carefully manipulated their wealth in
the prevailing social climate. Public subscription lists
for local charities, published in the Post, always featured
Liberal Association leaders as prominent donors. Great
demonstrations were held periodically to celebrate John
Bright 's birthday, or for some other purpose. They reinfor-
ced the social benefits of party membership and gave the
leaders a chance to display themselves. The leaders were
praised as public benefactors and all benefits received by
the town were attributed to their wise actions.
Chamberlain used the Liberal Association to generate
and harness enthusiasm for municipal reform. All things
seemed possible in the intense, emotional atmosphere of his
Trygve R. Tholfsen, "The Origins of the Birmingham
Caucus", The Historical Journal 2 ( 1959) : 161-84. Asa Briggs,
History of BirminiTham , vol. 2; Borourrh and City. 1865-1938
(London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 163-72. 11717.
Crosskey, "The Liberal Association—The '600' of Birming-
ham", Macmillan' s Magazine $5 (February, 1877) : 299-50?.
1
5
-^A Birmingham Tory, "Birmingham Caucus", National
Review , pp. 561-65.
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administration, and the forces of darkness appeared in full
retreat before those of light. He linked the politics of
the Council chamber with those of the platform and raised
mundane questions of sewage, sanitation and water supply
to the level of great political principles.
Chamberlain's program was not original. Birmingham
trailed other important towns in major reforms, and Chamber-
lain merely led the Council in catching up. All of his
reforms fulfilled notions of sanitary reform which had gained
national acceptance. With imagination, daring, and hard
business sense, he explored the possibilities of municipal
enterprise and accomplished in three years what had taken
other towns decades to achieve. In 1875, he enthusiastically
proclaimed, "In twelve months by God's help the town shall
not know itself."
""^
Chamberlain assiduously fostered a sense of municipal
patriotism and pride, and spoke of municipal buildings,
parks, libraries, and enterprises as the common property of
the community. He envisioned a town of stately municipal
buildings and broad boulevards which would honor the prin-
ciples and institutions upon which town government was foun-
ded. He stimulated philanthropic donations to the town. In
John Morley, Recollections , 2 vols. (N.Y. : Hacmillan
Company, 1917), 1:1^7. J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph
Chamberlain, vol. 1: 1836-1883: Chamberlain and Dofnocracv
(London: Macraillan and Company, 1^3^;, p. 188.
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1875, he donated £1000 to the Free Libraries Committee, in
order "to show in some practical way my confidence in our
municipal institutions." He secured donations of several
parks from wealthy citizens.
'^'^
The Town Council took up the message of municipal pride
It named the chief street through the improvement district
Corporation Street, and in 1875 commissioned J. T. Bunco,
the editor of the Birmingham Daily Post to write a history
of the Corporation. The General Purposes Committee publish-
ed and circulated Chamberlain's speeches in support of the
gas, water and improvement schemes, and the Post continu-
ally praised his work. The citizens of Birmingham were con-
tinually made aware of their town's position as a national
leader and of the accomplishments of its government.. Even
the hostile Birmingham Morning News caught the fever. In
187^ and 1875, it ran a weekly series on "Our Representa-
tives", giving biographical sketches of the town's parlia-
mentary representatives, the Town Council, and many of its
1
8
leading figures. In the following years, Birmingham news-
papers abounded with such sketches, and the town's presses
17Chamberlain at the dedication of municipal buildings,
June 17, 187^, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches , ed. Charles V/.
Boyd, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 191'+), 1:
59-^2. Josenh Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, April 26,
1875, June 6\ 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16A5, 5^1-.
18Birmingham Morning News , "Our Representatives", Novera
ber 28, 1S74fr.
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produced a steady stream of books on town government and
life. In the atmosphere of excitement and accomplishment,
the leaders of the old V/oodman regime were overborne. Even
Brinsley, Chamberlain's opponent in 1875, admitted that the
Mayor could pass anything he wanted.
"""^
Chamberlain courted the active support of the wealthy
businessmen who dominated the Council and were the officers
of his political army. They carried out the important hard
work of implementing his programs and continued his regime
after he left for Parliament in 1876. He appealed to both
their idealism and their interest. He utilized the prevail-
ing spirit of Nonconformist philanthropy. Education, v/hich
had drawn Chamberlain and others into politics, remained an
important issue. Temperance aroused a number of Nonconform-
ists, and Birmingham became unusual for the extent to which
representatives of the drink trade were excluded from Coun-
cil membership. Poverty was approached through sanitary
reform and improvement; Chamberlain and his followers be-
lieved that demolition schemes would solve the problem.
Chamberlain focused these disparate reform sentiments behind
PDone program and imparted a sense of movement to the whole.
19
'^Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons , p. 130, n. 78. Jos-
eph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, September 12, 1875, Cham-
berlain Papers, JC 5/'16A7. Thomas Anderton, A Tale of One
City: The New Birmin^';ham (Birmingham: Midland Counties Hor-
ald Office, 1900), pp. 8-1 5. Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse
Ceilings, June 6, 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/54.
20
Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons
, pp. 5'4—36, 144-^9.
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As the numbers of wealthy and socially prominent Coun-
cillors increased and the intense partisan debate died away,
the social prestige of Council membership rose. After 1873,
the Liberal Association could find safe seats for business-
men who would otherwise wish to avoid the hurly-burly of
politics. This further increased their representation and
imparted a sense of aristocratic noblesse oblin;e to Council
21
actions.
The new services which the Council instituted also in-
directly benefitted businessmen. Municipalization stabil-
ized and cheapened the gas and water supply, and the Im-
provement Scheme upgraded the business district. As streets
and sidewalks were paved, and the sewers extended, the qual-
ity of town life improved, at least in its public areas.
Chamberlain might argue that the poor benefitted most be-
cause town government provided to all citizens the services
which the wealthy could provide for themselves, but as pri-
vate individuals even the wealthy could provide those ser-
vices only in a very restricted area.
As Mayor, Chamberlain threw himself into the work of
the Council. His businesslike approach and impartiality
surprised his opponents and won him support among the inde-
pendent members of the Council. He was a model chairman
with "a happy knack of rattling through the business, which
21
er
lain Papers, JC V'lSA?.
^
"Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons
, p. 138. Joseuh
Chamb lain to Jesse (joiiinr,o, tiepL-emDor 12, 1875, Chamber-
7^
has saved both the Council and the School Board many hours
of valuable time." When necessary, he would use insult or
humor to move the meeting along. He utilized the Mayor's
right of attendance at all committees to push and prod them
into a more active policy. The Council revised its Standing
Rules and Instructions to Committees. The General Purposes
Committee, comprised of the leading members of the Council,
became a cabinet, through v/hich he presented most of his
major proposals to the Council. The new leadership made
political decisions in evening "Smokerei and Talkerei" in
the library of Southbourne, Chamberlain's Edgbaston home.
The migration of Birmingham's political back room from the
Woodman to Southbourne symbolized the class shift of local
political power.
Two major reforms imparted momentum to Chamberlain's
administration. Before assuming the Mayor's office, he be-
gan negotiations to purchase Birmingham's two gas light com-
panies. The time was propitious, though there v/as no public
22
The General Purposes Committee conducted negotiations
for the gas and water purchases. Council Proceedings , Jan-
uary 15, 187^^ no. 9^1 59; December ^f, 18'/^^, no. 9bpO.
25
3irminp::hani Morning News , December 29, "187$. British
Mercantile Gazetce , 1876, pp. 2-3. Joseph Chamberlain to
Jesse Ceilings, i-ebruary 17, 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC
VoAS. George Titterton, "The Real Chamberlain", Search-
light of Greater Birminrham , November 13, 1915, p. 2fo.
Council Proceedin.^-s , .iarch 3, 187^^-, no. 9^^-23; August , 187-'4,
no. 9^37, 9^^-52; October 6, 187^, no. 9519; December 15, 187^,
no. 9653; May 25, 1875, no. 99^+8. Morley, Recollections ,
1: 1^1-8-5^ • Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons, p. 133»'
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demand for the purchase.^''" The Birmingham Gas Light and
Coke Company was preparing to seek a Local Act to extend
its works, but could not succeed over the opposition of
the Corporation. Chamberlain was an excellent negotiator,
having bought out most of his competitors while he was in
the v/ood screw trade. With one agreement made, he approached
the Birmingham and Staffordshire Gas Light Company, which
agreed to sell because the directors feared to compete
against the Corporation.
By the beginning of 187^, Chamberlain was ready to
approach the Tovra Council with a concrete proposal. But,
his own supporters doubted the measure. When he attempted
to address the Council about the purchase on January 6,
187^, the Council voted 35-18 to adjourn. Seventeen of his
own supporters voted in the majority, while only six of
them voted with him.^^
Chamberlain's speech at the meeting of January 13,
reflected his need to convince the Council. He mixed the
philosophy of municipal enterprise with a businessman's
24
Relations between the Corporation and the companies
had generally been contentious, 'in 1860, the Public V/orks
Committee considered purchasing the companies, but did not
act to do so. Conrad Gill, History of Birmingham , vol. 1:
Manor and BorouiTh to 1865 (London: Oxiord University Press,
1952j, pp. 440-41. Two of Chamberlain's supporters mentioned
purchasing the gas companies during the 1873 campaign. Bir-
minfflam Daily Post , October 6, 1873, p. 8; October 13, 1H75,
p. 8.
Council Proceedings
, January 6, 1874, no. 9136.
76
assessment of the prospects of the venture. He asked only
that the Council approve the purchase in principle, with
final approval to come after the General Purposes Committee
negotiated the details. On March 2^, the General Purposes
Committee presented its report, and Chamberlain urged the
approval of the details of a proposal which the Council had
already approved in principle.
The Corporation sought a Local Act to empower it to
buy the companies. Railroad companies, some large consumers
and neighboring local governing boards opposed the Act. The
Sadlerites seized the opportunity to obstruct it, but they
were defeated in the Council and in a ratepayers poll. The
Corporation was too late to present the bill during the
1874 session of Parliament, so legislative action was de-
layed until 1875. The Act received Royal Assent on August
2, 1875, and municipal gas operations began September 1.^'^
Chamberlain took the chairmanship of the Gas Committee.
He was a thorough manager, mastering every aspect of gas
26Borough of Birmingham, A Short Plistor?;^ of the Passing
of the Birmingham (CorporationT Gas Act and the Birmin "ha"m
(Corporation) 'w'ater Act, v^ith the oPeeches of the iiayor
(Joseph Chamberlain, n-sq.) in ;>apport of thcGe iieasurcs, and
also in Favour oi the Adoption of the Artizans' and Labour-
ers Dv.'ellinr:s ' Improvement Act (Birmingham: General Purposes
Committee, i^75)/'pp. ^--15, 17-29.
^"^ibid., pp. 17-29. Council Proceedin^T-s , April 21,
1874, no. 9315-16; December 8, 1874", no. 9^>ri-^^0. Bunce,
Birmingham , 2:5^1-64. Elsie E. Gulley, Joseph Chamberlain
and English Social Politics (N.Y. : Columbia University
Press, 1926), pp. 4^-47.
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manufacturing and noting the results in a vest pocket note-
28book. In its first six months of operations, the Gas
Committee reported a profit of £25,358. Within t;^o weeks
of assuming control, Chamberlain was contemplating reducing
the price of gas. The ease with which the gas purchase
was achieved fed the Council's enthusiasm for further ven-
PQ
tures. ^
On December ^, 187'4-, Chamberlain proposed that the Cor-
poration also purchase the Birmingham Waterworks Company.
Unlike gas, there had long been a public demand that the
Corporation control the v;ater supply. The Birmingham Improve
raent Act of 1851 empowered the Corporation to buy the Bir-
mingham Waterworks Company, but efforts to use its powers
had foundered on fears of the expense. Though he mentioned
the business advantages of purchase, Chamberlain emphasized
the role of v/ater in public health. But, the V/aterworks
Company, prosperous and v/ithout competitors, refused to
sell.5°
At this Juncture, Chamberlain's wisdom in first proceed-
ing with the easier gas purchases became apparent. The
Council unhesitatingly prepared a bill to take the company
po
A copy of this notebook is in the Chamberlain Papers,
JC 6/1 /II.
29
•^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, Sentember 12,
1875, February 17, 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC^ 5/16/47, 48.
30Borough of Birmingham, Short History , pp. 51-73-
V8
by compulsory purchase, and it was backed by a ratepayers'
meeting. Chamberlain arcued for the Corporation before the
select committees of the two Houses of Parliament, and gained
the bill's passage after a sharp fight in the House of Lords.
The bill received the Royal Assent the same day as the Gas
Act.^^
Alderman Thomas Avery, who had led an attempt to buy
the Waterworks Company in 1869, was elected chairman of
the V/ater Committee, and conducted the final negotiations
with the company. Faced with the Corporation's powers of
compulsory purchase, the company agreed to sell voluntarily.
Chamberlain fulminated that Avery had agreed to an exorbi-
tant price, but he admitted that the Corporation would
profit nonetheless. By February, 1876, the Water Committee
reported a profit of £5000.^^
V/hile the profits from water were used to reduce its
price, profits from the gas works helped to keep down the
rates, which benefitted the reform party at the polls. The
gas operation greatly extended the Corporation's financial
resources. In the first three years, profits reached
£125,000, of which almost half went to reduce the rates . '^-'^
51^ Borough of Birmingham, Short History , pp. 75-78.
Bunce, Birmin'~ho.n , 2:^1-06-15. Gulley, Charanorlain , pp. ^1-8-51 •
52^ Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, September 12,
1875, February 17, 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/1 6A7, ^i8.
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'^'^Chamberlain's Gas Noteboolc, Chamberlain Papers,
JC 6/1/H.
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With its expanded financial base, the Corporation was bet-
ter able to finance Chamberlain's other projects
.
The history of the rates during Chamberlain's Mayor-
ality reflected the impact of municipalization. The gas
and v;ater purchases greatly increased the Corporation's
indebtedness, but did nothing to the rates. The total
municipal rate was 3s 11d in 1873, before Chamberlain as-
sumed office, falling to 3s 10 3Ad in 187-4-. It rose sharp-
ly to ^s 4 1/2d in 1875, before the gas and water purchases
took effect, but after many other reforms had been insti-
tuted. In 1876, the first year of gas profits, the rate
fell to 3s lOd. The Mayor took the occasion of the reduc-
tion in 1876 to chaff the Conservatives on the Council.
Avery made a humorous speech in reply. Critics found it
almost impossible to get a grip on an activist regime which
lov/ered taxes.
The momentum gained on major reforms stimulated all
aspects of the Council's business. A fire brigade was es-
tablished, new municipal buildings erected, the police force
increased, public houses inspected, and Hackney Carriage
by-laws revised. The Sanitary Committee achieved a nation-
^\he debt rose from £300,000 to £2,300,000. Gill,
Birmingham , p. 189.
-^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, March 15, 1876,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/49. The school rate v;as kept
to around 3d v/hile Chamberlain was chairman of the School
Board, but it rose to 6 l/^'id after he left. Bunce, Birming-
ham, 2:48.
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wide reputation for its work in sanitary reform and public
health. The reformers ousted Sadler from the Public V/orks
Committee at the end of Chamberlain's first term, and under-
took a program of paving and sewering streets.
Chamberlain's municipal program culminated in the Im-
provement Scheme. He proposed it to the Council on July 27,
1875, at the same Council meeting it v/as announced that the
Gas and Water Acts had passed Parliament. His speech on
the Improvement Scheme noted that the Artizans' Dwellings
Act, gust passed by Parliament, allowed general toi^m im-
provements in addition to housing and sanitary improvements.
He proposed that the Council rebuild a large part of the
center of town. The Council voted unanimously to set up
an Improvement Committee which would prepare a detailed
-57
scheme. -^^
In November, 1875, the Council adopted a scheme which
covered ninety-three acres in two districts, a sanitary
district and a smaller improvement district. The Corpora-
tion v;as to have the power to purchase over forty-three
acres v/ithin the tv;o areas, with discretion as to the sites
chosen. Eight acres of streets were planned; the remaining
Council Proceedings , January 6, 187^, no. 913^; Feb-
ruary 17, 187^, no. 9213, November 9, 187^-t-, no. 95^6; Dec-
ember 1, 187^, no. 9619-20; February 1, 1876, no. 10,2^1-^-
^6. Bunco, Birmingham , 2:98-102, 275-78. Gulley, Chamber-
lain, pp. 52-55.
^'^
Council Proceedinr^s , July 27, 1875, no. 10,006-07.
Borough of iiirminghara, ^nort History , pp. 81-85.
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thirty-seven acres were to be let on long leases, with the
Corporation owning the freehold. The net cost of the scheme
was £550,000, or £20,000 per year from the rates. It was
the riskiest proposal Chamberlain had made, but the members
of the Council followed him unhesitatingly. They approved
the scheme 59-1. Avery cast the single negative vote.^^
Chamberlain was occupied with the Improvement Scheme
for the rest of his Mayorality. In March, 1876, he faced
hostile landov/ners at a Local Government Board enquiry. He
saved some of the scheme's provisions by getting George
Sclater Booth, President of the Local Government Board, to
overrule his ovm investigator. Anticipating approval of
the scheme. Chamberlain secured a loan of £58,000 to pur-
chase properties quietly before prices could rise. He
placed the properties in an Improvement Trust and sold them
to the Corporation at cost v;hen it had the power to buy
thera.^'^
The risks of the Improvement Scheme appeared after
Chamberlain left the Mayor's office. It was launched on a
wave of prosperity, but fell into financial troubles in
three years. By 1878, it v/as the principal target of Cham-
^^Council Proceedings , November 10, 1875, no. 10,158.
^^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, April 10, 1876,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/51. Chamberlain and eighteen
members of the Council guaranteed the loan. Bunco lists
them and the amounts of their contributions. Bunco, Bir-
mingham , 2:466-67.
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berlain's local opponents, and in 188A- his national enemies
picked up the refrain. In 1883, the annual deficit reached
a high point of £18,995 over projected costs, and the scheme
did not return a profit until the 1890s.'^^
The To\^m Council's immediate support for the Improve-
ment Scheme testified to the "place of paramount influence
in Birmingham" which Chamberlain had achieved by the middle of
1875. The momentum of reform, political organization, and
personal style had produced a stable regime with Chamber-
lain as its unchallenged leader. Personal triumphs and
tragedy reinforced his ascendency. In late 18?^, Birming-
ham hosted the Prince of V/ales; Chamberlain's conduct dur-
ing the ceremonies allayed many fears of his "Red Republic-
anism". A few months later, his wife died suddenly in
childbirth. A disconsolate Chamberlain sent in his resig-
nation as Mayor, which the Council unanimously asked him
41
to withdrav/.
For a time. Chamberlain was so important to the reform
cause that he could not resign to enter Parliament. When
a candidacy appeared at Norwich in May, 1875, Chamberlain's
supporters talked him out of accepting it because the entire
reform effort might collapse if he left office before the
40
Bunce, Birmingham, 2:4-71-81. Briggs, Birmingham ,
pp. 80-85. Gulley, Chamberlain , pp. 59-60.
41 Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, May 30, 1875,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5V'45. Council Proceodings ,
March 9, 1875, no. 9787.
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gas and water bills became law.'^^
He ran the Coimcil with a dictatorial style in his
last year as Mayor. In March, 1876, he forced through the
Council Birmingham's first set of building bye-laws. James
Deykin, his v/hip on the Council, remarked that the reso-
lution was carried by a majority of forty-seven, forty-six
of whom voted against their consciences. Chamberlain didn't
care about their consciences; he had his bye-laws and inten-
ded to use them. Chamberlain's letters in 1876 reflected
satisfaction with his success. In a characteristic state-
ment, he declared, "The Improvement Scheme v/aits the report
of the Commissioner, the Gas V/orks are flourishing. The
health of the tov/n is improving, and my trees in Broad St.
are coming into leaf."
• • •
111
V/hat was Chamberlain's impact upon municipal reform
in Birmingham? He did not create the movement for reform,
and only became its leader after the reform party had gained
a majority on the Town Council. He did not supply its
ideas. George Dawson and Robert V/illiam Dale were the local
^2
John Morley to Joseph Chamberlain, May 28, 1875, Jos
eph Chamberlain to John Morley, May $0, 1875, June 1, 1875,
Jesse Collings to Joseph Chamberlain, May jl
, 1875, Chamber
lain Papers, JC 5/5V^^, ^5, ^6, JC 5/16/1.
-^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, March 5, 1876,
March 12, 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/49, 52.
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intellectual leaders, and every one of Chamberlain's spe-
cific proposals had been tried somewhere else. V/illiara
Harris created the Birmingham Liberal Association, which
consolidated the reformers' hold on the Council. Thomas
Avery won the reform party's first victories. What Cham-
berlain did was to bring these components together and
focus them on municipal administration. He made things
happen, and the Birmingham reformers took his success as
the justification of their whole regime.
The extent to which Chamberlain departed from the
norm in municipal politics can be shown by comparing him
with Alderman Thomas Avery. Avery was the archetype of the
normal municipal reformer. He was excellent at attacking
specific problems which could be solved by good administra-
tion and careful financial management. He welcomed Cham-
berlain's advent in 1875 and campaigned for Liberal Associa-
tion candidates against his fellow Conservatives. He re-
mained an active Council member throughout Chamberlain's
ascendency, and other Council members had confidence in him.
They elected him chairman of the Water Committee and entrust-
ed the final negotiations to him. When Birmingham and sur-
rounding towns joined in a Regional Drainage Board , in 1876,
their agreement was the culmination of Avery's sewage policy,
and he was elected the Board's President.
But, the balance, v/hich observers oftc->n used to symbol-
ize his character, made him independent of Chamberlain. He
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refused to follow Chamberlain blindly, holding to the same
cautious reforming principles during the height of Chamber-
lain's power as he did before and after. Significantly,
he cast the only negative vote on the Improvement Scheme,
which was to be an albatross to Council finances for fifteen
years. Chamberlain, impatient of opposition, simply rode
over him. For example, in June, 1876, the Public Works
Committee proposed a resolution that the Corporation spend
£50,000 a year for five years to pave all the footpaths and
streets in the borough. Avery objected to the amount, but
Chamberlain amended the motion to say "at least £50,000".
The amendment passed unanimously before Avery could recover.
But Avery outlasted Chamberlain. Like Chamberlain, Avery
served three terms as Mayor. Chamberlain left the Council
in 1880, and Avery's terms neatly bracket the Chamberlain
era: 1867-68 and 1881-82. Avery remained a member of the
Council until the turn of the century. He is a good measure
of the element of personal ambition in Chamberlain's program.
Personal ambition did not affect Avery's reform impulse, but
it v;as central to Chamberlain's.
During his years as Mayor, Chamberlain played to a nat-
ional audience. He never dropped his national political
ambitions, though he expressed doubts that he could accomp-
Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, June 6, 1876,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/54.
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lish nationally what he had locally. ^5 entangled per-
sonal ambition and the reform impulse with the speciric
political resources which had advanced them in Birmingham.
This had two unfortunate results. He never again enjoyed
the personal ascendency he experienced during his last
year as Mayor of Birmingham, and he spent the rest of his
career seeking it. Also, he constantly attempted to apply
Birmingham's experience to the entire kingdom. He not only
attempted to reproduce his success in Birmingham, but to
reproduce it in the same way he had done it there. He was
a prisoner of his own success.
Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, May 27 187fi
June 30, 1876, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/53, 55.
CHAPTER IV
"V/E SHALL RECRUIT AN ARMY"
As it had evolved in Birmingham, Joseph Chamberlain's
system of localism integrated the Council with the caucus
and a middle class elite with a largely working class fol-
lowing. Considering his success in Birmingham, it was in-
escapable that Chamberlain would attempt to apply his for-
mula on the national scene. Localism underpinned Chamber-
lain's Radicalism in two ways. It was a philosophic commit-
ment which showed through his proposals for social reform;
all of his positive programs were to be administered through
local government. It was also an integral element of his
political organization, as embodied in the National Liberal
Federation. His coalition politics presupposed that each
local elite would maintain enough of a following among the
working class to win elections. But, in the early 1880s,
economic, social and political changes made localism and
Nonconformity—the two sources of his power—less viable
bases of political operations. From 1883, Chamberlain was
openly responding to these threats to his power. He attemp-
ted to reassert his Radicalism in terms of the most recent
political rhetoric, and chose the traditional Radical cry
of franchise reform to maintain the unity of his coalition.
He supported the franchise issue with the Radical Prorramme,
87
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a compilation of reforms which is the most complete state-
ment of his Radicalism.
«
1
In 1875, Chamberlain outlined to John Morley his ap-
proach for reorganizing British politics. The Radicals, he
said, must focus upon a few leading issues and construct a
party organization to advance them. Particularly, they
must seize upon issues v;hich generate popular enthusiasm:
"Education for the Ignorant cannot have the meaning that
belonged to Bread for the Starving . . . the assistance of
the working classes is not to be looked for without much
extension of the argument."
Chamberlain tried out his approach in an article in
the Fortnightly Review for September, 1875. He tried to
unite all Radical demands into the formula, "Free Church,
Free Land, Free Schools and Free Labour." As the basis of
a nationwide party organization, he planned to use the
National Education League, through which he had built a
nationv/ide network of local chapters. He planned to dissolve
2the League and form a broader organization, however.
Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, August 19, 1875,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5V1 5.
2Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, August 25, 1875,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5V15. Joseph Chamberlain, "The
Liberal Party and Its Leaders", Fortnightly Review , N.S.
,
1^ (September, 1875) :287-502. Sir Charles Dilke to Joseph
Chamberlain, March 15, 187^, Joseph Chamberlain to Sir
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Chamberlain's policy addressed a very real need of
Radicalism. As Chamberlain described the situation to Jesse
Ceilings in 1878:
There is no party of Radicals below the gangway;
their only point of agreement is the fact that
each one differs in some respect or other from
the leaders; but their differences among them-
selves are really greater than those which sepa-
rate them from the front bench.
3
With such internal disunity, Chamberlain felt that the Radi-
cals would never be able to achieve any of their goals. The
policy he described to Morley was the one he follov^ed so
successfully in Birmingham. United on the Town Council and
backed by a powerful party organization, the Birmingham
Radicals routed their enemies—Tories and Woodman Liberals
combined—and achieved all of their goals. He felt that
Radicals could do the same on the national level if only
they would subordinate personal rivalries and set priorities
in pursuing their goals.
^
Though Chamberlain outlined his program to Morley in
1875, his plans were delayed because he failed to be elected
to Parliament in 187^. But, he lost no time after he be-
came Member for Birmingham in July, 1876. Before he was
Charles Dilke, March 17, 187^, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss.
^3885, f. 23, ff. 24-25.
-^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, February 26.
1878, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/78.
Z}.
D. A. Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone
and Rosebery; A Study in ueadership and 1-olicv (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1^72;, p. 4-1.
' ^
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in the House two weeks, he had organized a caucus of six
Radical Members to act on the principle of "perfect loyalty
one to another, and entire absence of all personal consid-
erations—each to do whatever the others think best." But,
early in the 1877 session. Chamberlain's little party fell
apart, unable to overcome the individualism of its members.
Instead, it became a "party of two". Chamberlain and Sir
Charles Dilke. He never was successful at uniting the
Radicals in Parliament.^
Therefore, Chamberlain returned to the idea of national
party organization. Though Birmingham was unique in the
degree to which political organization dominated municipal
politics, it was only one of many towns to have a Liberal
Association. A coalition of these associations might give
Chamberlain the base of support among Radicals outside of
Parliament that he v/as unable to obtain inside. In 1877,
Chamberlain and his Birmingham followers took the lead in
organizing the National Liberal Federation.^
On May 31, 1877, delegations from the Birmingham Liberal
Association and ninety-four other Liberal constituency or-
5^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, July 27, 1876,
February 8, 1877, Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, Febru-
ary 6, 1877, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/58, 59, JC 5/5V158.
T. H. S. Escott, "The Party of Two—Sir Charles Dilke, Mr.
Joseph Chamberlain", Personal Forces of the Period (London:
Hurst and Blackett, 1898), pp. 69-82.
^H. J. Hanham, El ections and Party Manar';ement ; Politics
in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone (London: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1959;, pp. 125-^0.
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ganizations raet at Birmingham to form a federation. Cham-
berlain presided over the conference and delivered the open-
ing speech. He noted that the new political conditions re-
sulting from an extended franchise, education and a cheap
press had created a need for new forms of party organiza-
tion. He felt that the old model Liberal Associations,
which made membership dependent upon a financial contribu-
tion, were inadequate to the task. Although working class
Liberals could not afford the contribution, their voting
power made it necessary that the candidates and party policy
be acceptable to them. The Birmingham Liberal Association,
he argued, had been successful because it consulted its
working class members on these matters. A democratic con-
stitution would be the one requirement for affiliation to
the National Liberal Federation, and one of the Federation's
objects would be to reform the non-democratic associations
on a democratic basis.
As its founders conceived of it, the National Liberal
Federation v/as an alliance of local elites, each with its
own following of working class voters. It was an effort
to use the pov/er of localism to achieve national goals.
But, several representatives at the conference were plainly
afraid that Birmingham would use the Federation to dominate
7̂Proceedinrs Attending: the Formation of the National
Federation of Liberal Associations; with -'eoort of Confer-
ence iield in Birmin^-ham on Thursday, Viay p1st, 1677 (Bir-
mingham: The "Journal" Printing Office, 1877), PP. 1 '^-^ 6
.
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their internal affairs. Alderraan Baker, President of the
Portsmouth Liberal Association, assented to the Federation
only because it did not commit his organization to a par-
ticular program or to combining municipal and parliamentary
politics. Robert Spence Watson, President of the Newcastle
Liberal Association, accepted the Federation only because
of Chamberlain's assurances that local autonomy would be
respected. The Chairman of the Manchester Liberal Associa-
tion v/as even more cautious. He agreed with the oboects
of the Federation, but hoped that the independence of its
affiliates would be maintained intact. His delegation was
at the conference simply to observe, he said, and he was
not sure that his Association would join the Federation.^
The constitution of the National Liberal Federation
established the same hierarchy of committees used in the
local Liberal Associations. The conference elected Chamber-
lain as the Federation's first President, and two other
Birmingham men as officers.^
Most of the Federation's local affiliates were less
"^Proceedings , pp. 24-25, 28-29, 56-37.
9
^ibid., pp. 4-5. The National Liberal Federation; Its
General Ob.jects and Immediate V/ork (Birmingham; I\ational
Liberal Federation, 1880). R, S. Watson, The National Lib-
eral Federation (London; T. F. Unwin, 1907), pp. 1-9. Ilan-
ham, ?Jlections and Party Manarrement , pp. 154-55. Donald
Read , The En^^lish Provinces c. 1700-1960, A Sbudy in Influ-
ence (N.Y.: Sz. rlarcin's Press, 1964), pp. 177-7^^ P. 11.
Herrick, "The Origins of the National Liberal Federation",
Journal of Modern History , 17 (June, 1945) :127.
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democratic than the Birmingham Liberal Association, though
they adopted its outward forms. All affiliated Associations
submitted to the requirements that non-subscribing working
class voters be allowed to join the Association, and that
they be allowed to approve policy statements and parliamen-
tary candidates. But, in many towns, the Association's
leadership exercised a much more stringent control over
their followers than did the Birmingham leadership. They
did not en^oy Birmingham's good relations between classes.
The Associations shored up middle class control of the
higher committees by requiring that members of the Executive
Committee pay a subscription, or by providing that a large
portion of the Executive Committee be appointed by the
10party leaders.
The National Liberal Federation grew rapidly. Forty-
six Liberal Associations joined at its foundation, rising
to eighty-eight by 1880, although the eighty-eight Associa-
tions represented only sixty parliamentary constituencies.
But, the Federation failed to be a true coalition of local
elites. It became little more than a platform from which
10
Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Orf^anization
of Political Parties , trans. Frederick Clarke, 2 vols.
(London: Hacmillan and Company, 1902), 1:18^-8^?. Political
Organizations Series, The Times , October 19, 1885, p. 13;
October 27, 1885, p. 13; October 31, 1885, P. 8; November
10, 1885, p. ^; November 16, 1885, p. ^; November 28, 1385,
p. 3; December 1, 1885, p. 5; December 11, 1885, p. 3; T)e-
cember 31, 1885, p. 7; January 11, 1886, p. 3; February
8, 1886, p. 13.
the Birminsham Radicals could press the Liberal party
leadership to accept their programs. Though most of the
affiliated associations supported their actions, man5^ har-
bored resentments against Birmingham domination, which were
to burst forth in 1886.^''
The National Liberal Federation had ambiguous relation-
ships with Radicalism and with the Liberal party. Radicals
dominated the Federation and set its policy. It was con-
sidered a Radical organization, and most non-Radical Liberal
organizations refused to associate with it. But, there was
no Radical party as such. The National Liberal Federation
v;as an alliance of Liberal Associations, and claimed to
speak for the national Liberal party. The Radicals of the
Federation regarded themselves as the true exponents of
Liberalism, and sought to take over the Liberal party from
the aristocratic V/higs.
The Federation's claim to be the representative of
true Liberalism was strongly reinforced by its relationship
to William E. Gladstone. Gladstone had retired as the Liberal
party leader in 1875 and had been succeeded by Lord Harting-
11
I^ead, The Enrrlish Provinces , p. 179. Hanham, Elec -
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ton. But, he returned to politics in late 1876 to combat
Disraeli's Eastern policy. Chamberlain sought to use Gladstone'
moral leadership to give a cover of legitimacy to the National
Liberal Federation, which had been formed in opposition to
the official party leadership. Gladstone cooperated. On
the evening of the founding conference, he addressed the
assembled delegates in Bingley Hall. The Federation suppor-
ted him in his campaign against Conservative foreign policy,
and the former Prime Minister gave the new organization
much of its moral and emotional coherence .
^
Chamberlain underestimated the dependency of his o\m
following upon Gladstone. In 1876, he wrote to Dilke that
if Gladstone "were to come back for a few years (he can't
continue in public life for very much longer) he would
probably do much for us & pave the way for more."'^^ It was
a mistake Chamberlain made several times. He backed Glad-
stone because the Grand Old Man's moral crusade was useful
to his own organizing effort. The pressing necessity for
unity overcame objections to tighter political organization.
The same defensive cry had helped establish Chamberlain's
control in Birmingham in 1873, but at that time the moral






Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, October 10,
1876, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. -^^-3885, f. 49.
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''^In 1873, the Birmingham Liberal Association's elec-
tion newspaper. The Liberal, argued that Conservative con-
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The combination of political organization and moral
crusade swamped the Conservatives in the General Election
of 1880. About the same number of Conservatives voted in
1880 as had voted in 18?^, but the number of Liberal voters
greatly increased. The National Liberal Federation reduced
the number of superfluous candidates in English boroughs
from twenty-one in 187^ to nine in 1880. Only three of
these troubled Federation affiliates, and none of them pre-
vented the victory of the official candidate. In the sixty
constituencies with Federation affiliates, the Liberals won
twenty-eight seats from Conservative incumbents, though
many of them had been traditionally Liberal seats before
187^.'^^
On April 13, 1880, Chamberlain wrote a letter to The
Times, claiming the Liberal victory for the National Liberal
Federation. Asserting that the Federation contributed to
the Liberal victories in sixty boroughs and ten county di-
visions, he argued that the caucus was a democratic force
which had increased voter participation and responsibility.
Also, he contended, the caucus candidates were generally
trol of the Town Council and School Board would threaten
John Bright 's parliamentary seat. The Liberal , No. 1,
September 26, 1875, p. 1.
f-lcGill, "Schnadhorst" , The Victorian Revolution, pp.
258-60. Trevor Lloyd, The General Election of 1880 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 1^4. J. L. Garvin, The
Life of Joseph Chamberlain , vol. 1: 1 836-1 88S; Chamberlarn
a.nd Ijernocracy (London: Hacmillan and Company, 1932), pD.
d^d,-yi , zy/. Hamer, Liberal Politics, pp. 79-83.
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stronger Liberals than the nominees of the old Liberal
election committees. He looked forward to extending the
Federation's influence to the countryside in the wake of
an extended county franchise
.'^'^
Chamberlain's claims ignored Gladstone's influence.
In the aftermath of the sweeping Liberal victory, Gladstone
was the indispensible leader. He brushed aside Hartington
to become Premier. His hold over the minds of all Liberals
and Radicals was unshakable. But, Gladstone was forced to
recognize Chamberlain's strength. He was willing to admit
Chamberlain and Dilke to office, but not to the Cabinet.
They both refused to accept office unless one of them was
given a Cabinet post. Significantly, Gladstone passed over
Dilke, who had longer service in Parliament, and chose Cham-
berlain, who had a wider following in the country. Chamber-
lain was appointed President of the Board of Trade. It was
considered a junior position in the Cabinet, but it was one
of the largest departments and gave some scope for his busi-
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Cabinet office cramped Chamberlain's style of leader-
ship. He could not take an independent line in parliamen-
tary debate, and he did little platform speaking before the
end of 1882. The Radical faction composed about thirty
percent of the parliamentary Liberal party. Radical M.P.s
consulted Chamberlain on domestic policy and Dilke (who was
Parliamentary Secretary at the Foreign Office) about foreign
and military policy. But, there was no formal Radical or-
ganization in Parliament, and Chamberlain and Dilke were
obliged to defend Cabinet policy. With no generally accepted
leader, the morale and cohesion of the parliamentary Radi-
cals quickly disintegrated and they exercised little influ-
ence on Liberal policy.
'^'^
The Irish issue dominated the first three sessions of
the 1880 Parliament. Agrarian crime in Ireland, Irish
Nationalist and Conservative obstruction in the House of
Commons, and occasional reaction in the House of Lords, al-
most paralyzed the government. The Cabinet's policy of
coercion and conciliation multiplied its enemies. Conserva-
tives opposed conciliation, and coercion divided the Radicals,
Although two-thirds of Radical M.P.s Joined Chamberlain in
19 .^Michael Barker^ Gladstone and Radicalism; The Recon -
struction of Liberal i-^olicy m 'intam, ibas-'j^t- Cii.Y.: Barnes
and hoble, 197^), pp« 1-4. T. V/. Heyck, 'J'he Dimensions of
British Radicalism; The Case of Ireland, 1674—35 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1974;, pp. ^41-46.
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supporting the Crimes Act of 1882, one-third inside the
House and a higher proportion outside, opposed it. Some of
his closest associates, including John ilorley and Jesse
Collings, opposed the Act. Even Dilke contemplated resign-
ing over the issue.
The controversy over Irish coercion contributed to the
growth of independent working class political organization.
Opposition to coercion was most intense among working class
Radicals, who held little sympathy for the rights of property
A large body of working class Radicals were permanently
alienated from middle class Radicalism. This division
posed a threat to Chamberlain's power.
Since the failure of Chartism, working class leaders
had accepted the need for allies in the middle class to help
them achieve their political goals. They found their best
allies among the Radicals. But, after the Reform Act of
1867, it was possible for working class representatives to
sit in Parliament. The desire of working class leaders to
elect such candidates bespoke a growing non-ideological
class consciousness. They began to see Labour as a distinct
interest which could not be adequately represented by middle
20
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class M.P.s. Working class support for Radicalism was con-
ditioned upon performance, and it varied accordins to the
degree of congruity between working class and middle class
Radical goals. Independent Labour candidatures were a baro-
meter of those relations. Three such candidates stood for
election in 1868, fifteen in 1874-, six in 1880, and fifteen
in 1885 and 1886.^^
¥he growth of English socialism in the early 1880s con-
tributed to working class militancy. Almost all working
class leaders were influenced by it. But, socialism also
appealed to the middle class. Under the impact of the de-
pressions of the 1870s and 1880s, many Radicals abandoned
their faith in Gladstonian Liberalism. The London Radical
clubs were especially affected, and many of them evolved
into, or affiliated with, new socialist societies. English
socialism was very broad-based. Specific socialist doc-
trines, such as Marxism, attracted only minorities of social-
ists. English socialism is hard to separate from Radicalism,
even in retrospect. Socialism affected every Radical's
rhetoric, including Chamberlain's.
The proximate cause of the revival of English socialism
was the visit of Henry George to the British Isles in 1881
and 1882. George, an American, published Progress and Pov-
22Barbara C. Kalaraent, "The Origins oi the British
Labour Party: Some Interpretative Problems", a paper delivered
to the Conference on British Studies, meeting at New York
University, Ilovember 6, 1976.
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ert^ in 1879. The book challenged the nineteenth century
liberal belief that progress would automatically bring pros-
perity. Since progress made land more valuable, George
argued, its owners would appropriate to themselves, in the
form of rent, an "unearned increment" from the benefits of
industrialization. The only solution, he held, was to
eliminate the economic gains from private ownership of land.
Henry George achieved sudden notoriety in England when he
was arrested in Loughrea, Ireland in August, 1882. Before
he left England in October, he was attracting wide attention.
His books. Progress and Poverty and The Irish Land Question ,
were published in cheap editions, and gained wide circula-
tion among the London workingmen. During 1883, socialism
and land reform doctrines spread rapidly.
Chamberlain's enthusiasm for Henry George varied in-
versely with George's influence. Before George visited
England, Chamberlain read Progress and Poverty and was
"electrified" by it. In April, 1882, before George's sudden
fame. Chamberlain and Bright dined with him at the Reform
Club, seeking his views on Irish land reform. But, Chamber-
lain was disturbed by George's impact upon the London work-
ingmen, and sought an antidote. Henry George's doctrines
reinforced the politics of class and threatened Chamberlain's
25
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politics of community. He v/as not a person to stay quiet
while the roots of his power were threatened.^^
A threat to his position in the Cabinet focused Chamber-
lain's anxieties. In December, 1882, he was almost trans-
ferred to the largely ceremonial post of Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, in order to make room for Dilke's en-
trance into the Cabinet. Only after a ten day crisis did
Gladstone decide to leave Chamberlain at the Board of Trade
and shift J. G. Dodson from the Local Government Board to
the Duchy. Dilke succeeded Dodson at the Local Government
Board. Though he maintained his post, the incident convin-
ced Chamberlain that he was vulnerable to such arbitrary
treatment, and that two years of inaction had damaged his
reputation as a Radical leader. In early 183^, he moved to
reassert his leadership.
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Chamberlain was in a belligerent mood in early 1885-
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He sent Morley a clipping from the Birmingham Daily Post
which showed the beneficial results of his Mayorality. He
concluded that "Unless I can secure for the nation results
similar to those which have followed the adoption of ray
policy in Birmingham it will have been a sorry exchange to
give up the Town Council for the Cabinet." Commenting to
Dilke on a speech by Hartington, he was unalarmed at the
Whig leader's conservatism. "I cannot complain, as he has
as much right to talk Whiggism as you and I to spout Radi-
calism." But, he insisted, the vast majority of Liberals
were ready for a new initiative, "So if we are driven to
fight, we shall easily recruit an army."
For his new politics. Chamberlain coined a new term:
The politics of the future are social politics,
and the problem is still how to secure the greatest
happiness of the greatest number, and especially
those whom all previous legislation and reform seem
to have left very much where they were before.^?
For the moment, much of Chamberlain's social politics was
rhetoric. His response to the threat to his working class
following was, essentially, to shout louder.
Principally, he attacked the aristocracy in the language
of Henry George. He focused on Lord Salisbury, the Conser-
PA
Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, January 23, 1883,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5V^i-80. Joseph Chamberlain to Sir
Charles Dilke, January 20, 1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss.
^3886, ff. 12-13.
27
'Joseph Chamberlain to Edward Russell, January 22,
1883, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/62/5.
104-
vative leader in the House of Lords. In a speech at Bir-
mingham on March $0, 1885, he accused Salisbury of obstruc-
tion, fractious and dishonest attacks on the government,
and warmongering; he even aired the idea that the Conser-
vatives were conspiring to block Liberal legislation by
constitutionally questionable means. He went on to attack
Salisbury's aristocratic status:
Lord Salisbury constitutes himself the spokesman
of a class—of the class to v/hich he himself be-
longs— "who toil not, neither do they snin"
—
whose fortunes, as in his case, have originated
in grants made long ago, for such services as
courtiers render kings—and have since grown and
increased while their owners slept, but the levy
of an unearned share on all that^ other men have
done by toil and labour to add to the general
wealth and prosperity of the country of which
they form a part. ^8
His language offended Salisbury's class and party, especially
since it came from a minister of the Crown. But, it did
much to restore Chamberlain as the Radical leader.
Chamberlain soon focused his political efforts upon
franchise reform. It was not social reform per se, but
appealed to the same sources of support: middle class con-
science and working class self-assertion. It was a tra-
ditional Radical cry, and the Birmingham Radicals were the
nation's traditional leaders in the field. Chamberlain
had advocated extending the franchise in the counties from
Joseph Chamberlain at Birmingham, March 30, 1883,
Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, M.P. , od
.
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early in the life of the ministry. In January, 188$, he
began pressing the issue earnestly.
The issue was stifled in Cabinet debate. Both factions
agreed that franchise reform must come before the next
election, but they differed on priorities. Chamberlain
wanted to take up franchise first and postpone all other
reforms. The moderates wished to improve the government's
legislative record first. Unable to move them, Chamberlain
launched a public campaign. On May 3, 188$, the National
Liberal Federation issued a call for a conference on parlia-
mentary reform to be held at Leeds in October. On June 1$,
Chamberlain started his attack from the platform.
The occasion for his speech was an anniversary cele-
bration to honor John Bright for twenty-five years service
as Member for Birmingham. Starting his speech with praise
for Bright, Chamberlain quickly shifted to the assertion
that "Every day the country is becoming more Radical and
more Democratic." The country, he insisted, was ahead of
the House of Commons. Any attempt to pass measures of social
29Joseph Chamberlain to Sir V/illiam Harcourt, April 10,
1880, Chamberlain Papers, JC $/$8/119. Garvin, Chamberlain
,
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Add. Mss. -4-^125, f. 181.
50
•I'he Times , December 27, 1882, p. 8. Lord Hartington
at Bacup, January 20, 188$, The Times, January 21, 188$, p.
6. Sir Charles Dilke's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss.
^$9$7, ff. 1$-16.
106
reform through the present Parliament would result in very
crabbed and limited laws. The solution was to expand the
franchise. He concluded his speech with a call for full
manhood suffrage, equal electoral districts, and payment
of Members of Parliament .^^
Chamberlain had thoroughly broken with conventional
Cabinet oratory. His critics fastened on some of his praise
for Bright which implied an attack on the monarchy. Glad-
stone ordered a retraction. Speaking at the Cobden Club
on June 50, Chamberlain praised the Queen, but asserted
his independence of his colleagues. Reviewing Cobden 's
life, he asserted that it exemplified the full Radical
tradition. Like Cobden, Chamberlain was willing to make
realistic compromises, but he refused to be silent. Silence
cost the Radicals too much, he asserted, and would only
lead to the break up of the Liberal party. He would not
give up his principles for the bribe of office. But,
Chamberlain was not as intransigent as he sounded. Though
he called for manhood suffrage, he was willing to accept
the extension of the household franchise to the counties.
Far from pushing for immediate redistribution, he v/anted it
31 Joseph Chamberlain at Birmingham, June I3, 1385, The
Times , June 14, 1885, p. 6.
52John Morley, The Life of V/illiam Ev/art Gladston e,
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Joseph Chamberlain to the Cobden Ciub", ' June' 56, 1885, The
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postponed until the next Parliament, because he felt he
could set a better bill at that time.
In the autumn, he pressed his public attack. On Octo-
ber 17, and 18, the National Liberal Federation met at
Leeds. There was strong pressure from the London Radicals
to put London government reform ahead of the franchise,
but the Federation voted full support for Chamberlain's
position. The action appears to have decided Gladstone.
At a Cabinet meeting on October 25, he made a speech about
the next session "which virtually meant franchise first
and the rest nov/here." Chamberlain delivered two strong
speeches on franchise first in November and December. On
January ^, 1884, Gladstone announced to the Queen that the
Cabinet had decided to present a franchise bill alone.
At the same time that he pressed for franchise reform,
Chamberlain held out to his followers a vision of the bene-
fits to be gained from it. He carefully assembled the most
comprehensive of his platforms, the Radical Programme . It
was published as a series of unsigned articles in the Fort -
nightly Review from July, 1885 to January, 1884, with
additional articles in May, 1884, January, 1885 and July,
-^^The Times , September 7, 1885, p. 6. Manchester
Guardian , October 18, 1885, p. 6, October 19, 1885, PP. 5-6.
Sir Charles Dilke's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 45957,
f. 166. Joseph Chamberlain at Bristol, November 26, 1885,
and at V/olverhampton , December 4, 1885, Speec h es of Jo soph
Chamberlain , dd.' 46-65. V/illiara E. GladstonG~fco the Uueon,
January 4, 1884, Public Record Office, CAB 41/18/2.
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1885. The series was published as a book in July, 1885.
V/orkinG closely with Fortnightly editor T. H. S. Escott,
Chamberlain commissioned the articles and edited thera.^^
Though written by other Radicals, the articles contained
Chamberlain's characteristic positions and represent the
most complete formulation of his Radicalism.
The Radical Progrramme was not simply a compilation of
Radical proposals. Many Radical issues, such as the con-
tagious diseases Acts, temperance, the game laws, payment
of Members of Parliament, and republicanism, were omitted.
He subordinated some issues to others: Ireland to local
government, housing and taxation to land reform, and all to
franchise reform. Escott listed the three heads of Radical
reform as education, land reform and taxation. Six of the
nine articles centered on specific reforms: housing, the
agricultural laborer, education, disestablishment, taxation,
and local government, including Ireland. Chamberlain also
tried to commission an article on Radical foreign policy,
but it was not written.
Frank Harris's article on "Housing of the Poor in Towns",
published in October, 1885, pinned its recommendations on
Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, October 18,
1885, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/105.
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Chamberlain's Birmingham Improvement Scheme. Shortly after
the article appeared, the housing issue became a crisis.
With the publication of The Bitter Cry of Outcast London ,
housing became the central issue of social politics. Lord
Salisbury leaped into the controversy with an article in
National Reviev/. He saw the problem as one of supply,
and suggested parliamentary loans for housing construction.
Salisbury's intervention was a complete surprise and drew
praise from all quarters.
Feeling he must reassert Radical interest in such a
critical issue. Chamberlain replied in the December Fort-
nightly . His article was signed and was not one of the
Radical Prorramme series. He repeated Harris's proposals
in more explicit terras. The solution to all such problems
was improvement, he argued. But, improvement schemes could
only succeed if landowners v/ere given no more than fair
market value for their property. Excessive costs for land,
he held, prevented many local authorities from acting. If
compensation were limited, costs would be under control,
and housing would be built.
^'^
56Chamberlain, et. al., Radical Prorramme , pn. 62-91.
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Land reform v/as the second specific issue addressed
Radical ProP-ramme. Only the franchise was more im-
portant to Chamberlain. He was more interested in present-
ing an alternative to Henry George than to the Tories.
Since 1872, his associate Jesse Collings had championed the
cause of the agricultural laborer. In the 1880s, he was
pressing for powers for local authorities to take land and
create allotments of land for small farms. Collings, the
son of an agricultural laborer, was sincere in his effort
to help the rural worker, but his campaign—coupled with
franchise extension—was an obvious opportunity for the
Radicals to break the Tory hold on the counties. The urban
worker, often an immigrant from the countryside, was also
interested in land reform. Chamberlain carefully kept
Collings 's proposals in the forefront of his program, but
he subordinated it to the franchise. In his article on
"The Agricultural Labourer", Collings loyally agreed that
"First in order among measures of reform comes the possession
of the franchise, without which the labourer cannot be re-
garded as a free man."
The Radical Programme presented two more issues in
early 1884. They were both Nonconformist issues: education
and disestablishment. Francis Adams argued in "Free Schools"
that school fees should be abolished for poor children. The
58Chamberlain, et. al.. Radical Programme, pp. 92-125.
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Birmingham Radicals had been pressing this issue for a
decade, but v;ithout success. John Morley's article on
"Religious Equality" discussed the mechanics of disestab-
lishing and disendov/ing the Anglican Church. It was nega-
tive in tone. His only positive proposal V7as to apply
church revenues to education.
Morley's article appeared in the Fortnightly in May,
188^. Then, there was a hiatus of over a year before the
last two articles appeared. The franchise issue absorbed
all others, as the Liberals controlling the House of Com-
mons faced the Conservatives controlling the House of Lords
Chamberlain was also absorbed into the crisis. His great
success had been to push Gladstone to take up the franchise
issue. But, when Gladstone did so it became his issue.
Chamberlain was assigned a subordinate place. Even John
Bright, who was traditionally identified with franchise
reform, received more honor than Chamberlain.
The Reform crisis reached its height in October, 188^,
and was then compromised by the party leaders. Redistribu-
tion was bargained by Gladstone, Salisbury and Dilke. Cham-
berlain, who still opposed an immediate redistribution
scheme, was bought off with an extra seat for Birmingham.
59
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appeared in January, 1885, was not part of the Radical Fro-
rramme series (though it was included in the book; and
dealt with the franchise issue.
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Franchise reform was Chamberlain's greatest success in
national politics, but it contained the seeds of failui^e.
He was to see that in the General Election of 1885.^'^
The rise of socialism in the early 1880s, reinforcing
the development of working class political consciousness,
produced various strategies for dealing with the new poli-
tical forces thus generated. Chamberlain, faced with a
threat to his personal leadership of the Liberal party's
left wing, chose to try to shout louder than the new voices.
He increased his platform activity, and his rhetoric esca-
lated. In 1884, the Pall Mall Gazette pointed out the
similarities between his language and that of Henry George. ^'^
But, his Radicalism was more conservative than his rhetoric
made it appear to be. The conservative element lay in the
role he projected for localism, which was a mechanism for
perpetuating the rule of his own class. The working class
was given rhetoric, but Chamberlain's system froze them out
of real power. Every positive proposal in the Radical Pro -
gramme was to be administered through local government.
V/hen v;e consider Chamberlain's overall concept of local
government—as a limited enterprise dominated by businoss-
4-1
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men—the checks upon his Radicalism are apparent.
Localism was a halfway house for Charaberlainite Radi-
calism. He departed from the "night watchman" theory of
the state, but did not reach the later concept of the state
as a creative instrument. Local enterprise was an alterna-
tive to state enterprise. With local government to perform
the positive, intervening role, the central state could
continue as the traditional night watchman. With this com-
promise, Chamberlain and those who agreed with him could
walk the line between the Conservatism they hated and the
socialism they feared more as the 1880s advanced.
Chamberlain failed to take account of the strategies
of the other party leaders, v;ho were reacting to the same
forces he was, and to his own actions. Ultimately, the
heads of the two parties, Gladstone and Salisbury, defeated
him. Salisbury's policy was clear: to win over enough
moderate Liberals to allow him to have a Conservative ma-
jority. He did not v;ant to have to make any concessions
to the Whigs in order to do this, and he considered Chamber-
lain an ideal recruiter for him. Chamberlain, he felt,
scared people away from Liberalism.
Gladstone was the more dangerous enemy for Chamberlain,
especially as they agreed on many issues. Gladstone had
great power over Chamberlain's own Radical followers.
Chamberlain's approach to politics v/as practical: a mat-
ter of programs, party organization, and coalitions.
But, Gladstone appealed to the moral element in Radicalism
in a way that Chamberlain could not. On the franchise
issue, they worked well in tandem. Chamberlain proved thai
the issue was a "mature" one, and Gladstone turned it into
the kind of crusade necessary to sustain a constitutional
crisis. In the process, he helped Chamberlain hold his
Radical coalition tocether in the face of socialist blan-
dishments. Chamberlain's personal submergence in the Reform
campaign showed that he was by no means the undisputed leader
of English Radicalism. Both his coalition and his leader-
ship were untested.
At the beginning of 1885, Chamberlain resumed his
Radical platform rhetoric. As he did, he faced a test of
his coalition in the upcoming General Election, and he





Historians run the danger of anachronism when they
consider the relationship between Chamberlain and Gladstone.
The bitter fight over the Home Rule bill affects our view
of the years before it. Gladstone and Chamberlain did not
like each other personally, and they often handled each
other poorly. But, they were often allied in the 1880-85
Cabinet, and tended to come to the same conclusions about
political and legislative priorities. Chamberlain usually
counted Gladstone as a Radical. They cooperated on fran-
chise reform and, before 1886, reached similar conclusions
on Ireland. Local government reform was a less prominent
area of agreement between them.
Local government reform was a secondary political issue.
It v;as a species of administrative reform, not social re-
form. Local government bills were advanced or postponed as
they suited other political purposes. The Gladstone Cabinet
produced five bills to reform English local government.
Only two of them were sufficiently noncontroversial to become
lav/. The others fell prey to disputes over priorities and
to contentions betv/een rival localisms. Their history,
therefore, illustrates several themes; the relationship
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between Chamberlain and Gladstone, the influence of rival
localisms upon legislation, and the low priority assigned
to local government reform.
Agitation to reform local government in the counties
began in the early 1870s. It started as a movement among
landowners to limit the burden of local taxation or to
shift it to the Exchequer. It found its strongest adherents
among the Conservatives. But, this pressure was resisted
by the Radicals and the moderate Liberals. The undemocratic
nature of county government made it increasingly difficult
for politicians to give financial aid to the counties with-
out extracting some reforms in return. Radicals attacked
the oligarchic structure of county government, particularly
the right of appointed officials to levy rates. Their price
for financial aid to the counties was the extension of
representative government to them.
All parties agreed upon a basic framework for the re-
form. Essentially, the system already at work in the bor-
oughs v/as to be extended to the counties, with necessary
modifications. But, some politicians went further, desiring
a significant measure of devolution from V/hitehall to local
authorities. Devolution would relieve the central govern-
ment of some burdens and further extend the benefits of
local democracy. To further complicate the issue, there
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was strong pressure from the bureaucracy to rationalize
the relations between counties and boroughs, fix the bound-
aries of local government areas, and systematize financial
relations between Whitehall and the local authorities.
Therefore, beyond the area of basic agreement, there was
intense bargaining in terras of an immense mass of technical
details.
In the 1870s, both Liberal and Conservative governments
tried unsuccessfully to deal with the issue. Gladstone's
first ministry tried to improve the financial administration
of local government. In 1871, George J. Goschen, President
of the Poor Law Board, introduced a bill for parish and
county boards elected on a narrow franchise. The landed
interest attacked the bill and it was withdravm.'^
In 1878, Disraeli's government tried to remove the
objection to financial aid by conceding a limited measure
of representative government. The bill contained many pro-
visions to preserve aristocratic control behind democratic
forms. It set up a County Board consisting of two Justices
and two elected representatives from each petty sessional
division of the county. The Board was to have the adminis-
trative power of the Justices, plus control over highv/ays,
rivers, education of pauper children, and adjustment of
1Simon Maccoby, English Radicalism, 18^5-86 (London:
George Allen and Unwin
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local government boundaries.^
When the bill was presented to Parliament, Chamberlain
saw it as an opportunity to press the franchise issue. He
vigorously attacked the bill , and proposed an amendment
that "no reform of county government will be permanent or
satisfactory which does not entrust the administration of
the county business to a Board elected directly by house-
hold franchise." He was delighted with the "opportunity
of a real stand up fight on the old franchise question",
but he found the moderate Liberals weak on the issue and
the Radicals too divided to present a common front. He was
prevented from bringing his amendment to a vote. The
government was no better off. They found no great support
for the bill in their own party and withdrew it.^
Another Conservative bill in 1879 never reached the
floor of the House. With only lukewarm support in their
ov;n party, the Conservatives were not prepared to face
Radical attacks on their bill. As a result of the election
of 1880, the bill was left in the hands of the Liberals,
who were inclined toward a more complete measure. Politically,
the outline of a basic trade was apparent: democracy for
money. J. G. Dodson, Gladstone's President of the Local
2
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Government Board, insisted that no new aid should be given
to the counties until the local government bill passed.'^
Before the Liberal Cabinet could produce a bill for the
consideration of Parliament, they must first agree among
themselves on its provisions and its priority in the agenda
of government bills. There was little controversy among
the Liberals over representation. Unlike the Tories, the
Whig landov/ners who dominated the Cabinet were confident
of their ability to control representative institutions.^
Instead, the Cabinet argued mostly over devolution and the
precise distribution of powers among the various levels of
local government.
Dodson stood close to the V/hig faction, so the bill he
produced in the winter of 1881-1882 v/as essentially a V/hig
bill. The Whigs represented the landed interest in seeking
rate aid, but their ov;n beliefs led them to seek a strong
measure which would effectively settle the issue of county
government reform for the foreseeable future. As a practical
matter, they liked schemes which would give landowners
special representation, though more to ease the bill's
J. P. D. Dunbabin, "The Politics of the Establishment
of County Councils", Historical Journal , 6 (1963) :231.
-'^Dodson felt that ov/ners could be elected as easily
as occupiers, and if they "do not care to exert themselves
to get elected, they have only themselves to thank. More-
over, the business of the Council must necessarily fall
mainly into the hands of its members who can afford the
time and cost of attending." Quoted in J, P. D. Dunbabin,
"Expectations of the New County Councils and their Reali-
zation", Historical Journal 8 (1965) :356.
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passage than through any belief in their efficacy. But,
though they v/anted a strong measure, they did not v/ant it
so strong as to threaten their control of their localities.
All parties felt that the size of local authorities was
closely related to their control. The poor would find it
more difficult to be represented in county government,
where meetings were far av;ay and held at inconvenient times,
than in districts or parishes. Also, by restricting the
powers of local authorities, the V/higs could lessen the
attractiveness of local government for reformers. They
tended, therefore, to restrict the reform to county govern-
ment, and to limit the powers of such authorities as were
created.
The Radical position on the issue was represented by
Chamberlain and Gladstone, though they were often backed
by other moderate Liberals. They wanted a democratic
measure. They resisted efforts to create special represen-
tation for landowners, and favored smaller units for repre-
sentation and administration. They tried to strengthen
district government at the expense of the county. Separately,
they wished to change the incidence of local taxation by
rating ov/ners of property as well as occupiers.
In November, 1881, Chamberlain was appointed to a
Cabinet committee to aid Dodson in drafting a county govern-
ment bill. Dodson attempted to restrict the representative
principle, recommending that one-third of the members of
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the Gounty Council be Justices chosen by other Justices.
The committee disagreed and voted to have all councillors
elected by the ratepayers, with owners to have two votes.
This was changed in the draft bill to a provision that each
voter would have one vote, but that one-sixth of the coun-
cillors at the first election would be Justices. The bill
transferred to the County Council the administrative powers
of the Justices, including complete control over liquor
licensing and police. Boroughs v/ith separate Quarter Ses-
sions were excluded from the counties.^
Precise terms of financial aid to the counties had to
be settled. In late 1881, John Lambert, Permanent Secre-
tary to the Local Government Board, prepared seventeen
memoranda detailing the workings of a system of assigned
revenues. Certain national taxes would be assigned to the
counties in place of grants-in-aid. The new system was
not reflected in Dodson's bill, which simply authorized the
councils to receive funds distributed according to another
Act."^
J. G. Dodson, "County Councils", November 15, 1881,
Public Record Office, CAB 57/6/31. William Gladstone to
the Queen, January 27, 1882, Public Record Office, CAB ^1/
16/3. Local Government Bill, March 10, 1882, Public Record
Office, HLG 29/18/1-163, cl. 3 and ^. Dunbabin, "Politics
of County Councils", HJ, p. 229.
7'Lambert's memoranda are in the Public Record Office,
HLG 29/'^3/605-853. Dodson presents some figures in "Grants
in Aid in Great Britain", November, 1881, Public Record
Office, CAB 37/6/33- Local Government Bill, March 10, 1882,
P. P.O., cl. 6.
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The bill's limitations drew criticism. Gladstone
declared that "now or never is the time to decentralise",
but did not press his view. The bill was put off for other
business. When Sir Charles Dilke replaced Dodson as Presi-
dent of the Local Government Board, Chamberlain warned him
that "Dodson' s draft is a poor affair and I doubt if you
would care to father it." Dilke inclined toward a more
comprehensive measure.^
ii
The Liberal government's concern with local government
reform extended beyond the counties. In 1882 and 1833, they
presented to Parliament two municipal corporations bills.
The Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 was noncontroversial
.
It was a consolidating Act which combined the Municipal
Corporations Act of 1835 with the several dozen Acts which
had amended it. It was inspired by bureaucrats as a neces-
sary preparation for the county government legislation which
would settle relations between the counties and the boroughs.
The Municipal Corporations (Unreformed) Act, 1883, completed
the tidying up process. Over one hundred tiny municipal
corporations were left unreformed by the Municipal Corpora-
8
V/illiam E. Gladstone to J. G. Dodson, January 10, 1882,
quoted m Dunbabin, "Politics of County Councils", HJ, p.




tions Act of 1835. In 1876, a Royal Commission had been
appointed to find them and recommend action. The 1885 Act
provided that they must be chartered under the Municipal
Corporations Act of 1882. If they did not secure a charter
by 1886, they ceased to exist as municipal corporations
The reform of local government in and around London
was more difficult. Like the small municipal corporations,
the metropolis had escaped reform in 1835. The City Corpora
tion, one of the most powerful vested interests in England,
had prevented reform ever since. In 1876, J. F. B. Firth,
a London Radical, began a campaign to secure a municipal
constitution for the metropolis. His reform group made no
headway with the Tories, but the Liberal Cabinet decided
to produce a government measure. Sir William Harcourt,
the Home Secretary, was assigned departmental responsibility
Harcourt presented his bill to the Cabinet in Decem-
ber, 1881. It provided for a unitary municipality for
metropolitan London. The ancient City Corporation would be
absorbed and the independent vestries shorn of most of their
powers. Chamberlain objected to the scheme, preferring a
two-level system, with Metropolitan Boroughs sharing power
with the central municipality. Harcourt replied that muni-
cipal functions were so interdependent that they could not
tion'-""^r?pn^
Rogal Commission on [Municipal Coroora-r o
,
Great Britain. Parliament, Parliamentary Paner'^(Commons) 1880 [c. 2^4o, 2^90-1] , Vol, yi 'porations Act 1882. ^5 'rr^^6"viitorIa ; ch! 56^%^^'Corporations fTTnrerormed) Act. 183^ , zle & ^,7 kc togia, gh . 18
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be easily separated. Chamberlain found no support for his
proposal, and declined to press his objections when Harcourt
had Cabinet responsibility for the measure. '^^
He had more support, however, for his criticism of the
provision that the London police were to remain under Home
Office control. The Radicals, supported by Gladstone, in-
sisted that the Corporation of London must have as much
control over its police force as a provincial town. Harcourt,
rattled by Fenian bombings in London, questioned the ability
of a Watch Committee to administer the police, and ignored
contrary evidence from the provinces. He also pointed out
that the London Police District covered a much larger area
than the proposed municipality, creating a problem of what
to do with the remainder of the district. Exasperated,
Dilke remarked that "Harcourt thinks himself a Fouche and
wants to have all the police but nothing but the police."
'^^
10 .
Sir William Harcourt, "Memorandum on a Plan for the
Municipal Government of London", December I3, 1881, Public
Record Office, CAB 37/6/34-. Joseph Chamberlain to Sir
^'l^'^l^^^
^^^rcourt
, December 21, 1881, Chamberlain Papers,
JC 5/:^8/129. Joseph Chamberlain and Sir William Harcourt,
'Further Memorandum on a Plan for the Government of London",
January 2, 1882, Public Record Office, CAB 37/7/1. Sir
Charles Dilke 's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. ^3937, f. 5.
11
Sir William Harcourt to Joseoh Chamberlain, January
19, 1883, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/38/27. Joseph Chamber-lam to Sir Charles Dilke, January 20, 1883, Dilke Papers,
Add. Mss. ^1-3886, ff. 12-13. Sir William Harcourt, "Police
Authority in the New Municipalitv of London", March 1, 1883,
Public Record Office, CAB 37/10/23. Note from Dilke toChamberlain, March 17j 1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 4-3886,
f. 39. Sir Charles Dilke 's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss.
43937, ff. 5-7, 18-24-, 46, 4-9-50.
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In April, 188$, the police difficulty led the Cabinet
to postpone the bill for another year, but the controversy
erupted with the same fierceness when the bill was brought
forward again in 1884. Ultimately, Dilke produced a com-
promise which Gladstone reluctantly accepted: control of
the police would be given only after the new London govern-
ment had proved itself. Though Gladstone gave the bill an
eloquent defense on the Second Reading, Dilke always had
doubts as to what the Prime Minister would have done with
the police clauses in committee. But, at this point, the
crisis over the franchise bill overshadowed all other
legislation. The London government bill was lost in the





In December, 1882, the appointment of Sir Charles
Dilke as President of the Local Government Board provided
an opportunity for county government to be reconstructed
along Radical lines. Dilke had worked with flarcourt on the
London government bill, and he was anxious to prove himself
to his colleagues by bringing in an important measure. At
12
V/illiam E. Gladstone to Sir Charles Dilke, April 11,
1884, Dilke Papers, Add. Hss. 43875, f. 1$2. Sir Charles
Dilke to V/illiam E. Gladstone, April 11, 1883, Gladstone
Papers, Add. Mss. 44149, ff. 138-39. Sir Charles Dilke 's
Hemoir. Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43937, ff. 92, 96, 98-100,
120, 179; 43938, f. 3.
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once, he began to plan a bill which would be far more com-
prehensive than Dodson had contemplated.
Dilke's entry into the Cabinet coincided with Chamber-
lain's decision to press the franchise issue. Never par-
ticularly interested in local government reform, Chamber-
lain still adhered to his amendment of 1878. He felt that
franchise reform must precede county government reform.
He argued that "Any Bill passed now would be a County gen-
tleman's and County Magistrates Bill and would infallibly
have to be altered when the labourers and others now exclu-
ded get the franchise." ^ The converse was also true.
The franchise would settle the question of representation.
Once the agricultural laborer could vote for Parliament,
he could not be denied participation in local government.
Dilke was hard to convince, but Chamberlain received
support from an unexpected source. Sir John Lambert, re-
cently retired from his position as Permanent Secretary of
the Local Government Board, visited Dilke shortly after he
took office. Lambert argued that county franchise must
come before county boards. His reasons were bureaucratic:
the same electoral register must be used for both parlia-
ment and local government, and he felt that the county
people should be represented before their local government
was set up. Dilke accepted the argument and supported
15
Joseph Chamberlain to V/illiam E. Gladstone, January
18, 1383, Gladstone Papers, Add. Mss. 4^+125, f. 131.
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Chamberlain's position in the discussions with other members
of the Cabinet. '^^
Their colleagues were not convinced. Gladstone v;as
in bad health and did not participate. All other members
of the Cabinet opposed franchise first. Lord Hartington
took the opposite tack from Lambert. He argued that the
issues of registration and electoral areas could be settled
in the local government bill. Then, the franchise bill
would be light enough to settle redistribution in the same
session. He was supported by Lords Spencer and Selbourne.
Lords Granville, Derby and Kimberly v/anted to postpone
franchise reform because it would produce a crisis that
could lead to a dissolution. They wanted to pass some con-
structive legislation before again facing the electorate. '^5
Outvoted, Dilke and Chamberlain gave way. Chamber-
lain took up the cause of an Irish local government bill
and an English tenant right bill. Gladstone supported him
v^hen he returned at the beginning of March. Only the ten-
ant right bill was passed in the 1883 session.''^
14
Sir Charles Dilke to Joseph Chamberlain, January 4,
1883, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/2V347.
1
5
-^Lord Hartington to Sir Charles Dilke, January 9,
1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43891, f. 53- Joseph Chamber-
lain to Sir Charles Dilke, January 20, 1883, Dilke Papers,
Add. Mss. 43886, ff. 12-13. Sir Charles Dilke to Joseuh
Chamberlain, February 3, 1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss.^
43886, f. 23. Sir Charles Dilke 's F^emoir, Dilke Papers,
Add. Mss. 43937, ff. 13-16.
16Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, February 4,
1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43886, ff. 27-28.
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Dilke moved proraptly to produce a local government
bill. He went over a first draft before Easter, and cir-
culated a printed draft to the Cabinet in late July. He
favored a complete measure, covering both districts and
counties, and he wanted a large amount of devolution. He
wrote to Chamberlain, "I desire to burn down this office
and give all its powers to the County Boards." Gladstone
strongly supported him.'^'^
Dilke 's draft bill created elected district and county
councils everywhere outside the boroughs. The District
Councils were to take over the powers of the local sanitary
authority, the Poor Law Guardians, the Boards of Education,
and a half-dozen other local boards. Also, they were to
have the powers of the Justices over liquor licensing,
apportionment, and administration of several Acts. The
County Councils absorbed all of the Justices' other adminis-
trative duties, and many powers of the Local Government
Board to sanction district loans and approve other actions.
All members of the councils were to be directly elected by
the ratepayers. Boroughs over 50,000 population were to
become counties, smaller boroughs were to be districts.
The bill also settled a host of technical questions relating
to boundaries, valuation of property, asylums, election law,
17
'Sir Charles Dilke to Joseph Chamberlain, February 3,
1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43886, f. 24. William E."
Gladstone to Sir Charles Dilke, December 31, 1882, Glad-
stone Papers, Add. I-iss. 44149, ff. 125-26.
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and finance. Its most important financial provision made
ov/ners liable for half of the rates.
Chamberlain liked the bill, and thought "it could be
popular and v/orkable." The rest of the Cabinet thought it
too complete. In November, a Cabinet committee was set
up to redraft the bill and consider questions of finance
connected with it. The committee split into two groups:
Dilke, Chamberlain and Childers against Dodson, Kimberley,
Derby, Carlingford and Fitzmaurice. Sir Edmund Fitzmaurice
Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board, pro-
duced an alternative scheme which Dilke considered "good
but very timid". He suggested that the question of dist-
rict boundaries be left to the County Councils, and that
the Boards of Guardians be made the rural district councils
though with some liberalization of the franchise.
^'^
Chamberlain tried to strengthen Dilke 's resolve, and
suggested that he bring the matter before the full Cabinet,
where he v/ould have a majority. But, Dilke compromised
v;ith Fitzmaurice, adopting the Union areas for Poor Law
1
8
Draft Local Government Bill, August 24, 1885, Dilke
Papers, Add. Iiss. ^3923, ff. ^4-9-125.
19
^Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, July 8,
1885, Dilke Papers, Add. Hss. 4388S, f. 38. William E.
Gladstone to the Queen, Movember 13, 1883, Public Record
Office, CAB 41/17/24. Sir Charles Dilke to William E.
Gladstone, iloveraber 19, 1883, Gladstone Papers, Add. Mss.
44149, f. 186. Sir Edmund Fitzmaurice, "Memorandum on
County Government", November 20, 1883, Public Record Office
HLG 29/43/715-17. Sir Charles Dilke 's Memoir, Dilke Papers
Add. Mss. 43938, ff. 146-85.
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purposes. The Guardians were to be a Joint committee of
the councils of the constituent districts.
In another change, the committee raised the population
for county boroughs to 100,000. Its most important contri-
bution was to improve the financial clauses of the bill.
The system of assigned revenues, which had been drafted
by the Local Government Board two years earlier, was incor-
porated in a bill for the first time. Thirty-one separate
central grants were to be terminated, and licensing fees
formerly paid to the Exchequer were to be paid to the county
treasury. In addition, the proceeds of Id of the income
tax collected from the county were to be paid to the county.
Certain excises on carriages and dogs were to cease and
the county v/as empowered to tax them.
Dilke's draft bill was a dead letter before it v/as
completed. In the fall of 1883, Chamberlain's campaign for
franchise reform reached its height. Dilke's bill, already
subordinated to Harcourt's London government bill, v/as
doomed by Gladstone's conversion to the franchise issue.
Dilke continued to work on his "now useless Local Government
Bill", and suggested to Gladstone that it might be published
before the next election. The Liberal ministry had no more
20Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, November
29, 1883, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43886, ff. 89-90. Sir
Charles Dilke's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. ^3958,
ff. 188, 204.
^ Local Government lill, January 13, 1884, Public
Record Office, HLG 29/18/167-353.
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opportunity for local sovernraent reform. Dilke's bill
was never introduced. Dilke had departmental responsibility
for the franchise and redistribution bills. He and Glad-
stone were the leading negotiators with Salisbury over re-
distribution. Local government reform was left over to
the next Parliament .^^
IV
Liberal efforts to reform local government thus appeared
to have ended in futility. Four more years of internal
debate ensued before Parliament was presented with a local
government bill. But, Dilke 's bill was not lost, for it
was the foundation of all future bills.
Local government reform failed because of its low
priority as a legislative issue. Only Dilke and Harcourt
seemed to be genuinely interested in seeing their bills
become law. Chamberlain and Gladstone had no compunction
about shoving them aside for more popular legislation.
Even the V/hig leaders were less interested in local govern-
ment reform for its own sake than in using it to slow down
the franchise bill.
Rival localisms contributed to the bill's demise.
22 .
Sir Charles Dilke to V/illiam E. Gladstone, January
11, 188^, January 15, 1884, April 5, 1884, Gladstone PaDers,
Add. Mss. 44149, ff. 196-97, 198-99, 20?. Andrew Jones',
The Politics of Peform, 1884 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
siby Press, ^19/2), pp. 204-15.
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Local government touched questions of power and wealth.
The Whigs, who had much to lose, favored cautious legisla-
tion to keep from losing control of their local governments,
and their local governments' taxing powers. The Radicals
favored comprehensive legislation and were afraid that a
half-measure would block further reform. Chamberlain pre-
ferred to change the political balance in the counties
before he ratified that change with new local institutions.
We should note that Chamberlain's position on local
government reform was not strictly a negative one. He did
not merely shunt it aside to make room for the franchise
issue. Pie genuinely believed that franchise reform was a
necessary precondition for county government reform. As
alv/ays, he perceived the roots of power. He consistently
held that government in England should be conducted upon
the widest possible franchise, and he had confidence that
he could maintain his power in that environment. To give
the agricultural laborer the parliamentary franchise would
bring in its train democratic local government. His pre-
diction was correct. It fell to the Conservatives to
draft the bill which became law. Though that bill was
far more restricted than Dilke's bill, it v;as a consider-
able advance upon what the Conservatives had offered in
1878. Once the laborer had been granted representation in
Parliament, even the Tories were forced to concede him
participation in local government.
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The local government issue illustrates considerable
common ground betv/een Chamberlain and Gladstone. They
agreed in opposing Dodson's restrictions on representation,
on control of the London police, and on the priority of
franchise, tenant rights and an Irish local government bill
over English local government reform. There v;as no reason
to believe that they would inevitably disagree over Home
Rule.
Thus far, local government reform had led a subter-
ranean existence in the Liberal ministry. Often shunted
aside, it had developed a strong claim to be the next re-
form after franchise and redistribution. Chamberlain did
not agree—he favored land reform—but he was forced to
accomodate a growing consensus among politicians that local
government v/as next. Local government v;as a prominent
issue in 1885. Ironically, the next local government bill
to be drafted v/as Chamberlain's.
CHAPTER VI
THE COLLAPSE OF CHAMBERLAINITE RADICALISM
At the beginning of 1885, Joseph Chamberlain anticipa-
ted an increase of Radical influence in the British Parlia-
ment. T. H, S. Escott confidently predicted that the Radi-
cals would emerge from the next election as "the control-
ling party in the State." Chamberlain was more cautious,
aware that the swing of the pendulum could bring in the
Tories. His goal was to give the Radicals a dominant voice
within the Liberal party. Throughout 1885, Chamberlain
prepared for the coming election. He was delighted when
the Liberal government fell in June, for it freed him of
any responsibility for Liberal policy and gave him a Tory
government to attack. The 1885 election was a test of his
Radical leadership and his policy of verbal assaults on the
landed interest. It forced him to face the fact that he
could not win votes by simply adding items to the Radical
Programme . The results of the election gravely weakened
his position within the Liberal party and left him powerless
'I
to stop Gladstone's move toward Home Rule.
Joseph Chamberlain, et. al., The Radical Programme
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1885; reprint ed., edited v/irh
an introduction by D. A. Hamer, Brighton: Harvester Press,
1971), p. 21. Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, February
2, 1885, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/5V601 . Joseph Chamber-
lain to J. T. Bunce, June 11, 1885, quoted in J. L. Garvin,
13^
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As v/e have noted in previous chapters, the localistic
basis of Chamberlainite Radicalism concealed a dangerous
split betv;een middle class and working class Radicals. The
organizational structure of the National Liberal Federation
assumed that each local party organization would be able to
deliver the votes necessary to elect candidates. The na-
tional organization only supplemented local efforts. It
was able to give a lead only when the local Liberal Asso-
ciation leaders would take it. These local leaders often
followed willingly, but they did so only insofar as their
ideas and interests dictated. Most of them were less wil-
ling than Chamberlain to appeal strongly for working class
support. The strongest Associations were dominated by
Nonconformists, who did not like to see their favorite
issues subordinated to Chamberlain's social politics. Fie
was forced to appeal to both parts of his following, so
land reform and working class housing shared billing with
disestablishment and free education. The Nonconformist
issues multiplied his enemies. His appeal was dissipated,
and his program became confused and contradictory.
In geographical terms, Chamberlain hoped to consolidate
the Radical position in the tovms and extend Radical influ-
The Life of Joseph Chamberlain , vol. 2: 1883-1893: Disrup-




ence in the countryside. By 1885, Jesse Collings had won
widespread support among the agricultural laborers. The
National Liberal Federation supported Collings with an or-
ganizing effort in the rural parishes. Chamberlain pre-
dicted a sweep of the counties at the elections. He did
not face the same contradictions seeking the votes of the
agricultural laborers as he did seeking those of urban
workers. He had no allies among the possessing classes in
rural England, so his appeal to the rural worker came throunrh
2
clearly.
The election of 1885 took place in the wake of a mas-
sive restructuring of British electoral geography. The
kingdom was divided into single member constituencies. Only
twenty-four boroughs and the universities continued to
elect two members. Ninety-one small boroughs had been
merged with the county divisions and their seats given to
the large urban areas. Metropolitan London had fifty-nine
seats, compared to its former twenty-two. Fifteen other
large boroughs doubled their representation from thirty-
five to seventy seats.
^
The disappearance of the small boroughs lent greater
2Francis Schnadhorst, County Organization; A Paper Head
at a Conference of Liberals~HQld at CJardiff, on October 23th,
1880 (Birmingha:ri: National Liberal Federation, 1o80). Jos-
eph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke , June 50, 1885, Dilke
Papers, Add. Kss. 4$887, ff. 157-58.
7.
-^Andrew Jones, The Politics of Poform, I.^B^'t- (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 8.
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immediacy to Chamberlain's campaign v/ith the agricultural
laborers. Some effort must be made to win them over, if
the old Liberal tov/ns were not to be swamped.
The large towns had all been divided into single-member
constituencies. This confronted the National Liberal Fed-
eration and its affiliates with an organizational problem.
The caucus system guaranteed working class representatives
a vote in the selection of candidates. Parliamentary can-
didates for the entire borough had been selected by the
Grand Committee, the "Eight Hundred", as it was in Birming-
ham in 188^. The new parliamentary divisions called for a
matching unit in the structure of the caucus. For Birming-
ham, Chamberlain announced, a new level of committees would
be created. There would be district councils in each di-
vision to select parliamentary candidates. The district
councils would be combined in a United Liberal Association
of Birmingham, to collect and express the opinion of the
v/hole town. This new Grand Committee would be the "Two
Thousand." Other towns followed the Birmingham example.
In subsequent years, most of the tov/n-wide Liberal Asso-
ciations faded out of existence or became relatively pov/er-
less in the face of divisional autonomy. The Birmingham
Liberal Association remained strong, however.
Joseph Chamberlain at Birmingham, January 5» '1 835,
Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches , ed. Charles V/. Boyd, 2 vols.
(Boston : iloughcon ilifflin Company, I'^'l^), ^'^53- Moisei
Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political
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This organizational restructuring could not overcome
the divisive effects of redistribution. Chamberlain could
not accurately assess the impact of the new electoral geo-
graphy. One midland Radical has described his errors of
judgement
:
The London seat he thought best went Tory,
the other London seat and a big borough division,
which he put next, have been in and out ever
since, v;hile my own prize constituency [East
Northants] , the steadiest in Great Britain, he
had little faith in.
5
But Chamberlain did not have any less foresight than his
colleagues. Nobody knew what the effect of redistribution
would be. Even Dilke and Salisbury, who negotiated it,
calculated that the large towns would remain Liberal and
the counties would stay strongly Conservative. Each party
had designs upon the other's territory, but they had no
clear idea of how successful they could be.^
11
Chamberlain's first step in preparing for the election
was to reassert the independence he had enjoyed two years
earlier, but v/hich had been eclipsed during the Reform
crisis. In two speeches at Birmingham and one at Ipswich
Parties , trans. Frederick Clarke, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan
and Company, 1902), 1:338-^0.
^F. H. Channing, Memories of Midland Politics, 1885-
I9IQ
^ quoted in Jones, Polibics of Hei'orn! , p. 20y, n. 3.
^ibid, pp. 207-08.
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(Jesse Collings's constituency), he made a strong appeal
to the working class. The Liberal party, he argued, must
appeal to the newly enfranchised working class voter. In
rhetoric reminiscent of Henry George's, he argued that the
laborer's original communal rights to land had been stolen
by the landed class. They must be paid for, he asserted.
So, "what ransom will property pay for the security it
enjoys? ... I think in the future we shall hear a great
deal more about the obligations of property, and we shall
not hear quite so much about its rights." He congratulated
his audience on "the fair prospect which is opening up for
the class to v/hich you belong." He predicted that new
social legislation would lessen the evils of poverty and
bring the greatest happiness of the greatest number.*^
Chamberlain's assertion that possession of property
involved obligations as well as rights was not a new element
in his speeches. It was, in fact, a fundamental element in
his social thinking. But, the word "ransom", like the
phrase "they toil not, neither do they spin" two years be-
fore, offended many people. There were the usual protests,
and in his speech at Ipswich two weeks later, he changed
the word "ransom" to "insurance", but he held to the concept.^
7'Joseph Chamberlain at Birmingham Tov/n Hall, January
5, 1885, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches , 1:130-59.
gJoseph Chamberlain at Ipswich, January 1^, 1885,
ibid., pp. 140-150.
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He continued his attack on irresponsible property
rights in his second Birmingham speech on January 29, and
declared his faith in manhood suffrage. By this time, his
"terror", as Dilke called it, put Gladstone in an acutely
uncomfortable position. He remonstrated with Chamberlain,
who replied v/ith a Radical manifesto. Chamberlain consid-
ered resigning, but feared to have Gladstone openly against
him. He stopped his speechraaking, but he had accomplished
his obj'ect of independence.*^
In the remaining four months of the Gladstone ministry.
Chamberlain focused on the Irish question. The Crimes Act
of 1882 was due to expire at the end of the session, and
any attempt to renew it would again split the Radicals. He
tried to provide an alternative to coercion by negotiating
a partial settlement with Charles Stewart Parnell, the
Irish Nationalist leader. His effort failed. The choice
of an intermediary v;as poor, and misunderstandings developed
between Chaniberlain and Parnell. Chamberlain could not
persuade the Cabinet to accept his scheme of representative
county councils and a central board for Ireland. Though
supported by Gladstone , Chamberlain and Dilke were unable
to move the Cabinet on this or any other issue. The two
q
-^Joseph Chamberlain at Birmingham, January 29, 1885,
Mr. Chamberlain's ST^eeches , 1:151-60. Joseph Chamberlain
to William E. Gladstone, February 7, 1885, Chamberlain Pap-
ers, JC 5/3V76. J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamber-
lain , vol. 1: 1836-1885: Chamberlain and Democracy (London:
Flacmillan and Company, 1932; , pp. 548-58.
1^1
Radicals sent in their resignations, but the government
fell before Gladstone could act on them.^^
Freed from the restrictions of his Cabinet post, Cham-
berlain began preparing in earnest for the election. He
resurrected the Radical Programme . The July issue of the
Fortnightly Review carried its last two articles. Francis
Adams's article on "Taxation and Finance" picked up a theme
of Chamberlain's speeches: that the burden of taxation ought
to be redistributed on the principle of equality of sacri-
fice. He suggested graduated income and inheritance taxes,
and a restriction of government expenditure to legitimate
public purposes. The article strengthened Chamberlain's
appeal to the working class.
^'^
The final article in the series, "Local Government and
Ireland", by T. H. S. Escott and George Fottrell, acknowl-
edged the growing power of the local government issue, though
it contained no new proposals. Escott 's description of a
reformed local government matched the provisions of Dilke's
-^ local government bill, and Fottrell 's proposals for Ireland
were a copy of Chamberlain's Irish central board scheme.
The significance of the article v/as the link it proposed
between the two issues. It was Chamberlain's first attempt
10
C. H. D. Hov/ard, "Joseph Chamberlain, Parnell and
the Irish 'Central Board' Scheme, 188^-5", Irish Historica l
Studies , 8 ( 1 955) : 324-61 . Joseph Chamberlain, Memoranda
on Ireland, Anril 11, 1885, April 25, 1885, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 8/5/1/11, 12.
11
Chamberlain, et. al., The Radical Programme , pp. 207-32
^^2
to increase the palatability of one of his favorite projects
by linking it to local government reform. '^^
As soon as the articles were published, the entire
Radical Programme was issued as a book, v^;ith a preface by
Chamberlain. Symbolism was observed: the book had a red
cover.
Chamberlain began his speaking campaign as soon as the
government resigned. His language was more moderate than
it had been in his January speeches. He appealed more to
the moral sensibilities of property owners and less to the
revolutionary aspirations of workers. He stressed three
issues: free education, purchase of land for allotments and
small holdings, and equality of sacrifice in taxation.
Speaking at V/arrington on September 8, he described his pro-
posals as the Radical Programme, even though they differed
in details from the book.
Chamberlain v;as disappointed in Gladstone's election
manifesto, issued on September 17. It promised reforms in
five areas: House of Commons procedure, finance, local
government, the land laws, and registration of voters.
Though Chamberlain considered Gladstone's position on tax-
ation acceptable, the manifesto did not mention his land
purchase proposals, and it downplayed free education. He
protested privately and issued a public ultimatum., that the
12
Chamberlain, et. al.. The Radical Programme
, pp. 233-65.
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next Liberal government would have to include these pro-
posals in its program or he would not Join it. George J.
Goschen, Chamberlain's most vocal opponent among the V/higs,
dubbed his additions the "unauthorized programme", to dis-
tinguish it from Gladstone's official one. Characteristic-
ally, Chamberlain adopted the term.'^^
Chamberlain's ability to make his ultimatium effective
depended upon his influence in the election. He faced
many difficulties. Gladstone's manifesto was vague because
nothing more specific could encompass the contending wings
of the Liberal party. The Tories mounted a vigorous cam-
paign. Lord Randolph Churchill, the creator of Tory Demo-
cracy, carried the Conservative campaign into the large
towns. He even dared accept a nomination to stand against
John Bright in the Central Birmingham division. In Bir-
mingham and elsewhere, Churchill exploited the fair trade
issue. Fair trade, the opposite of free trade, was a move
ment to impose tariffs against foreign competition. A
15
^C, H. D. Howard, "Joseph Chamberlain and the 'Un-
authorized Programme'", English Historical Review , 65
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Gladstone, September 20, 1885, copy in Dilke Papers, Add.
Mas. ^$887, ff. 171-72. Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Col-
lings, September 20, 1885, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/108.
Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, September 20, 1885,
September 21, 1885, September 24, 1885, Dilke Papers, Add.
Mss. 45887, ff. 167-68, 169-70, 173. Joseoh Chamberlain
to Sir V/illiara Harcourt, Seotember 20, 1885, October 5,
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product of Britain's economic troubles, the fair trade
movement was popular among employers and workingmen in the
large industrial centers, particularly in Lancashire. It
was brought to Chamberlain's attention when he returned to
Birmingham in mid-October to contest his own seat. Glad-
stone was sufficiently alarmed to ask Chamberlain and Dilke
y\ Zl
to campaign aganist it.
Free education did not win the support Chamberlain
had hoped for, and it landed him in the midst of a religious
controversy. Ratepayers were v/orried about the effect that
the abolition of school fees would have on their school
rates. Churchmen knew that the abolition of fees in govern-
ment-supported schools would force many private schools
into bankruptcy. V/hen Chamberlain proposed to subsidize
both types of schools with treasury grants, he raised oppo-
sition among his own Nonconformist supporters. This knot
of conflicting religious groups forced many Radicals to
distance themselves from Chamberlain, and even he de-empha-
sised the issue in the last month of campaigning. Free
education was especially damaging in London, where Dilke
considered repudiating the Radical Programme .
Robert Rhodes James, Lord Randolph Churchill (N.Y.
:
A. S. Barnes and Company, 19^9), pp. 117-18, 1^8,
Michael Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction
of Liberal Policy in Britain, 1d8'3-9-l- (N.Y.; Barnes and
iMoble, l^^yp;, ^y. '.villiam ji. Gladstone to Joseph Cham-
berlain, November 11, 1885, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/3V^^.
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If free education was damaging, disestablishment was
disastrous* John Morley's article in the Radical ProCTamme
stirred cries of "the church in danger". His proposals for
disendowment of the Church of England repelled even those
who supported its disestablishment. Gladstone declared
the article "outrageously unjust." To many people, it
seemed like robbery. Disestablishment set Nonconformists
against Anglicans and Roman Catholics, and gave energy to
the Conservative party. Gladstone decried the harm which
the issue visited on the Liberal party, and asked Chamber-
lain to relegate it to the distant future. Chamberlain,
v/ho had de-eraphasised the issue from early in the campaign,
gladly complied. However, the damage was already done.'^^
With the Nonconformist parts of his program in dis-
array, Chamberlain focused his attention on the land reform
issue. His proposals centered on a bill prepared by Jesse
Ceilings to give local authorities powers to take land by
compulsion and create allotments and small holdings for
agricultural laborers. Chamberlain felt he must strengthen
the issue's appeal among Liberal candidates. In his Vic-
toria Hall speech on September 24, he broadened the issue
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to include reform of local Government. The next local
government bill, he declared, could include a provision
which gave elected local authorities "the power to acquire
land compulsorily—at its fair value, for public purposes,
and among these public purposes I have laid great stress
upon the letting of land for allotments and small holdings."
Local government reform had received v/idespread sup-
port in the campaign. The leaders of both parties endorsed
it. But, until his Victoria Hall speech. Chamberlain
showed no great enthusiasm for it. He had endorsed it in
general terms and had included it in the Radical Programme ,
but he had not linked it to the land issue, and did not
press it on its own merits.
Lord Salisbury tried to assert Conservative interest
in the local government issue, without Chamberlain's addi-
tions. Speaking at Newport on October 7, he argued that
local autonomy was historically a Tory principle. The
chief issues in local government, he felt, were decentrali-
zation, inequities in local rates, and liquor licensing.
In his remarks, Salisbury reflected a Conservative county
councils bill which Arthur Balfour, President of the Local
Government Board, was preparing at that time. Salisbury
did not intend to let the Liberals have the issue free
17^Joseph Chamberlain at Victoria Hall, London, Septem-
ber 2^, 1885, Hr. Chamberlain's Speeches , 1:213.
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and clear.
On the local government issue, Salisbury faced a more
effective foe than Chamberlain. Dilke wrote to Chamberlain
that he was going to strike at Salisbury's exploitation of
local government. At Halifax on October I3, Dilke gave a
detailed exposition of his local government bill, with a
wealth of detail which bewildered his listeners. His speech
v/as equivalent to publishing his local government bill,
the course of action he had suggested to Gladstone in 1884.
The Conservatives would now be forced to Justify any less
complete bill. Also, Dilke 's ideas had advanced beyond his
bill. He now wished to add another level to rural local
government, restoring the parish meeting as the base of
the entire system. He suggested that the parish have some
powers over Poor Law overseers, parochial charities, commons
and recreation grounds, and valuation. He also endorsed
Chamberlain's proposals to give district and parish authori-
ties power to take land for allotments and small holdings. '^'^
Dilke 's speech threw the mantle of local government
reform over Chamberlain's land purchase proposals. Hence-
forth in the campaign, they were linked. Chamberlain was to
consider the election a mandate to carry out both reforms.
1
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The results of the general election reversed earlier
patterns of electoral support for the Liberal and Conser-
vative parties. The Conservatives won a small majority in
the English boroughs, and did best in the large boroughs
which had been divided by the Redistribution Act. Their
strongest areas were London and Lancashire. They won
thirty-three seats in London to the Liberals' twenty-six.
In the other eleven English boroughs which had been divided,
they won thirty seats to the Liberals' tv/enty. Only in
Birmingham were they prevented from winning any seats. To
offset their gains, the Liberals v;on I33 seats in the Eng-
lish counties, to the Conservatives' 110. A minority of
Liberal victories in the counties were actually in rural
divisions. Many of them were dominated by formerly inde-
pendent boroughs v/hich had voted Liberal. But, forty-three
of the Liberal county divisions were agricultural. In some
of them, Liberal landlords or Nonconformist farmers gave
the Liberals their victory. But, in many, Jesse Ceilings
and Joseph Arch won the votes of the agricultural laborers.
Most of the Liberal victories in rural county divisions
were concentrated in East Anglia and southwest England.
20James Cornford, "The Transformation of Conservatism
in the Late Nineteenth Century", Victorian Studies , 7 (Sep-
tember, 1965) Figures are calculated from i'rederick
McCalraont , McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book; British
Election Results, 1S32-1'-)18 , 3th ed. , edited by J. Vincent
and M. Stenton (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1971), and Henry
Polling, Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-1^)10
(N.Y.: St. Martin's l-^ress, 1967).
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The resulting party balance in the House of Commons
was a standoff. 335 Liberals exactly balanced 2^9 Conser-
vatives and eighty-six Irish Nationalists. No party could
govern alone. Parnell could form a governing alliance with
the Liberals, but not the Conservatives. The Radicals
emerged as a strong group within the Liberal party, oust
slightly less than half of the parliamentary Liberals. The
bulk of them represented constituencies in large boroughs
and industrial counties, though twenty-five represented
OA
rural county divisions.
The Radical success did not benefit Chamberlain.
Though he was credited with the Liberal victory in the
counties, he was blamed for the losses in the towns. Glad-
stone expressed a widely held opinion when he commented
that the causes of the Liberal defeats were "Fair Trade +
Parnell + Church + Chamberlain", in that order of impor-
tance. Ceilings 's program had been humorously dubbed "Three
acres and a cow." In the aftermath, Chamberlain wrote to
Harcourt that "V/e are dreadfully in need of an urban 'Cow'.
. . . The boroughs do not care for our present programme
and I confess I do not know v;hat substitute to offer them."^^
21
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The election of 1885 exposed the contradictions in
Chamberlainite Radicalism. It relied for its support upon
middle class Nonconformist leaders. Chamberlain's efforts
to seek working class support alienated many middle class
voters. But, Nonconformity was an even weaker reed. Re-
distribution destroyed Nonconformist control in many large
boroughs. The issues which attracted them alienated many
Anglicans. The Radical Programme was a dead end. Most of
its proposals were later implemented by the Conservatives,
shorn of the very points which made thera attractive to most
Radicals. As instruments of middle class and Nonconformist
ambition, they were failures.
Chamberlain's attack upon the citadels of aristocratic
power and privilege came to an end in the election of 1885.
He was already moderating his attack a month before the
polling commenced. The Liberal losses in the towns deprived
him of the Liberal victory he had predicted and led others
to expect. The divergence betv/een expectation and result,
and his disorientation at being unable to find an urban
"cow", left him in a weakened position. He quietly dropped
his attempts to set conditions on entry into the Cabinet.
He was not the only leader who was weakened: Hartington's
faction also did not do well in the elections. This opened
the v;ay for Gladstone's attempt to convert the Liberal party
to Home Rule.




Gladstone's conversion to Home Rule was announced by
his son Herbert in the famous "Hawarden kite" on December
16. The Irish issue had loomed over the election. Parnell's
willingness to sell his support to the highest bidder cost
the Liberals dearly. He ordered the Irish in England to
vote for the Conservatives, v/hich cost the Liberals an
estimated forty seats. During the same period, Gladstone
reassessed his position on Ireland and came to the conclu-
sion that it was a great question which must be solved by
his usual methods of moral leadership. He made no secret
of his interest in the question. When v/arned of Gladstone's
intentions, Chamberlain was not worried. He thought that
a deal with Parnell v;as impossible, and that "Mr. G's plans
will come to naught."
He was unprepared for the v/idespread Radical support
which Gladstone received after the Hawarden kite. Most
Radicals decided that the bill v;as necessary to remove the
Irish issue from English politics and clear the road for
their own reforms. Even the faithful Jesse Ceilings rejected
Chamberlain's objections to Gladstone's schemes, arguing
that they v;ere mere points of detail. Morley publicly de-
"^Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism , pp. 105-20.
Henry Labouchere co Joseph Chamberlain, October 18, 1885,
Joseph Chamberlain to Henry Labouchere, October 20, 1885,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/50/28, 29.
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Glared his support for Gladstone's position. Chamberlain
found few allies for his proposal to leave the Conservatives
in power while forcing them to pass Liberal measures.
Throughout January, 1886, he found many of his longtime
supporters drifting into Gladstone's orbit.
Seeking to head off the Home Rule bill, he tried to
focus Liberal interest on the allotments issue. On January
11, 1886, he addressed the second annual meeting of Ceilings 'i
Allotments and Small Holdings Association. He argued that
land reform was urgent, and that a bill must be put before
Parliament soon in order to assure the Liberal party con-
tinued support from the agricultural laborers. He was
outmaneuvered: Gladstone used the allotments issue to un-
seat the Conservatives on January 26, and then dropped it.^^
Powerless to halt the Liberal drift, Chamberlain
agreed to serve under Gladstone on the formula that the
Cabinet would simply investigate the issue of Home Rule.
After some difficult negotiations, he accepted the Presi-
dency of the Local Government Board. It was another junior
post, but it gave him a role in domestic politics.
His position gave Chamberlain another opportunity
24
Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism
, pp. 109-11,
120-25. David Aronson, "Jesse Collings, Agrarian Radical,
1880-1892", Ph. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, 1975, p. 91.
25
^Aronson, "Jesse Ceilings", pp. 91-99.
153
to try to stop the Liberal rush to Home Rule. He secured
Cabinet permission to draft a local government bill, and
constituted a committee to prepare it. Chamberlain was
the only Cabinet member on the committee. The other mem-
bers were Dilke, Ceilings (now Parliamentary Secretary to
the Local Government Board), Hugh Owen (the Board's Per-
manent Secretary), Henry Thring and Herbert Jenkyns (Par-
liamentary Counsel to the Treasury and his assistant).
Dilke, who was out of the Cabinet, usually acted as chair-
man. Dilke and Thring did most of the work. Chamber-
lain confessed that "I have been so full of work that at
present I have been able to get no grasp of the subject
and hardly know where to begin or what difficulties to
meet." Undisturbed by political conflicts, the commit-
tee rapidly drafted a bill.
Chamberlain's local government bill was the most com-
prehensive measure of the entire series of local government
bills. Only the government of London was excluded from its
scope. It established parish, district and county councils,
incorporated Ceilings 's allotments bill, and attempted to
solve the difficult problem of liquor licensing. Chamber-
2S
The scandal which destroyed Dilke 's career had not
yet become public, but it was known in political circles
and he was excluded when Gladstone assembled his Cabinet.
Sir Charles Dilke 's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 459^0,
ff. 119-20.
27̂ Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke, February
15, 1886, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 43888, ff. 10-11.
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lain did not write the bill, he coordinated it. He was
more interested that there be a bill than he was in what
was in it. The ideas were Dilke's, with some additions
from Collings, and a legal check from Thring.^®
The core of the bill was Dilke's bill of 188^. It
established county councils, but the key institution of
local government was to be the district council, created
from existing urban and rural sanitary authorities. All
councils were to consist entirely of elected representatives
probably all elected at the same time. The poor law was
included, probably on the same basis as in Dilke's bill.
Rates were divided between owners and occupiers, and the
system of assigned revenues was preserved.
To this core was added provision for parish government.
28Chamberlain's local government bill has been lost.
It was never submitted to the Cabinet, and there is no copy
of it in the Public Record Office, or in the Chamberlain or
Dilke papers. However, it can be largely reconstructed from
the following sources. Joseph Chamberlain, A Political Mem-
oir, -1880-1892 , ed. C. H. D. Howard, (London: Batchwood
Press, 19!?p;, p. 195. Sir Charles Dilke's Memoir, Dilke
Papers, Add. Mss. ^^W, ff. 125-26. The London Daily News
,
March 15, 1886, p. 4. Sir Charles Dilke at Halifax, Octo-
ber 13, 1885, The Times , October 14, 1885, p. 7. Sir Charle
Dilke to the Thirteenth Annual Poor Law Conference, Decem-
ber 9, 1885, Manchester Guardian , December 10, 1885, p. 6.
Collings 's bill for allotments and smallholdings. Great
Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1886
(Sess. I), 1:17-42. Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles Dilke
February 25, 1886, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. 45888, f. 22.
Joseph Chamberlain, "Alliance Dept. March 5/86", Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 6/5/5/5- Dawson Burns to Joseph Chamberlain
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as outlined in Dilke ' s speeches of 1885. The ancient
parish Vestry was to be democratized and given corporate
status. It was given powers to appoint Overseers of the
Poor and other parish officers, supervise boards for high-
ways, baths and washhouses, and watching and lighting.
It could let and manage parochial charity lands, control
commons and recreation grounds, and lease allotments.
The allotments and small holdings provisions were taken
from Ceilings 's bill. Local authorities were given powers
to take land on purchase or lease, including compulsory
purchase. They could improve land belonging to them, sell
superfluous lands, divide land into allotments or small
holdings, sell or lease them, and make loans to smallhold-
ers for improvements.
The clauses on liquor licensing were taken from Dilke 's
bill and from the bill prepared for the Conservatives by
Arthur Balfour. The bill gave liquor licensing powers to
district councils, and provided for compensation if the
licenses were terminated. Compensation v;as to be paid out
of license fees received from the remaining licensees.
Chamberlain hoped to use his bill to provide an alter-
native to Home Rule. But, he quickly discovered the dis-
advantages of opposing the legislative program of a deter-
29̂ Ceilings 's bill defined an allotment as one acre of
arable or three acres of pasture, v;hich was to be leased
(clause 3)« A small holding v/as to be from one to forty
acres, and was to be purchased (clause 36).
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mined Prime Minister. According to Treasury regulations,
no government bill could be drafted without Thring. On
March 4, Gladstone pulled him off the local government bill
to draft the Home Rule bill. Chamberlain was too angry to
come to the House of Commons, so Dilke v/ent to his home
and "held with him an important conversation as to his
future." He could not talk Chamberlain out of his opposi-
tion to the Home Rule bill.^^
On March 15, the leading article of London's most im-
portant Liberal newspaper, the Daily News , carried a full
description of the bill. The article commented that it
v/as fortunate that the bill was in the hands of someone of
Chamberlain's experience in local government, and expressed
the hope that it could be introduced in the current session.
Chamberlain's trial balloon did not work. The only response
was a protest from Dawson Burns, London representative of
the United Kingdom Alliance over the liquor licensing pro-
visions. The Cabinet crisis over Home Rule quickly came to
a head, and on March 26, Chamberlain resigned and went into
-51
public opposition.-^
After tv;o months of maneuvering. Chamberlain, in alliance
v/ith the Conservatives and Lord Hartington's V/higs
, helped
50Sir Charles Dilke 's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss.
459^0, ff. 125-26.
51 Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism , pp. 1 30-51.
Daily News , March '15, 1886, p. 4. Dawson Jurns to Joseph
Chamberlain, March 16, 1886, Chamberlain Papers, JC 6/5/5/4.
157
to defeat the Home Rule bill on its Second Reading. Of the
ninety-three Liberals who voted against the bill, thirty-
two were Radicals.
The crisis shook Chamberlain's power to its foundations.
He was almost driven out of politics altogether. Only care-
ful maneuvering and his reputation kept him from being re-
pudiated by the Birmingham Liberal Association. The organi-
zation was held together behind Chamberlain, but Schnadhorst
and many other Birmingham Liberals supported Gladstone.
Though the organization remained formally undivided, there
v/as a real split which remained to trouble him in the future.
He lost control of the National Liberal Federation to
Schnadhorst and Gladstone. Upon call of the officers, the
General Committee of the Federation met in London on May 5.
It was attended by an unprecedented number of delegates.
James Kitson, the president, opposed Chamberlain, so William
Harris presented the officers' resolution. It declared
support for Gladstone and the Home Rule bill, but requested
that he accept Chamberlain's amendments. The strategem
was defeated, and the meeting overwhelmingly voted for an
amendment declaring the Federation's unabated confidence in
Gladstone. Six officers resigned. The power of the Bir-
mingham group over the Federation was broken, and Chamber-
Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism , p. 253*
Michael Hurst, Joseph Chanberlain and V/est Midland
Politics, 1886-1895 , Occasional i^aper or fne uu'^^^-dale bociety,
No. 1b C Oxford: Vivian Ridler, 1962), dp. 11-55^.
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Iain's organizational base shranl^ to his own city. His
loss of the National Liberal Federation destroyed his posi-
tion in the Liberal party. It was probably the most impor-
tant event in the entire contest over Home Rule.^^
iv
Chamberlain's opposition to the Home Rule bill divorced
him from most of his Radical supporters. They soon became
his bitterest enemies. After ten years as a Radical leader
and a vigorous effort to turn the Radicals into the domi-
nant faction within the Liberal party, he was driven out
of the party. V/hen the Radicals were given a clear choice
between Chamberlain's leadership and Gladstone's, they
chose Gladstone. Almost all of Chamberlain's leading Radi-
cal supporters outside of Birmingham deserted him. Even
Ceilings did not come out against Home Rule until after he
had been very badly treated by the Liberals.
Chamberlainite Radicalism v/as distinguished from Radi-
calism in general only by the fact that Chamberlain led it.
Its doctrinal peculiarities v;ere due to Chamberlain's idio-
syncrasies. From 1876 to 1886, he had no effective rivals
for the Radical leadership. Gladstone led the Radicals at
^^R. S. V/atson, The National Liberal Federation (London
T. F. Unwin, 1907), pp. ^1-57. A. T. Bassett, The Life of
the Rt. Hon. John Edv/ard Ellis, M.P. (London: Macraillan and
Company, 191^), pp. 7^-77-
^^Aronson, "Jesse Collings", pp. 103-09.
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some times, but generally he tried to preserve a position
above the Liberal factions. But, 1886 was the first time
since 1877 that Chamberlain openly and directly opposed
Gladstone on a major issue. Few Radicals cared to follow
him. His fall was the fall of Chamberlainite Radicalism.
He retained his influence in Radical circles only so long
as he actively led them, and he had little permanent im-
pact upon Radicalism.
The election of 1885 severely damaged the local basis
of Chamberlain's politics. The division of the great towns
into several constituencies destroyed their influence in
Parliament. Chamberlain could no longer assemble a coali-
tion of communities to advance his interests in national
politics. Parliamentary districts more clearly reflected
class divisions, which gave an advantage to political coa-
litions based upon class interest. Localism v/as not a
negligable force, but the politics of class made steady
headv/ay, and issues v/ere nationalized. Chamberlain was
forced to accomodate himself to the new political patterns.
Chamberlain's coalition with the Conservatives changed
his vantage point in politics. In the years after 1886,
he found that his formulations v/orked as well in a Tory
context as a Radical one. They were used to a different
purpose, for he had moved from the attack in social poli-




Joseph Chamberlain did not sit in the Cabinet acain
until 1895. For the first three years after he helped to
to defeat the Home Rule bill, he was principally concerned
with surviving as a national political leader. He faced
a difficult task. Lord Salisbury was a bitter enemy who
thought little of Chamberlain's value to the Unionist
coalition. Lord Randolph Churchill, upon whom Chamberlain
relied to secure concessions for the Radical Unionists,
suddenly fell from power at the end of 1886. An attempt
at Liberal reunion failed, and Schnadhorst tried to break
his control of Birmingham. Only slowly did he win Salis-
bury's respect and re-establish the security of his base
in Birmingham. It was not until 1889 that he could resume
his role as an important voice in national politics.
Chamberlain rapidly asserted himself as a creative
defender of the status quo. 1889 was the year of the Lon-
don dock strike. The Nev; Unionism was a stimulus to Cham-
berlain similar to that of Henry George seven years earlier.
Determined to present an alternative to class-based poli-
tics, he came forv/ard with new proposals for social legis-
lation: old age pensions, and workmen's compensation and
employers' liability. Significantly, his new proposals
did not have the localistic basis of his old ones; they
were to be administered by the state.
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In 1895, fully established in his ovm party, Chamber-
lain Joined in the Conservative attack upon the London
County Council. The Progressive party were heirs of his
own accomplishments in Birmingham. In attacking them,
Chamberlain rejected his own past. Shortly afterwards,
Chamberlain turned to Imperialism, and localism ceased
to have much importance in his career.
CHAPTER VII
THE UNIONIST COALITION
At its inception, the Unionist coalition was an un-
likely alliance. The only common ground between Salisbury's
Conservatives, Hartington's Liberal Unionists and Chamber-
lain's Radical Unionists, was a commitment to maintaining
the union between Great Britain and Ireland. That uneasy
coalition only slowly became a party. In order to maintain
their political viability, the Liberal and Radical Unionists
had to prove that they were still Liberals as well as Union-
ists. To do this, they tried to secure concessions from
the Conservative government. Salisbury and his colleagues
were disinclined to make such concessions and only slowly
saw the need for them. Eventually, there was some success,
and by 1889, Chamberlain was claiming that Salisbury v;as
implementing the unauthorized programme.
Localism entered into the consolidation of the Unionist
coalition. As always. Chamberlain Judged the rest of the
world by the state of his power base in Birmingham. That
base was not fully secure again until 1889. Only after
that did he feel fully confident in embracing Salisbury.
Localism as it related to local government reform was also
part of the process. It gave Chamberlain a series of issues
upon which he could seek concessions from the Conservatives,
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or to claim that he had won them. Through a combination of
political organization and seeking concessions, Chamberlain
thoroughly entrenched himself in the Unionist coalition.
1
Party organization v/as the foundation of Joseph Cham-
berlain's continued political power in the late 1880s and
1890s. He v;as able to become a pov/erful and respected
leader within the Unionist coalition only after he rebuilt
his political base in Birmingham. That base was in doubt
for two years after the Home Rule crisis. The Birmingham
Liberal Association did not split during the crisis, and
Chamberlain shared power with Schnadhorst, secretary of
the National Liberal Federation. There was little oppor-
tunity to appeal to the voters on the issue, and their
attitude was unknown. On a national level. Chamberlain
kept his ov^n organization, the National Radical Union,
distinct from the Liberal Unionist party, despite its for-
- mal affiliation with Lord Hartington's organization.'^
In national politics, Chamberlain was in an extremely
difficult political position. The loss of the National
Liberal Federation and his repudiation by the bulk of par-
liamentary Radicals left him with only a tenuous claim to
1 .
^ Michael Hurst, Joseph Chamberlain and V/est Midland
Politics, 1886-1893 , Occasional Paper of the Durdale Society,
iio. 1b (Oxford: Vivian Ridler, 1962), pp. ^^5-4-3".'
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be a national political leader. Lord Salisbury only toler-
ated him because Lord Hartington and Lord Randolph Church-
ill considered him important to the Unionist cause. Har-
tington needed Chamberlain to preserve his own independence
from Salisbury, while Churchill tried to use him to force
the Cabinet to accept Tory Democracy. Churchill so freely
used Chamberlain's name in the Cabinet that Salisbury took
umbrage at "his friendship for Chamberlain which made him
insist that we should accept that statesman as our guide
in internal politics." ^
Almost as soon as Chamberlain entered the Unionist
coalition, local government reform emerged as an issue
around which the terms of that alliance were to be defined.
Chamberlain preferred to postpone local government reform.
He wrote to Lord Hartington that an Irish land bill was the
best issue for the Unionists to press, in order to prove
that their Irish stand was not merely negative. But, Chur-
chill selected the issue as one he could win concessions
with. On October 7, 1886, Chamberlain left for an extended
vacation in Greece and Turkey, carrying with him Churchill's
assurances that the government's program would be acceptable
to the Radicals.-^
2Lord Salisbury to Sir Fitzjames Stephen, December 30,
1886, quoted in Lady Gwendolin Cecil, Life of Robert, Marouis
of Salisbury , ^ vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1922-
32), 3:p::^6-37.
-^Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Hartington, August
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Though many Conservatives opposed local government
reform, party leaders regarded it as inevitable, and Lord
Salisbury was pledged to it. Accordingly, C. T. Ritchie,
President of the Local Government Board, set to work on a
measure as soon as he entered office. On November 12, he
presented a memorandum outlining a bill to establish county
and district councils, with metropolitan London to be a
county. Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Irish Chief Secretary,
took exception to Ritchie's omission of special represen-
tation for landowners. He worried about the economic im-
pact of the new rating system, and about the precedents
for Ireland.
Most of the Cabinet discussion centered on a proposal,
adopted from Dilke's bill, to give administration of the
Poor Law to the district councils. Many Conservatives
agreed with Salisbury that this would be "rather like
leaving the cat in charge of the cream Jug." Churchill
held out for a comprehensive measure, along the lines of
Chamberlain's bill, but v;as isolated in the Cabinet. He
represented Chamberlain's position as the demand of all
1, 1886, September 7, 1886, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/22/
121, 123. Joseph Chamberlain, A Political Memoir, 1830-
1892 , ed. C. H. D. Howard (London: Batchwood Press, 1953),
pp. 231-33.
C. T, Ritchie, "Memorandum on Local Government",
November 12, 1886, Public Record Office, HLG 29/18/3^1-9-71.
V/inston Churchill, Lord ^ Rando lph Churchill, 2 vols. (Lon-
don; Odhams Press, 1-)ud), ^:2^^3-^p.
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Liberal Unionists. On November 25, Salisbury met with
Hartinston, only to find that the "Liberal Unionist leader
agreed with Beach's position that inclusion of the Poor
Law should entail ex-officio representation on the councils.
Hartington was mainly interested in an Irish local govern-
ment bill, citing Chamberlain's arguments in favor of giving
Irish legislation priority.^
On November 29, Salisbury informed Beach that Churchill
had agreed to a compromise. Irish local government would
be promised in the Queen's speech after English and Scottish
The initial English bill would be limited to county councils
which would contain some co-opted members. Ov/ners would
pay half the rates upon expiration of existing contracts.
The county council would share control of the police with
the Justices. Churchill's budget would make some provision
for aiding local rates. Beach agreed to the compromise,
and Hartington agreed to drop his demand for an immediate
Irish bill.^
The bill now moved rapidly. Draft election and fin-
ancial clauses were settled on December 1$: one-third of
the council members would be appointed, and the system of
assigned revenues would be implemented, though none of the
^J. P. D. Dunbabin, "The Politics of the Establishment
of County Councils", Historical Journal , 6 (1963) : 2^4-1
ibid., p. 243, Michael Hurst, Joseph Chamberlain
and the Liberal Heunion; The Round Table Conference of
"
1887 (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1 ;b'/ ) , p. 1^1.
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income tax would be diverted. Churchill set aside money
in his budget for the reform.'^
When Chamberlain returned to London on December 13,
he found the old Conservatives very obviously in charge of
the situation. In a speech on December 8, Salisbury de-
clared that "the Conservatives are as conservative as ever,"
an obvious slap at Tory Democracy. On December 15, V/alter
Long, Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board,
spoke at Melksham on the government's idea of local govern-
ment reform. The new county councils, he said, would rep-
resent "all interests connected with the land," and would
give the wealthy pov/er to prevent "wanton extravagance of
o
public money."
Chamberlain was furious. Birmingham was divided over
the government's Irish policy, and the obvious conservatism
of the contemplated local government bill made his position
even more difficult. It was publicly obvious that Chamber-
lain was having no influence on the Conservatives.
Through Churchill, he pressed for concessions on the
principle of representation in the local government bill.
Salisbury refused to implement a system without checks.
George J. Goschen, v;ho was present at the interview between
7'Draft Election Clauses, Draft Financial Clauses,
December 15, 1886, Public Record Office, IILG 29/18/765-75,
770-85. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill , 2:209-10.
gHurst , Liberal Reunion, pp. 64, 90-91
•
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Churchill and Salisbury, susgested a compromise: that
councils be fully representative but that they be limited
to a ^i-s rate. Churchill was v/illing to accept this com-
promise, but \-jhlle Chamberlain saw no objection in principle,
he thought it unlikely to carry the Cabinet. He replied
that "if this is the Bill, v/e are unable to support it,
unbelievable mischief will be done." Tory intransigence
was liable to split apart the- Unionist coalition.*^
Churchill, who had hoped to use Chamberlain to strengthen
his ovm hand, found himself caught between Chamberlain and
Salisbury. He v/as insulted when Salisbury made petty ob-
jections to his proposals to aid local rates. On December
22, he resigned over a budget dispute with the service de-
10partments
.
Lord Randolph Churchill's resignation was a bombshell.
It destroyed his career and almost led to the fall of the
government. Chamberlain concluded that "the reactionary
party in the Cabinet had gained the upper hand" and made
a speech holding out the olive branch to the Liberals.
9Memorandum sent to Chamberlain by Lord Rothschild,
December 19, 1886, and Chamberlain's note of reply. Cham-
berlain Papers, JC 6/5/5/1, 2. Goschen's proposed limi-
tation was no real barrier to local expense at the time.
Most counties did not exceed a 2s rate' until after the
First V/orld V/ar. Dunbabin, "Politics of County Councils",
HJ, p. 246, n. 97. Lord Randolph Churchill to Joseph
UHamberlain, December 19, 1886, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/
1V26.
''^Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, 2:232-34.
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They responded favorably, and he spent three months nego-
tiating v/ith Harcourt and Morley at the Round Table Con-
ference. But, Gladstone refused to give Chamberlain the
kind of concession on Home Rule which would allow him to
claim a victory and return to his former position as a
leader in the Liberal party. So, the negotiations failed.^''
Throughout 188?, Chamberlain struggled desperately to
win some concessions from somebody. In July, he denounced
the Conservatives and threatened to vote them out if they
did not give way on details of the Irish land bill then
before Parliament. Reluctantly, Salisbury made the neces-
sary concessions, admitting that "it is the price we have
to pay for the Union, and it is a heavy one." On August
26, Chamberlain and five other Birmingham M.P.s voted against
the government on a resolution to condemn the government
for its application of the Crimes Act to Ireland. V/ith
that action, Salisbury finally accepted Hartington's con-
tention that Chamberlain must be brought fully into the
Unionist coalition. On August 28, he telegraphed to the Queen
that he was nominating Chamberlain as the chief commissioner
to negotiate a new fisheries treaty with the United States.
Chamberlain left for V/ashington in late October.
11
Chamberlain, Political Memoir , pp. 233-70. Hurst,
Liberal Reunion .
12
J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain , vol. 2:
188^-1893: Disruption and Combat (London: .-lacmillan and
Company, 1^3^;, pd. 30^-07, 309-17. Dunbabin, "Politics
of County Councils", HJ , pp. 239-40.
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Chamberlain was not consulted on Ritchie's local gov-
ernment bill as it was revised repeatedly in 1887. Though
the details altered, drafting proceeded upon the basis of
the Salisbury-Churchill compromise of November 28, 1886.
The financial clauses were in danger for a few months after
Churchill's resignation, but were finally incorporated into
the bill unchanged in April. The issue of representation
was resolved by dropping the plan to divide rates between
owners and occupiers. The municipal system would be ap-
plied to the counties: one fourth of the council members
would be co-opted by their colleagues. District councils
were to be weaker than in Dilke's and Chamberlain's bills:
liquor licensing would be a county council power, and the
Poor Law was left untouched. ^ The county council's power
over the police was restricted by making the V/atch Committee
a joint committee of the county council and the Justices.
The most controversial clauses granted compensation to
liquor licensees if their licenses were withdrawn.
^'^
In Washington, with his fisheries negotiations nearing
conclusion. Chamberlain v/as anxious to find out where the
government's decisions would leave him politically. On
13 •Dilke attacked the provisions for district councils
v/hen the bill was published. He criticised the exclusion
of the Poor Law and parish government. Otherwise, the list
of powers for district councils in Ritchie's bill compares
closely with that in Dilke's.
"^^Draft Bills, Public Record Office, HLG 29/18/5/^-7-1225
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January 15, 1888, he wrote to Salisbury, expressing his
"earnest hope that the English Local Govt. Bill will prac-
tically establish in Counties the same institutions that
have worked so well in the Towns". Salisbury replied that
"we have acceded to your views on the County Govt. Bill to
a great extent", and described the bill's provisions for
representation, police, poor law, and rates. The bill
contained the minimum Chamberlain needed to claim success:
acknowledgement of the principle of representation. As Ion
as the constitution of county government was at least as
democratic as that of the borough, his political position
was viable. Re replied, "V/hat you tell me about the Local
Govt. Bill relieves me from a great anxiety. I should be
prepared to go further in the direction of local control,
but I recognize the necessity of compromise under existing
n 15circs." ^
Chamberlain gave the local government bill his full
support when it came before Parliament. Ee based his sup-
port on the fact that the bill extended the municipal sys-
tem to the counties. He criticized the omission of the
Poor Lav; and parish government, and asked that the police
provisions be amended in committee. He supported the systei
1
5
"^Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Salisbury, January 15,
1888, quoted in .Uunbabin, "Politics of County Councils",
HJ , p. 250. Lord Salisbury to Joseph Chamberlain, Febru-
ary i, 1888, Josenh Chamberlain to Lord Salisbury, Febru-
ary 16, 1888, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/1/88, 29.
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of co-opted members, pointing out that the boroughs had an
identical system. His only criticism of the institution
was semantic. He thought the name of Selected Councillors
for the co-opted members was atrocious, and suggested that
they be named aldermen, as in the boroughs. It was the
only one of his suggestions that the government adopted.
Though the Liberals made no effort to attack the bill
as a party issue, there v;as opposition to specific sections.
The bill was debated in committee through twenty-two sessions,
and the section on district councils had to be abandoned
for want of time. Chamberlain supported the government
throughout, even v;hen he came under attack from temperance
17organizations.
The bill passed with government pledges that district
and parish government v/ould be reformed in the next session,
but no bill was introduced before the Liberals returned to
office in 1892.
Chamberlain could claim that he had made the Conser-
vatives concede representative government to the counties.
But, he did not carry that point personally. Conservative
political realism did it for him. Chamberlain won it when
he won the franchise first debate. For, his position in
'^S Hansard , 52^:1353-68 (April 15, 1888).
17
'^Dav/son Burns to Joseph Chamberlain, April 17, 1888,
C. T. Ritchie to Joseoh Chamberlain, I'laj 11, 1888, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 6/5/3/7, 8.
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1878 v/as correct: once the agricultural laborer could vote
for Parliament, he could not be denied participation in
local government. The Conservatives recognized this fact
v/hen they adopted the issue in 1885. V/ith this point won,
Chamberlain could afford to lose every other point, for he
could still gain what was most essential to him.
At the time the local government bill was passing
through Parliament, Chamberlain was forced to fight for
his political life in Birmingham. Schnadhorst took ad-
vantage of his five month absence in America to seize con-
trol of the organizations where Radicals and Radical Union-
ists coexisted. On February 15, 1888, the Allotments and
Small Holdings Association deposed Jesse Ceilings from its
presidency. In March, Just as Chamberlain returned, Schnad-
horst seized control of the Birmingham Liberal Association.
xHe flooded the poorly attended v/ard meetings with his sup-
porters. They elected new ward committees and extended
their control level by level up the organizational struc-
. 18
ture.
Chamberlain quickly recovered. The local government
bill made life easier for all Liberal Unionists, and he
quickly re-established his organizational base. Chamber-
1
8
David Aronson, "Jesse Ceilings, Agrarian Radical,
1880-1S92", Ph. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, 1975, t^d. 133-3^. Hurst, 'Jest Midland Politics ,
pp. 43-^5
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Iain's supporters withdrew from the Liberal Association to
found a rival Birminghain Liberal Unionist Association. In
May, the new organization successfully supported a Conser-
vative in a municipal by-election. Simultaneously, Cham-
berlain and Ceilings launched the Rural Labourer's League
which, despite denials, was a political agency to win back
the county divisions which Ceilings had delivered to the
Liberals in 1885. John Bright 's death in March, 1889
precipitated a succession crisis to his seat in Central
Birmingham. Lord Randolph Churchill was still the official
Conservative candidate, and local Conservatives pressed
his name. Chamberlain was not prepared to allow a popular
national figure into Birmingham, where he might easily
become a rival. Churchill did not force the issue, and
the Liberal Unionist Association nominated John Albert
Bright to succeed his father. Bright 's victory over a
Liberal opponent, followed by Unionist victories in the
municipal elections, re-solidified Chamberlain's regime in
Birmingham.
'^'^
V/hile he was stabilizing his base in Birmingham, Cham-
berlain also regularized his relations v/ith Hartington and
Salisbury. In March, 1889, he changed the name of the
National Radical Union to the National Liberal Union. He
agreed with Hartington and Salisbury that, instead of
19
-^Aronson, "Jesse Ceilings", pn. 155-36. Hurst, V/est
Midland Politics, pp. 6-7, ^5-55.
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being a rival national organization to Hartington's party,
the Union would become the Liberal Unionists' regional
organization in the West Midlands. Birmingham and the
thj?ee surrounding counties sent thirty-nine representatives
to Parliament. Henceforth, all Conservative and Liberal
Unionist communications with constituency organizations in
that area would go through Chamberlain. Influence was not
control. Many local Conservatives were old enemies of
Chamberlain, and a few defied him with impunity. But,
Salisbury and Hartington consistently backed him in squabbles
with constituency organizations. Chamberlain's electoral
influence thus extended out from Birmingham in concentric
rings. In Birmingham itself, he was paramount. In the
West Midlands, he had a dominant voice, though he often
had to fight to get his way. Outside of that area, he had
influence in some constituencies, either directly or through
Collings. How many votes he could add to the Unionist total
in divisions across the country could not be calculated,
but it v/as assumed to be significant in some areas.
In his relations with the Conservatives, Chamberlain
confined his pressure to private representations, v;hile
refusing to vote them out in Parliament. He did vote against
them on a few occasions when private pressure did no good,
but his attitude was realistic. In 1892, he admitted to
^^Hurst, West Midland Politics, pp. 9, 57-72.
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Arthur Balfour that "I have to expect to be refused three
times out of four when I advocate a particular cause and
hope to succeed the fourth tirae."
'^^
Local government reform continued throughout the years
when Chamberlain was re-establishing his political position
He was not a central figure in any of the reforms, but they
afforded him an opportunity to press the Conservatives for
concessions which v/ould make it easier to sell Unionism to
his Radical followers.
The Scottish local government bill gave him one of his
greatest triumphs. The Scottish municipal system was more
liberal than its English counterpart, and this was reflec-
ted in the provisions for county government. The bill in-
cluded a provision for abolishing fees in Scottish elemen-
tary schools. Free education was never a controversial
issue in Scotland, but English Conservatives opposed it
for fear of the precedent. It was an obvious triumph for
Chamberlain, and led to the extension of free education to
English schools two years later.
By mid-1889, Chamberlain felt he had been successful
21Arthur Balfour to Lord Salisbury, July 31, 1892,
quoted in Hurst, V/est Midland Politics , p. 9.
22
Scottish Office, Memoranda as to the Local Govern-
ment (Scotland) Bill, March 15, 1889, March 29, 1889, Public
Record Office, CAB 37/23/11, 15- Garvin, Chamberlain , 2:
419. P. W. Clayden, England Under the Coalition; ':'ao Poli-
tical History of Great Ivritam and Ireland from the General




in winning concessions from the Conservatives. Such visible
marks of his influence made it much easier for the Liberal
Unionists to justify their existence to the voters. In
July, 1889, he claimed that the Conservatives were imple-
menting the unauthorized programme, after it had been mis-
understood and rejected by the Liberals. He ticked off
the points gained: local government reform, free education
for Scotland, Ceilings ' s allotments bill, and a move tov/ard
graduated taxation in Goschen's death duties. He concluded
that, "Under these circumstances, as a practical man, and
as a practical reformer, I am perfectly satisfied." He
reiterated this theme in many of his speeches. By 1891,
Salisbury was privately requesting him not to do so, as
it was embarrassing him with the Conservatives.^^
But, after 1889, local government reform was one of
Chamberlain's areas of least success. The government still
had not introduced the promised parish and district councils
bill, and the Liberals began to make an issue of it. Jesse
Ceilings, who greatly desired the bill, even attacked the
government in his newspaper, The Rural V/orld . But, the
Cabinet continued to postpone the bill session by session,
arguing that time did not permit it. The Irish local gov-
ernment bill was postponed until electoral considerations
-^Joseph Chamberlain at a dinner of the Liberal Union
Club, Greenwich, July 31, 1889, Mr. Chamberlain ' s Speeches ,
od. Charles V/. Boyd. 2 vols. (Boston: Hou.-hton Mifflin
Company, 191^), I:?©-??. Hurst, West Midland Politics ,
p. 64, n. 2.
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forced it forv;ard in 1892. It contained so many restric-
tions that the Liberals and Nationalists denounced it as
"a shabby, insolent, illusory half-measure." Only the
Liberal Unionists strongly supported it, and Chamberlain
protested the cumulative vote which protected landlords.
The bill v/as withdravm after the Second Reading.
Chamberlain was generally successful in pressuring
the Conservatives in those years, however. Free education,
the Irish Land Purchase Act of 1891, and the Small Holdings
Act of 1892, testified to his influence. Other events
strengthened his position. In December, 1891, Lord Hart-
ington's father died and Hartington was translated to the
House of Lords as Duke of Devonshire. Chamberlain succeeded
him as the Liberal Unionist leader in the House of Commons.
Three months later, W. H. Smith died, and was succeeded
as Conservative leader in the House of Commons by Arthur
Balfour, Salisbury's nephev/. Chamberlain and Balfour de-
veloped a close v/orking relationship, and Balfour was an
PSintermediary between Chamberlain and Salisbury.
24-
Aronson, "Jesse Ceilings", p. 1-4-1. Lord Salisbury
to the Queen, January 9, 1892, Public Record Office, CAB
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Studies , IS (March, 1975) : ^17-^19.
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The general election of 1892 made clear the strength
of Chamberlain's local party organization. The West Midland
counties contravened the national trend toward the Liberals.
In the first general test of his organization, Chamberlain
held all of the seats in Birmingham and produced a net gain
of tv/o seats in the surrounding counties. As a result,
he began to gain a reputation in Conservative circles as
an electoral miracle worker.
The Liberal victory in the election was based partly
on the success among the rural laborers of their demand
for parish and district councils. Once the obligatory
Home Rule bill had passed the House of Commons, Henry
Fov/ler, President of the Local Government Board, opened
the debate on his local government bill.^'^
Fowler's bill was based closely on Chamberlain's bill.
Urban and rural sanitary districts were to become the areas
for the new district councils, v/hich would absorb the powers
of all existing ad hoc authorities except the Poor Lav/.
Parishes in boroughs and urban districts v/ould be abolished.
Those in rural districts v;ere to be governed by a parish
council if they had over eight hundred inhabitants, and by a
parish meeting if they v;ere smaller. The election of Poor
^^Hurst, V/est F^idland Politics , p.
27
'^Aronson, "Jesse Ceilings", p. 169-
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Law Guardians was to be popularized, and where boundaries
were coterminous, the district councillors were to be the
po
Guardians.
Chamberlain took no general stand on the bill. It was
impossible for him to oppose a bill which was so close to
his ovm, and which the Liberal Unionists had demanded for
many years. But, the Conservatives were incensed over the
provision to transfer control of parochial charities to the
parish councils, and many of them opposed the reform root
and branch. On the other side, many Liberals such as Dilke
considered the bill poorly drafted. They were responsible
for over one-third of the fourteen hundred amendments civen
notice of. Dilke proposed to Chamberlain that they cooper-
ate to strengthen the bill.^*^
In debate. Chamberlain objected to being listed among
the bill's opponents, but he supported the Conservative
attack on the parochial charities clause. He also suppor-
ted a Conservative amendment to retain ex-officio repre-
sentation on Boards of Guardians. But, he opposed his own
party on allotments, fully supporting Fowler's position
that fair compensation should be given for compulsory pur-
chase, and no more. He did some partisan quibbling on
^^H. H. Fowler, "Parish Councils Bill", March 14, 1893,
Public Record Office, CAB $7/53/27.
29
^Sir Charles Dilke to Joseph Chamberlain, November,
1893, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/2V93.
182
technicalities. He intervened on other issues to support
Dilke, but for the most part, his contributions were narrow,
technical, idiosyncratic and inconsistent.^^
Chamberlain made his chief contribution to the local
government bill behind the scenes when it ran into trouble
in the House of Lords. As the bill left Commons, Chamber-
lain advised Salisbury that the Lords "should deal tenderly
with the Parish Councils Bill", because of the explosive
electoral implications if they gave the Liberals an excuse
to withdraw it. The Lords mutilated the bill anyway. Con-
vinced that Salisbury v/as embarking on a dangerous course,
Chamberlain and Devonshire pressured him to moderate his
position. In two issues of The Rural V/orld , Ceilings pub-
licly warned the Lords not to oppose the allotments clauses.
At a meeting on February 12, the Liberal Unionist, leaders
v;arned Salisbury that they could not support the Lords'
action. Chamberlain opened negotiations with Fowler in an
effort to keep the bill alive. In concert with Fowler,
Chamberlain helped shepherd the bill through, as it travel-
led back and forth between the Houses three times. At one
^'^^ Hansard
, 19:150-51 (November 30, 1895); 281-87
(December 1 , 1893) ; 502-0^ (December 5, 1893); 58G-90 (Decem-
ber 6, 1893); 67^-76, 682-83, 739-^3 (December 7, 1893);
862, 888-9^ (December 8, 1893). ^ Hansard , 20:278-81, 307-
08 (December 27, 1893). ^ Hansard , 21; 5^^8-58 (February
15, 189^); 639-^1 (February 16, 189^) ; 7^^5-^6, 773-76 (Feb-
ruary 19, 189^); 1075-76, 1096-97 (February 26, 189^0.
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point he bluntly warned the Conservatives of the electoral
consequences of opposing the allotments clauses. On March
5, the bill finally became law.^'^
iv
The Local Government Act of 189^ ended the issue of
rural local government reform for both Chamberlain and the
country. Though the parish councils disappointed Radicals,
there was no further general reform of English local gov-
ernment until 1929. Only the government of London was an
outstanding issue. The establishment of the London County
Council in 1888 left the constitution of the metropolitan
vestries untouched, and the Act of 1894 made only minor
changes in them. All parties agreed that further reform
was necessary, and Chamberlain challenged the Liberal gov-
ernment to pursue it. The issue was surrounded by political
and economic considerations, v;hich brought Chamberlain for-
ward as a leading opponent of the London County Council
v;ithin a few months of his success on the local government
bill.
52
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CHAPTER VIII
"THE TRUE SPHERE OF MUNICIPAL ACTIVITY IS LIMITED"
By 1889, Joseph Chamberlain's political situation
had stabilized sufficiently for him to attend to social
politics again. Though his position as a national leader
was secure, he was still searching for a new role in
British politics. He was valued for his appeal to working-
class voters, but there was no room for a Radical of his
type in the Unionist coalition. He was forced to redefine
his positions on a number of issues. The growth of English
socialism and of trade unions in the late 1880s polarized
English politics in a new way. Representatives of the
propertied classes v/ere concerned about the threat of
collectivism—a vague term designating ideologies and
political programs which promised to use government power
(national or municipal) to redistribute wealth. From an
advanced Radical who flirted with the label of socialist,'^
Chamberlain became a vociferous critic of socialism, es-
pecially as it was applied to municipal government. In
this action, he refused to recognize his own children, for
the Fabians and London Progressives drew much of their in-
1
Joseph Chamberlain at Sheffield, September 25, 1875,
Birmingham Daily Post , September 26, 1875, P« 6»
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spiration and program from Chamberlain's term as Mayor of
Birmingham. He leaned heavily on his reputation as a muni-
cipal reformer in the early 1890s, to criticize socialism
and advance the Unionist cause. Before he abandoned the
local government issue in 1895, he had set his face against
contem.porary municipal reform, and with it much of his
localism.
1
The alienation of labor from the Liberal party, which
Chamberlain had tried to prevent in the early 1880s, was
accelerated by the Home Rule crisis. To many English
working class leaders, the Home Rule issue was simply a
diversion of Liberal energies away from legislation they
considered vital. The advocates of working class represen-
tation in Parliament began to couple their cause with a
demand that such representatives be independent of the
existing parties. An independent Labour party needed par-
ticipation of the trades unions, because working class
representatives could not afford to pay for campaigning
and could not support themselves while sitting in Parlia-
ment.
The growth of political awareness in the unions v;as
closely associated with a more militant attitude tov/ard
labor negotiations. It was also promoted by the rise of
English socialism, though it had broader roots. These
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new attitudes, with their implications of one generation
of leaders succeeding another, were called the New Union-
ism,
In 1887, the new movement began to surface. At the
Trades Union Congress that autumn, J. Keir Hardie, the
Scottish labor leader, attacked^Henry Broadhurst, M.P.,
the chairman of the T. U. C.'s Parliamentary Committee.
Broadhurst fought off the attack, but not all of his sup-
porters were against the New Unionism. In 1888, Hardie
refused an offer from Schnadhorst of a Liberal candidature
in order to stand as an independent Labour candidate.^
The New Unionism became a public issue very suddenly
in August, 1889 during the London dock strike. The strikers
drew widespread popular support, and sparked an epidemic
of trade union organizing. The movement spread rapidly
in a period of relative prosperity, and the unions showed
new militancy until the onset of depression in 1893.
Socialists dominated the organizing effort, though they
did not push socialist programs for fear of alienating
non-socialist workers.^ .
A. E. P. Duffy, "New Unionism in Britain, 1889-1890:
A Reappraisal", Economic History Review , 2nd. series, 14
(December, 1961 ); 306-19.
"^Henry Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-
1900, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963) , pp. 62-
69, 78-98. Paul Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour:
The Struggle for London, 18F33-1 91 '^i (London: Houtledge and
Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 4-3-61.
187
The Nev; Unionism faced Chamberlain with the threat
that an independent Labour party would destroy the basis
of his politics by reinforcing the politics of class. It
also gave hira an opportunity to play on the alienation of
labor leaders from the Liberal Associations.
He experimented with a new approach toward Labour in
an article published in an American journal in May, 1891.
The article bore the title, "Favorable Aspects of State
Socialism". Chamberlain started from the argument that
the industrial revolution had impoverished the working
class, but he strongly emphasised the rise in working class
living standards since 1840. This improvement, he held,
was due to socialistic legislation, such as the Factory
Acts, the Allotments Act, the Education Act, and the Poor
Law. Much remained to be accomplished, he admitted, but
it could be done if politicians would continue a policy
which has been sho\m to afford practical results." ^
Chamberlain presented his complete political program
to an English audience in "The Labour Question", published
in the Nineteenth Century in November, 1892. The article
surveyed the congeries of groups professing to speak for
labor. Two of them, the Manchester School and the old
trade unionists, had been superseded. Two more, the Marxists
Joseph Chamberlain, "Favorable Aspects of State So-
cialism", North American Review, 152 (May, 1891 ) : 53^-'4-8.
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and the Anarchists, were not a political force in Britain.
He concentrated most of his fire on the fifth group, the
new unionists. He found them intolerant and their political
program a definite threat, however moderate their immediate
demands. Noting the new unionists' factionalism and petty
Jealousies, he questioned the movement's staying power in
the growing depression. Its principal legacy, he felt,
would be to stimulate further organization among the em-
ployers. The sixth group, the state or municipal socialists,
overlapped most of the other categories. State socialism
(in v/hich he included municipal socialism) could not be
rejected completely. "Its proposals must be examined sepa-
rately on their merits, and with due regard to the circum-
stances of the time." ^
Having assigned himself the position of choosing among
labor's demands. Chamberlain then assumed his most judicial
mien for the examination. Some proposals, such as paying
Members of Parliament and amendif^g the law of conspiracy,
he rejected. To others, principally the eight hour day,
he offered the type of intricate compromise between labor
and the Tories that only a Liberal Unionist could like.
He treated municipal socialism cautiously, endorsing its
aims, but v/arning of his objections to the London County
Council's labor policy.^
^Joseph Chamberlain, "The Labour Question", Nineteenth
Century




Chamberlain's positive proposals in "The Labour Ques-
tion" focused on two schemes: employers' liability and old
age pensions. For the former, he outlined the approach
v/hich v/as to be his last major accomplishment in social
n
legislation.^ He suggested that the principle of liability
which underlay the present law (which he had written v;hile
President of the Board of Trade), be abandoned in favor of
the German system. Compensation would be given automatic-
ally for every employment-related injury. It would be
paid for by contributions from both capital and labor.
^
The clarity of this scheme, which employers were wil-
ling to accept, contrasted with the half-measures he sug-
gested for old age pensions. Any scheme must be voluntary,
he insisted, and must be confined to persons in receipt
of regular v;ages. Pensions would start at age sixty-five,
and would carry no stigma of pauperism. The state might
contribute some money to encourage v/orkers to Join the plan
early in their adult life.^
7
His principles were embodied in the V/orkmens ' Com-
pensation Act of 1897? which he piloted through the House
of Commons,
^Chamberlain, "The Labour Question", Nineteenth Cen-
tury , pp. 695-98.
^ibid., pp. 698-702. Chamberlain was forced to moder-
ate his support for old age pensions because of opposition
from the Friendly Societies. Joseph Chamberlain, "Old Age
Pensions and Friendly Societies", National Review , 2^
(January, 1895) : 592-61 5. The power of these hostile vested
interests probably explains v/hy Chamberlain consigned old
age pensions to the indefinite future, while moving reason-
ably quickly to pass employers' liability.
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His program, Chamberlain admitted, v/as not final or
complete. However, the Liberals v/ere committed to Home
Rule and political reforms, and would have no time to legis-
late for labor. The working class, he argued, must look
to the Tories, v/ho had a history of passing social legis-
lation.
In the 1890s, Chamberlain's social politics had a new
national ring. Old age pensions and employers' liability
were to be administered by the central government. His
politics were still the politics of community. The local
community was no longer strong enough to hold the balance
against the politics of class, so now he promoted the
national community. Chamberlain's social politics of the
early 1890s were therefore a step away from localism and
a step toward Imperialism.
He took more direct action to turn his back on localism.
In 1895, he Joined the Conservative attack on the London
County Council.
11
The leaders of the London County Council in the 1890s
v/ere Chamberlain's heirs in many ways. They agreed with
his distinctive contribution to English municipal reform:
that a reforming party must maintain itself in power through
10




political organization. Party politics dominated the Lon-
don County Council from the first. The reformers called
themselves the Progressive party, uniting a predominant
Liberal element with Radicals and socialists who avoided
the Liberal label. They polarized the Council at the out-
set by electing eighteen of nineteen aldermen from their
own supporters. The minority assumed the title of the
Moderate party, though it did not fully organize until
1894.^'^
Chamberlain did not condemn the party structure of
the London County Council. Initially, he made no objection
to the Progressive party. They wished to elect Sir Charles
Dilke as one of their Aldermen, and Chamberlain pressed
him to take the post. Even after he soured on the Pro-
gressives, he defended party organization in local govern-
ment^ In 1898, he still urged the Moderates to "Make it
a party fight, gentlemen", though they should take care
that "when the elections are over that party questions are





Sir Gv;ilym Gibbon and Reginald Bell, The History of
the London County Council, 1889-1939 (London: Macraillan
and Company, 1939) i PP. 83-86. Thompson, Socialists, Lib-
erals and Labour
, pp. 77-8'^ •
12
Sir Charles Dilke to Joseph Chamberlain, September
27, 1888, October 3, 1838, Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Charles
Dilke, September 30, 1888, October 3, 1888, Dilke Papers,
Add. Mss. ^3888, ff. 1^2, 1^7-^8, 144-^}-5, 1^9. Sir Charles
Dilke 's Memoir, Dilke Papers, Add. Mss. ^39^^-1, ff. 98-100.
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Chamberlain influenced the Progressives' program both
directly and through the Fabian Socialists. Most council-
men, whether Progressive or Moderate, agreed that London
must catch up the fifty years lead which the provincial
towns had in municipal services. Birmingham, with its
much publicized accomplishments, was a convenient standard
of comparison.
Chamberlain was at the height of his reputation as a
municipal reformer in the early 1890s. After a long, dif-
ficult passage, the Improvement Scheme finally showed a
profit in 1891, removing a lingering cloud over his repu-
tation as Mayor. There was a general growth of interest
in municipal reform on both sides of the Atlantic, in part
stimulated by the Progressives. Birmingham and Chamberlain
received a good deal of favorable attention as a result.
In June, 1890, one American magazine published an article
on Birmingham since Chamberlain, entitled "The Best-Governed
City in the World." Chamberlain fostered his reputation,
and published an article on "Municipal Institutions in
America and England" in an American Journal. As usual,
1
he held up Birmingham as the standard for other cities. ^
Joseph Chamberlain, "Municipal Institutions in America and
England", The Forum (Philadelphia), 1^ (November, 1892):
276. Joseph Chamberlain, "Municipal Government—Past,
Present and Future", The New Review , 10 (June, 189^0:654-.
Gibbon and Bell, London County Council , p. 595.
15^Julian Ralph, "The Best-Governed City in the World",
Harper's Monthly Mar-azine , 81 (June, 1890) :99-111 . Chamber-
lain, "i-iunicipal Insritutions" , The Forum, pp. 267-81.
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Chamberlain's example also impressed some socialists,
who were interested in its potential as a road to broader
socialism. In 188?, Sidney V/ebb of the Fabian Society
half-humorously described the unconscious socialism of the
typical municipal reformer. He pictured the individualist
city councillor in a world of municipal streets, municipal
gas and v/ater supplies, municipal markets, municipal parks,
municipal tramways, municipal reading rooms, and municipal
art galleries, museums and libraries, yet asserting, "Self-
help, sir, individual self-help, that's what made our city
what it is."
'^^
The death of J. F. B. Firth in 1889 left a vacuum
in policy formulation for the Progressive party which V/ebb
slowly came to fill. In 1891, he published The London
Programme , a series of eight Fabian Tracts. Much of the
program was straight from Chamberlain: municipal control
of the police, water, electricity, transport and the markets
Even Webb's calls for equalization of rates, and taxation
of the unearned increment on land values, echoed some of
Chamberlain's platform oratory of 1883 and 1885.
However, V/ebb went beyond Chamberlain. He provoked
Chamberlain's violent disagreement with his recommendations
for the Council's labor policy. His program recommended
an eight hour day and a six day week for all public employee
Sidney V/ebb, Socialism in England
,
(Baltimore: Ameri-
can Economic Association , 1889 ) p. bi?.
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prohibition of overtime work except in emergencies, full
liberty to unionize, direct employment of labor by the
Council whenever possible, and a fair wages clause in all
contracts that could not be avoided. For the 1892 muni-
cipal elections, the London Liberal and Radical Union
adopted "The London (Progressive) Platform". It followed
closely upon Webb's recommendations.'^^
This Fabian influence upon the Progressive party
alarmed Chamberlain and his Conservative allies. When the
Liberal government empowered a Royal Commission to consider
the amalgamation of the City and County of London, the
Conservatives came to the City's defense, resisting the
aggrandizement of a body which v;as firmly controlled by
the enemy. Chamberlain had long favored decentralization
of the government of the Metropolis, and the Conservatives
adopted his scheme. When the Royal Commission reported
in favor of a unitary municipality for the Metropolis in
189^, the Conservatives opened a full-scale attack upon
the London Progresssives . Chamberlain was one of the
leaders of the attack.
As late as February, 189^, Chamberlain still expressed
no strong animosity toward the Progressives. In his article
15
-^Sidnev Webb, The London Programme (London: S. Sonnen-
schein, 1891). A. M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and Enr':ligh
Politics, 1884-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962), pp. 191-98. The London (Progressive) Platform is
Quoted in Albert Shav/, Municipal Government in Great Britain
(N.Y.: The Century Company, 189i?), PP. ;^49-b^.
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on "Municipal Institutions in America and England", he
warned that the London County Council's labor policy "may
easily be carried too far", leading to the type of corrup-
tion prevalent in American cities. However, he concluded
that at present no damage had been done. He also raised
the question of L. C. C. policy during debate on the local
government bill. He spoke of the Council with respect,
arguing that it "has made mistakes, as has every great
Municipal or Local Authority, but I believe as it gains
experience its mistakes will be fewer". He did wish,
however, that the metropolitan boroughs had been reformed
before the creation of the county council.
In June, 189^, Chamberlain opened his attack on the
London County Council with an article in The New Review
entitled "Municipal Government—Past, Present and Future".
In the article, Chamberlain leaned heavily on his reputa-
tion as a municipal reformer. After a brief historical
survey of English municipal government and a description
of its powers, he laid down the true principles of muni-
cipal enterprise. He noted that corruption in American
municipal government showed that democracy alone will not
avert abuses. The cause of American corruption, he asserted,
was in the spoils system and consequent lax supervision
'^^Chamberlain, "Municipal Institutions", The Forum ,
p. 279. ^ Hansard , 21:820-21 (February 19, 18^7^
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of city administration by the Council. Municipal govern-
ment had limits beyond which it did not function v;ell. One
limit was size—no more than half a million people should
be governed from one center. In the area of enterprise,
"The true sphere of municipal activity is limited to those
things which the community can do better than the individ-
ual." Public bodies should not compete with private enter-
prise, and public employment should be no more remunerative
than private emplo;}niient
:
Certainly the public when it becomes an employer of
labour, ought to act at least as generously towards
its workpeople as the most liberal of private firms,
but if it goes one inch beyond this, it is entering
the downward path which has conducted so many Ameri-
can municipalities to their ruin; it is establishing
at the cost of all ratepayers, and of the great mass
of the working people themselves, a new class of
privileged workmen, enjoying special advantages
over their less fortunate fellows.
Such -a policy, he said, was inconsistent with the full
1
7
development of municipal energy. '
In November, 189^, Lord Salisbury ejcpanded the Con-
servative attack on the L. C. C. to a full-scale political
battle. He offered the support of the Conservative party
to the Moderates. The Moderate party was reorganized under
the name of the London Municipal Society, its constituency
organization was expanded, and national political figures
were enlisted to run for the Council. The election cam-
1
7
^Chamberlain, "Municipal Government", New Review ,
pp. 658-60.
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paign of February and March, 1895 v^^as hotly contested. In
early February, Chamberlain spoke at Edinburgh Castle Hall,
Stepney, making his most vitriolic attack on the Council.
Its labor policy, he charged, was "creating a privileged
body of employes " . It was the beginning of the process
which led to Tammany Hall in America. Their policy, if
pursued, would undermine the efficiency of local government
and mal^e it impossible to carry on. He attacked the Coun-
cil's policy of building working class housing. His al-
ternative was to empower the metropolitan vestries to
demolish buildings through improvement schemes, and then
leave rebuilding to private contractors. The root of the
problem, he argued, v;as the L. C. C.'s grasp for power,
so the vestries must be turned into metropolitan boroughs
'1 P,to produce a balance of power in the metropolis.
.The Conservative attack on the Progressives was partly
successful. Moderates and Progressives elected
equal numbers of councillors, though the Progressive majority
among the aldermen allowed them to keep control. The re-
sult v/as virtual paralysis of Progressive aims for three
years. Further intervention by the Conservatives in the
municipal elections of 1898 was unavailing, as the Progres-
sives won a solid victory. In the short run, however, the
1 ft
London Hunicipal Life; A Speech by the Rt. Hon.
Joseph TTnamberlain , 1-. . P. , I'ebruary 6, 18'j!? (London: London
Municipal Society, 1895).
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London election allowed the Unionists to rehearse for their
victory in the Parliamentary elections three months later.
National politics had begun to invade local politics in
19a major way, ^
His role in the Conservative attack cost Chamberlain
his reputation as a municipal reformer. Frederick Dolman,
a London Progressive, expressed a common view in an article
on "Mr. Chamberlain's Municipal Career", in the Portninhtly
Review for June, 1895. The article was a reasonably ob-
jective account of Chamberlain's career in the Birmingham
Town Council and as Mayor. It noted the close relationship
between party organization and municipal accomplishments
in Birmingham during the 1870s. Without referring to
current events, the article painted a picture of the
parallels between the policy Chamberlain carried out in
Birmingham in 1875 and the policy he attacked in London
in 1895. The closing paragraph made the contrast explicit:
But many v;ho were then his helpers and supporters
cannot but feel keen regret that, having led the
battle of municipal progress in Birmingham, Mr.
Chamberlain should have thrown in his lot v;ith
the forces of reaction in London. They remember
what he must have forgotten when accusing the
London County Council of "ambition"—that on his
own confession he was always inclined "to magni-
fy his office as councillor and mayor of Birming-
ham." . . . They remember v/hat Mr. Chamberlain
must have forgotten, when he joined company with
those who never tire of cheap sneers at the Lon-
^Gibbon and Bell, London County Council , pp. 95-97.
Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour , p. 81.
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don County Council—that on one historic occasionin Birmingham he declared that "municipal insti-tutions represent the authority of the peopleAny disrespect shown to us, any ridicule unduly
cast upon our functions, strikes through us at
the constituency itself and lowers our authority
and our power of public usefulness
Dolman pinpointed the essence of Chamberlain's shift to
the forces of reaction. Chamberlain did not repudiate
any program, idea or accomplishment of his period as Mayor
of Birmingham. But, he refused absolutely to go beyond
what he had done twenty years earlier. In taking his
stand, he repudiated the spirit of his own accomplishments:
the use of municipal institutions to solve the problems
of the day. Dolman did not have to read Chamberlain out




The attack on the London County Council marked the
end of Joseph Chamberlain's close association with localism
In Joining that attack, Chamberlain was on the side of
nationalism against localism. The L. C. C. election of
1895 v/as more than a rehersal for the coming general elec-
tion. It brought the power of one of the major national
parties to bear to block the program of a local government.
20
Frederick Dolman, "Mr. Chamberlain's Municipal
Career", Fortnightly Review , N.S. 57 (June, 1895) : 90^^-12
,
quote from p. 912.
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The Tory attitude in 1895 was very different from Conser-
vative policy V7hen Chamberlain was Mayor of Birminchara.
Richard Cross, the Home Secretary, had consulted with
Chamberlain on the Arti.sans' Dwellings Act of 1875. The
Tory Parliament had passed his gas and water bills. George
Sclater-Booth, the President of the Local Government Board,
had been so helpful in circumventing legal difficulties
for the Improvement Scheme that Chamberlain wrote to
Ceilings, "Hooray for the Tories!" '^^ Now, municipal re-
form was municipal socialism and it was considered a threat
to the middle class. Chamberlain's action showed the
extent to which he had become a defender of the established
order.
21
•Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Ceilings, April 10, 1876,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/51.
CONCLUSION
Joseph Chamberlain was the first Englishman to become
famous as a municipal reformer. Before him, there was no
distinctive reform philosophy in municipal government. In
Birmingham itself, the program of Dawson and Dale consis-
ted mainly in changing the membership of the Town Council.
Beyond a general application of business efficiency and
good will to municipal administration, they had few specif
i
suggestions. Chamberlain did not originate the program he
implemented. Every one of his reforms had been carried
out somewhere else before he became Mayor. What he did
was to assemble them into a program, encourage others to
add to it, publicize it extensively, and see that it had
party backing at the polls.
Chamberlain's singular contribution to local politics
was the degree to which he integrated party politics and
municipal reform. V/hile Mayor, he actively recruited
talented businessmen and professionals for the Council,
and then used the party machine to get them elected. This
same machine elected parliamentary candidates, so he used
it as a component in a coalition aiming at national power.
This is the reason localism has such a broad meaning in a
study of Chamberlain. In Birmingham politics, local govern
ment and local party organization were inseparable. He
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assumed that it could be the same elsewhere.
Birmingham was Chamberlain's political base from 1873
until he died, and he handed it on to his sons. Had he
been any less firmly supported, he could not have survived
the Home Rule crisis. In Birmingham, his power rested on
localism of the strongest kind. Chamberlain and his friends
retained control of the town through their social and eco-
nomic power, not through organization. The hostile critic
who v/rote "The Local V/orkings of the Birmingham Caucus"
in 1885 recognized that fact, and Schnadhorst learned it,
to his grief, in 188?. Schnadhorst won the struggle for
control of the Birmingham Liberal Association, but he in-
herited an empty shell. Chamberlain promptly formed a new
organization and beat him at the polls. V/hat counted were
the people and their ties to each other, not organization.
Organization only made those relationships more effective.
Chamberlain's contributions to party organization
had a deleterious effect on localism. The National Liberal
Federation was never a true coalition of local elites. In
the years after they unseated Chamberlain, the party leaders
of other towns found that the Federation could be used as
a mechanism for imposing national priorities on them. They
generally retained control of their own localities, but
their collective function was to support party policy and
not create it.
Party organization reduced the scope of the Member of
20$
Parliament. As national party cohesion increased, the
general election became a referendum on who was to govern.
The local candidate was often judged more upon his party
label than his own abilities. Candidates were often out-
siders to the district, recommended to the local Associa-
tion by the party's central office. Less tied to their
localities, their dependence upon party organization in-
creased. By the turn of the century, party organization
was fully in command.
During the time that Chamberlain was a Radical, local-
ism was a via media for him. With the exception of dis-
establishment, every item in the Radical Programme was
mediated through, or had implications for, local government.
Localism was a saf.erty control mechanism in his social
politics in the 1880s. No matter how radical-sounding
his proposals were, they were to be administered by local
business elites upon the correct principles of honesty and
efficiency.
His conversion to Unionism involved the loss of this
via media . The Conservatives implemented Chamberlain's
proposals because they saw that they were no threat to the
existing order. Though he transferred his allegiance
quickly in a crisis, Chamberlain was slow to come to terms
with his new position. Only after 1889 did he again re-
spond to political forces other than those directly involved
with his ovm political survival. He did so in a manner
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that reflected the political and social alignments of the
1890s. Every proposal took him away from localism. Only
his ties to his ov/n locality remained. After 1839, he
rejected localism as a political philosophy.
Chamberlain's rejection of localism reflected a larger
social process that was creating greater national cohesion
in Britain. As a consequence of this cohesion, localism
was a declining' force in the 1890s.' A national society,
centered on the capital, began to supersede a looser so-
ciety in which London was the most important center, but
was supplemented by large provincial towns with their own
political, social, and cultural pretensions and influence.
An important element of the growing national cohesion
in Britain was a polarization of politics along the lines
between nation-wide classes. The wealthy and important
inhabitants of the towns v/ere absorbed into a new national
elite. Their numbers grew in the House of Commons, they
were admitted into the peerage, they rubbed shoulders with
dulces ±n the business world, and they sent their sons to
Eton and Harrow. Traditional differences between aristo-
cratic "ins" and bourgeois "outs" faded. Differences over
religion v/ere buried, and many middle class leaders lost
their enthusiasm for reform and democracy. They differed
little in their resistance to the pretensions of Labour.
The economic dimension of politics also came to center
on London. Rather than pressure individual M.P.s, most
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businesses found it more convenient to open a lobbying
office in London, or to join an organization which had one.
That way, they could bring direct pressure to bear upon
the ministry and the departments of state. Even local
governments fell into this pattern. The Municipal Corpor-
ations Association was formed in 1873 to oppose unfavorable
legislation. County councils, urban district councils,
rural district councils, and parish councils each formed
their own associations soon after the councils themselves
came into existence. Government draftsmen found it con-
venient to consult these representative associations before
a bill was presented to Parliament, rather than be forced
to alter it later.
Growing national cohesion paralleled a decline in the
influence of the great provincial towns. In part, the
new national forces produced the decline. Men of Chamber-
lain's generation and before found it impossible to enter
national politics. They were thus forced to content them-
selves with local affairs. If an ambitious citizen could
not add M.P. to his name, he might at least be able to
acquire a J. P. By the 1890s, the barriers had been lowered.
This had the effect of systematically looting town politics
of many of their best men.
A second cause of decline was the growth in the size
of the towns themselves. Chamberlain's observations about
the maximum size for a viable local community were correct.
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Above a population of half a million, the provincial towns
began to lose their social cohesion. The middle class
moved to the suburbs and no longer came into intimate con-
tact with tradesmen or members of the workin,^ class. They
did not run for municipal office and interested themselves
little in the affairs of their city. Even the extension
of the city boundary to include them did not make them in-
terested, for their reasons for non-participation were
social rather than political. Beatrice Webb noted the
effect of their withdrawal while doing her local government
study at the turn of the century. She heard that the old
generation of businessmen councillors were dying off and
not being replaced by men like themselves. There were
constant complaints of a decline in the ability of council-
lors.
V/ealthy businessmen had been a reforming force in
municipal politics in the nineteenth century. Chamberlain
had only been the most spectacular of many reformers. By
1900, most of the businessmen had withdrawn. V/hore they
stayed, they usually joined the party of resistance. The
v/orking class was to be the creative force in local poli-
tics in the twentieth century. They did not have a majority
on any town councils until after the First V/orld War, but
they entered into reform coalitions from the 1890s. Their
model was the London Progressive party and not Chamberlain.
The London Progressives applied Chamberlain's method of
20?
political orsanization of municipal politics, but to dif-
ferent ends. In so doing, they generated a rival model
of municipal reform. For a time, the two coexisted. Leeds
went through a period of Chamberlainite reform in the 1890s,
at the same time the Progressives v/ere generating their
program. But, the future belonged to the Progressives.
Municipal reform and localism are a different thing
in twentieth century England than they were in the late
nineteenth century. When he turned his back on them, Cham-
berlain repudiated some of his ov/n past.- The years from
1886 to 1895 were the period in which Chamberlain changed
from a Radical to an Imperialist. As his Radicalism faded,
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B. Printed Sources
1. Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc.
Hundreds of General and Local Acts applied to local
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government during the time Joseph Chamberlain was connectedwith It. The more important General Acts are listed here.
Vestries Act, 1818 fStur.g^es Bourne's Act^. 58 Georre 5
ch. 69. ~~"
Poor Relief Act, 1_819. 59 George 5, ch. 12.
Vestries Act , 1.319. 59 George $, ch. 85.
Lighting and V/atching Act, 1835 . 3 & ^ William ^, ch. 90.
Poor Law Amendment Act, 133^ . 4 & 5 William 4, ch. 76.
Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 . 5 & 6 William 4-, ch. 76.
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. 8 & 9 Victoria
ch. 18. '
Baths and Washhouses Act, 1846 . 9 & 10 Victoria, ch. 74.
Markets and Fairs Clauses A ct, 1847. 10 & 11 Victoria,
ch. 14.
'
Gasv/orks Clauses Consolidation Act, 1847. 10 & 11 Victoria
ch. 15.
Incorporation of P^jblic Commissioners Clauses Act, 1847.
10 & 11 Victoria, ch. 16.
V/aterworks Clauses Consolidation Act, 1847 . 10 & 11 Vic-
toria, ch. I7.
Tovms Improvement Clauses Act , 1847. 10 & 11 Victoria,
ch. 34.
Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 . 10 & 11 Victoria, ch. 89.
Public Health Act, 1848 . 11 & 12 Victoria, ch. 63.
Small Tenements Rating Act, 1850 . 13 & 14 Victoria, ch. 99.
Metropolis Management Act, 1855 . 18 & 19 Victoria, ch. 120.
County and Borough Police Act, 1856 . 19 & 20 Victoria,
ch. 69
.
Municipal Cornorations Act, 1857 . 20 & 21 Victoria, ch. 50.
Public Health Act, 1858 . 21 & 22 Victoria, ch. 97.
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Local Government Act, 18S8. 21 & 22 Victoria, ch. 98.
Municipal Corporation Hortp:a.-:es Act, 1860 . 25 & 2^ Victoria
ch. lb. " '
Public Improvenient Act, 1860 . 23 & 2^ Victoria, ch. 30.
Local Government Amendment Act, 1861 . 2^ & 25 Victoria
ch. 61. '
Hip:hv7ays Act, 1862 . 25 & 26 Victoria, ch. 61.
Sev/a-e Utilization Act, 1865 . 28 & 29 Victoria, ch. 75.
Sanitary Act, 1866 . 29 & 30 Victoria, ch. 90
Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellin.TS Act, 1868 (Torrens' Act).
31 & 32 Victoria, ch. I30.
Assessed Rates Act, 1869 . 32 & 35 Victoria, ch. .
Municipal Franchise Act, 1869 . 32 & 33 Victoria, ch. 55
Sanitary Loans Act, 1869 . 32 & 33 Victoria, ch. 100.
Elementary Education Act, 1370 . 35 & 5^ Victoria, ch. 75.
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